Bewyse vir 'n beroep op die goddelike as 'n manier om gedrag te beïnvloed

Bewyse vir 'n beroep op die goddelike as 'n manier om gedrag te beïnvloed


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Om die goddelike aan te spreek, is 'n maklike manier om die subjektiewe, objektiewe te maak.

Byvoorbeeld:

Persoon A: U moet nooit egbreuk pleeg nie.
Persoon B: Maar egbreuk is vir my heeltemal aanvaarbaar. Dit is net jou mening.
Persoon A: Nee. God sê vir ons dat dit verkeerd is.
Persoon B: Ag. OK.

Is daar bewyse dat die elite van enige vroeë beskawing godsdiens subversief gekoöpteer het as 'n manier om maatskaplike gedrag vir hul eie doel te beïnvloed (ten bate van die breër samelewing of nie)?

Aanvaarbare bewyse kan dokumentêr wees van so 'n plan.


Ek dink dat hierdie vraag uiteindelik op opinie gebaseer is, maar dit is interessant en het reeds 'n goeie antwoord gegenereer, sodat ons dit oop moet laat.

Ek dink die uitgangspunt in die eerste reël word nie gesteun nie: "'n beroep op die goddelike is 'n maklike manier om die subjektiewe, objektiewe te maak."

Daar is 'n aantal maniere om die vraag te beantwoord - die beste is die toets wat @Semaphore voorstel - 'n tekstuele artefak wat aandui dat die resultate van 'n waarsêery om politieke redes onaanvaarbaar is. Ek glo daar is veelvuldige voorbeelde van dit wat gebeur. As ek reg onthou, het die Romeinse veldtog teen Hannibal verskeie veldslae gehad wat vertraag is omdat die generaal die voorval verwerp het en die augur teruggestuur het vir 'n ander drie. Is dit die gevolg van die generaals wat die goddelike proses ondermyn het, of was dit die optrede van 'n vroom generaal wat nie die wreedheid sou versoen met die taktiese situasie nie. Elke waarsêery behels 'n mate van interpretasie, en moet altyd interpretasies verwerp wat in stryd is met die waargenome werklikheid.

Henry IV se aanhaling "Parys is 'n massa werd" kan in die kategorie pas, hoewel hy nie probeer om die samelewing deur godsdiens te beïnvloed nie, het hy sy trou laat vaar ten gunste van politieke doelwitte. Maar ek kan nie met sekerheid sê dat sy opmerking heeltemal sinies was nie.

Die Chinese voorskrif van die "mandaat van die hemel" kan aangewend word - ek is nie 'n Chinese geleerde nie, maar ek verstaan ​​dat dit 'n beginsel is wat enigste word ex post facto toegepas - die heerser het die mandaat van die hemel, en die enigste mense wat getoon kan word dat hulle nie die mandaat van die hemel het nie, is afgedankte en mislukte heersers. Is dit 'n ondergang of 'n opregte oortuiging dat die hemel die koning bevoordeel?

Henry VIII van Engeland, Defender of the Faith, het die Rooms -Katolieke geloof laat vaar weens 'n teenstrydigheid tussen sy plig teenoor sy dinastie en sy plig teenoor sy geloof, soos geïnterpreteer deur die politieke besluite van 'n godsdienstige owerheid. Was dit ondermynend, of was dit 'n opregte bekering?

Konstantyn het onder die simbool van die kruis geveg, maar het die bekering tot die Christendom jare lank vertraag. Sommige beweer dat dit 'n voorbeeld van ondergang was, ander dring daarop aan dat dit 'n opregte bekering was, maar bemiddel deur politieke realiteite.

Daar is baie wat beweer dat die hekproewe van Salem 'n voorbeeld was van jong meisies wat in 'n onderdrukkende godsdienstige huishouding om praktiese redes die numines verloor het. Die onlangse podcast van Lord Bragg oor die onderwerp beweer dat Tituba haar ervaring met die bonatuurlike ondermyn het om by 'n sosiale vertelling te pas, en dit beïnvloed hulle om haar nie te vermoor nie.

Die bekering van Egipte onder Amenhotep en die daaropvolgende herhaling is ook as voorbeeld gestel.

Soortgelyke beskuldigings is teen pous Urbanus VIII gerig wie se veroordeling van Galileo moontlik gebaseer was op die wil van God of op die goeie van die kerk.

Ek het soveel verhale gelees dat ek die spoor byster geraak het, maar die laaste dosyn keer dat ek geskrifte oor die Delphic Oracle teëgekom het, het die verhale aangeneem dat die uitsprake van die Oracle geneig was om by politieke realiteite te pas.

Uiteindelik tree alle godsdienstige leiers op in 'n onstuimige gebied tussen geloof, pragmatiek en inspirasie. Hulle maak keuses wat waarskynlik opreg is - dit sal 'n daad van skouspelagtige arrogansie verg om hul eie dwaalleer te dokumenteer.


Die elite van verskeie vroeë beskawings het godsdiens vir hul eie doeleindes gekoöpteer deur die vergoddeliking van koninklikes. Een van my persoonlike gunstelinge is Caligula, net omdat hy in die algemeen megalomanie na 'n heel nuwe vlak geneem het :-)


Sokrates se goddelike teken: godsdiens, praktyk en waarde in die sosratiese filosofie

Pierre Destr ée en Nicholas D. Smith (reds.), Sokrates se goddelike teken: godsdiens, praktyk en waarde in die sosratiese filosofie, Academic Printing and Publishing, 2005, 192pp, $ 26,95 (pbk), ISBN 0920980910.

Gegee deur Nickolas Pappas, The City University of New York

Tien referate van 'n konferensie oor Sokrates daimonion (Brussel 2003) evalueer wat vandag bekend is oor die stuk van die Sokrates -raaisel en bespreek 'n reeks onopgeloste kwessies. Die hoofstukke is geskryf deur Luc Brisson, Mark L. McPherran, Gerd Van Riel, Thomas C. Brickhouse en Nicholas D. Smith, Pierre Destrée, Roslyn Weiss, Mark Joyal, Michel Narcy, Louis-André Dorion en Aldo Brancacci.

Die Sokrates wat in Plato se dialoë uitgebeeld word, het gepraat van a daimonion sein wat na hom toe gekom het. Daardie woord daimonion is 'n byvoeglike naamwoord " daimôn -ish " -goddelik, of miskien wat die Engelse van vroeëre eeue" weird "genoem het.

Die teken kom in elk geval as 'n soort stem en Sokrates beweer dat hy dit van kleins af gehoor het. Dit was apotrepties eerder as protrepties, en het Sokrates nooit beveel om op een of ander manier op te tree nie, maar net om seker te maak dat hy die ontmoedigende woord hoor wanneer hy kans sien om 'n skadelike aksie te begin (Verskoning 31d).

Xenophon se Sokrates het 'n ietwat ander stem gehoor, een wat nie geskroom het om die een aksie bo die ander te onderskryf nie. Plato bied konsekwent 'n remmende goddelike middel aan.

Xenophon en Plato is dit egter eens dat die goddelike teken van Sokrates spesiaal bespreek moet word in verband met die verhoor waarop Sokrates hom met so 'n beroemde onsukses verdedig het. In Plato se verslag oor die verhoor sê Sokrates dat hy die dag geen spookagtige piep gehoor het nie, hetsy op pad na die howe of tydens sy (impromptu, hoogmoedige) verdedigingstoespraak. Hy aanvaar die nuus van sy doodsvonnis met ewewig en selfs met goeie moed op grond daarvan dat sedert die daimonion het hom nie gekeer nie, die dood wat sy gedrag sal volg, mag nie 'n slegte ding wees nie ( Verskoning 40a-c).

(Xenophon bied 'n variasie op hierdie laaste argument, maar toon ook die goddelike teken wat Sokrates prakties versnel tot 'n gelukkige dood.)

Wat die Platoniese Sokrates betref, is Plato s’n Verskoning bevat al die noodsaaklike algemene inligting oor die goddelike teken. Ander vermeldings kom in vyf dialoë voor: Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Phaedrus, Republiek, en Theaetus . Daar is ook die Alcibiades , nie algemeen aanvaar as 'n egte werk van Plato's nie, en die Theages , word glad nie as eg beskou nie. Die bykomende vermeldings versterk of illustreer wat die Verskoning sê, sodat vir Plato se lesers die daimonion kom neer op 'n paar vreemde eienskappe wat in twee handvol gedeeltes aangeraak word.

Vir die afgelope halwe eeu is die onderwerp van Sokrates se goddelike teken meestal verwaarloos, hetsy omdat daar so min bewyse is om aan te gaan of omdat die onderwerp van godsdiens Plato se kommentators in die verleentheid gestel het. Sokrates was immers verbind tot rasionaliteit. As die teken wat hy ontvang het, werklik was, sou dit verenigbaar moes wees met wat sy rede vir hom gesê het. Dit het geen sin om dit as iets behalwe die stem van die rede te beskou nie.

Die huidige volume bestaan ​​egter omdat die daimonion die vraag sal nie aan die kantlyn van die Sokratiese geleerdheid bly nie. Om dieselfde rede was Nicholas D. Smith, een van die mede-redakteurs van hierdie bundel, ook onlangs mede-redakteur van 'n ander versameling wat ietwat soortgelyke terreine behandel het: Smith en Paul B. Woodruff (reds.), Rede en godsdiens in die Sokratiese Filosofie (Oxford University Press, 2000).

Dit is onmoontlik om uit te vind of nie, die goddelike teken is relevant vir die groter prentjie van wie Sokrates was en wat hy gedoen het. Was die man eintlik wat moderne mense rasionalisties noem? Het sy toewyding tot die rede hom 'n ateïs gemaak?

Ook: Aangesien slegs Sokrates 'n goddelike sein gehoor het, het Plato hom as iets unieks beskou, of was sy lewe in plaas daarvan 'n moontlikheid vir alle mense? (Filosofeer 'n mens slegs met 'n daimonion ?)

Meer algemeen: Waarom is Sokrates verhoor en tereggestel? Op watter manier en om watter redes het sy ervaring van sy goddelike teken tot sy oortuiging en dood gelei?

Omdat Sokrates nie verstaan ​​kan word voordat sy vreemde stem was nie, is die eerste prioriteit dus om vas te stel wat die stem is en hoe dit werk. Die antieke getuienis is nie onbegryplik nie en nie heeltemal teenstrydig nie, maar dit stel vrae wat nog nie met die deeglikheid behandel is nie, beslis nie definitiewe antwoorde gegee nie.

Byvoorbeeld: Na watter soort ervaring het Sokrates verwys met woorde soos ''n stem' '? Wie het die boodskap gestuur? Het dit sy betekenis op sy mou gedra, of het dit verduideliking nodig gehad? Is dit alles "nee" wat gesê word?

'N Mens kan ook agterdogtig raak. Waarom het Plato en Xenophon spesiale moeite gedoen om te praat oor die teken en wat dit wel of nie gesê het in hul onderskeie weergawes van die verhoor? Miskien het hulle aan Sokrates gedink dat hy deur sy onfeilbare waarskuwingstelsel op 'n magiese manier beskerm is, net om te kyk hoe hy sonder omgee in die vurige hofsaal struikel, waar die eenvoudige praatjies wat Athene in die agora verneder en opgewek het, bloot die jurielede beledig het. Was hulle verkeerd oor die teken en was Sokrates net 'n gewone man? As hierdie angs Plato en Xenophon laat vaar het, is hul ingewikkelde beroep op die teken en verduidelikings waarom Sokrates sy doodsvonnis as 'n gelukkige einde beskou het, moontlik 'n redelike rede vir die klaarblyklike mislukking van die stem.

Hierdie spesifieke vrae oor die stem en die boodskap daarvan is die bydraers tot Sokrates se goddelike teken. Die elf skrywers sif deur die beskikbare Platoniese bewyse vir nuwe insigte oor die goddelike teken, in die hoop om dit wat hulle leer, te gebruik om Sokrates te verstaan.

Wat die outeurs van hierdie artikels, net soos dit gepas is, verdeel, is die omstrede kwessies rondom die goddelike teken - of die teken van 'n god kom of eerder uit Sokrates spreek, of dit getuig van die uniekheid van Sokrates onder mense of inteendeel hom 'n paradigma vir alle ander om te volg. Met baie ruimte vir die standpunte aan beide kante van hierdie debatte en ander, bring die bundel sy leser op hoogte van 'n florerende en betekenisvolle bespreking.

Miskien vind filosowe wat nie antieke filosofie bestudeer nie, die bloemlesing te gefokus. En ondanks die meerjarige belangstelling in Sokrates, waarborg die mikro -chirurgie waarmee die skrywers hierdie gedeeltes ontleed, amper dat die algemene leser nie na die boek sal kom nie, of nie daarmee sal volhard nie. Tog sal dit sy invloed hê. Byna almal wat Plato en Sokrates op die universiteit onderrig, sal waarskynlik onder aannames oor die daimonion dat artikels in hierdie versameling uitdaging. Die geleerdes behoort hierdie boek te lees nadat hulle dit gelees het, hulle sal beslis op nuwe maniere van Sokrates praat. Dit is goed om so 'n boek beskikbaar te hê.

Verder is dit goed om te weet dat so 'n boek kan kom vandag uit, 'n bemoedigende teken van die tyd wat 'n welkome verandering in die studie van antieke denke betref. Deur die ernstige beoordeling van die Griekse godsdiens al meer as dertig jaar het antieke oortuigings en gebruike die studie meer waardevol laat lyk as wat dit was. Die name van Walter Burkert en Jean-Pierre Vernant is slegs die prominentste van vele in hierdie onderneming. Tog kan filosowe nie reageer op die Atheense denke van die vyfde en vierde eeu nie as die werk van 'vrydenkers'. U kan Thucydides en sy rol as 'n gids van elke moderne mens tot die vyfde eeu blameer: ​​Thucydides met sy ongeduld vir orakels kan Sokrates se Athene vandag net so ateïsties laat lyk soos 'n filosofie -afdeling in Amerika.

Maar Sokrates was nie 'n man in die Atheense skare wat deur die intellektuele modes van die dag verslaaf was nie. Die Platoniese Sokrates het gepraat oor gehoor en ag slaan op drome (Verskoning , Crito , Phaedo ) en oor die gehoorsaamheid aan die Delphic -orakel ( Verskoning, Republiek ) het hy wyn vir Zeus gemors in die Simposium. In verskeie ander dialoë ( Ion, Phaedrus ) skryf hy poësie toe aan goddelike inspirasie. Die stem wat hy gehoor het, was deel van 'n lewe wat goddelikheid insluit, en teorieë oor Sokrates sal onvolledig wees as hulle anders voorgee.

As Thomas Brickhouse en Nicholas Smith dus Gregory Vlastos se reduksionistiese lees van die goddelike teken weerlê-die stem as 'n rasionele voorgevoel-help dit om 'n onderdrukte kant van Sokrates weer in die prentjie te bring (44-49). Sokrates se ervaring was werklik godsdienstig-wat, soos Brickhouse en Smith ook aandui, dit nie irrasioneel maak nie (61-62).

Mark McPherran het ook gewerk om die heersende interpretasie van Sokrates se rasionaliteit uit te brei. Dit is redelik dat hy deel van hierdie boek moet wees: Hy het 'n groot rol gespeel in die Smith-Woodruff-bundel, en sy eie Die godsdiens van Sokrates (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996) het uitgebrei aangevoer vir die verenigbaarheid tussen die vroomheid van Sokrates en sy filosofiese onderneming.

McPherran is op sommige maniere 'n tipiese bydraer, want dit is gewoonlik algemeen erkende name in Sokrates-studies, kundige en helder denkende, maar ook verbeeldingryke geleerdes. Hy val op in een opsig waarna dit die moeite werd is om aandag te vestig: Hy hou hom op hoogte van hedendaagse navorsing oor die Atheense godsdiens en verwerk sy navorsing in sy beoordeling van Sokrates.

Alhoewel McPherran se boek die meeste voorbeelde bevat van hoe hy kennis oor die Griekse godsdiens gebruik, is daar ook 'n paar hier. Sy artikel in Sokrates se goddelike teken maak verwysings na die stem lewendig deur dit te ondersoek as 'n verhouding tussen Sokrates en Apollo (26-30). McPherran stel Sokrates se vertroue in drome saam met die skeptisisme waarin Aristoteles stem Oor waarsêery in slaap 464a, om 'n kulturele lens te bied om Sokrates te sien (13-14). Dit is skaars gedetailleerde navrae oor die Griekse godsdiens, en tog oortref dit wat u in die ander artikels van die boek kan vind. Die meeste gaan voort sonder om te verwys na hoe Sokrates se tydgenote hul godsdiens beoefen het, en veral sonder verwysing na wat onlangse navorsing oor die onderwerp ontdek het.

Om die punt anders te stel: Dit is waar dat alle bewerings oor die Sokratiese goddelike teken op minder as 'n dosyn gedeeltes moet berus. Maar die hersiening van hierdie paar gedeeltes kan die gevolg hê dat vrae oor die agtergrond van klassieke Atheense godsdiensbeoefening uitgesluit word. Slegs enkele frases in hierdie boek gee selfs ruimte vir die godsdiens van die dag (bv. 31-32, 62, 72, 85, 109, 148). Sulke vermeldings laat meer gereeld vrae ontstaan.

Neem Pierre Destrée wat skryf oor die wetenskaplike konsensus dat Plato nie die goddelike teken wil verwar nie "met 'n tradisionele godsdienstige manier om 'n daimôn as 'n persoonlike voog "(62). Destrée weerstaan ​​later hierdie konsensus en roep 'die gewilde beskouing van die daimôn soos geheg aan elke persoon vanaf geboorte "(72), in elk geval, stel hy hom tevrede met yl en dubbelsinnige verwysings waar die bespreking baat by detail. Net watter tradisie of populêre siening van daimôn bedoel hy?

Want lank voordat die Christendom aangekom het, kon die Grieke dink aan 'n daimôn as 'n bron van kwaadwillige aktiwiteit. Sien meestal Burkert, Griekse godsdiens (Harvard University Press, 1987), 180-81. In Odyssee 5.396 siekte is 'n "gehate [ stugeros ] daimôn, 'terwyl Pindar met bygelowige indireksie na 'n' ander 'verwys daimôn " ( Pyth. 3.34). Inderdaad die "goeie daimôn "aan wie die karakters van Aristophanes versoeningsoffers gooi ( Ridders 85, Wespies 525) is moontlik net gebel agathos as 'n eufemisme, deel van die poging om hom te kalmeer.

Selfs al is die bewyse vir kwaadwillige daimones oorweeg dit nie oor verwysings na 'persoonlike voogde' nie, maar die bestaan ​​van hierdie getuienis maak die vraag oop waarop Sokrates moontlik sou verwys het, of hoe hy deur sy tydgenote gehoor kon word. Dit moet nie vanselfsprekend wees nie, soos dit hier toegelaat word, dat die taal van Sokrates 'tradisies' oor persoonlike helpers getrek het.

In 'n ander artikel beklemtoon Gerd Van Riel die privaatheid van die goddelike teken, en met reg. Die politieke belangrikheid van Sokrates se 'godsdienstigheid' moet inderdaad te doen hê met sy bevoorregte toegang tot 'n morele toetssteen wat verwyder is van alles wat sy medeburgers sê.

Maar weer is daar 'n beroep op 'tradisie', waarvan die vaagheid slegs diffuse lig op Sokrates laat val. 'Die skakel tussen Sokrates en syne daimôn is absoluut eksklusief, wat nooit die geval is as dit kom by die ingryping van tradisionele godhede nie "(35). Nooit? Van Riel noem geen bewyse vir hierdie bewering nie (alhoewel sy vonnis klink asof dit van Robert Garland kan kom: Sien Bekendstelling van nuwe gode [Cornell University Press], 149). Dit sou gehelp het om te weet: Private in teenstelling met wat? Hierdie besorgdheid oor 'n eksklusiewe skakel "na die persoonlikheid van die ontvanger" (35) moet met behulp van spesifieke kontraste bewerkstellig word.

Wat van orakels, byvoorbeeld? In die tyd van Sokrates was dit toenemend individue wat hul oordele aangevra het, Delphi se vroeëre voorspelling dat Persië sou seëvier en die geloofwaardigheid van die orakel onder regerings benadeel het (Burkert 116). Is die goddelike boodskap aan 'n privaat kliënt nie 'n eksklusiewe ingryping nie?

Of oorweeg hierdie persoonlike aanraking. Voor Sokrates het die Pitagoreërs gepraat daimones wat hulle - en klaarblyklik niemand anders nie - kon sien (Aristoteles, frag. 193). Wat is die verskil tussen dit en die eksklusiewe toegang van Sokrates tot syne? daimonion stem? Van Riel se fokus op privaatheid moet beslis reg wees, maar sy oorsaak word nie gehelp deur veralgemenings oor die Griekse praktyk nie.

'N Artikel deur Asli Gocer in die Smith-Woodruff-bloemlesing het reeds gewaarsku teen die kategorisering van Sokrates se' godsdienstigheid 'in die afwesigheid van beter bewyse oor Athene in sy geheel (' ''n Nuwe beoordeling van die Sokratiese filosofie van godsdiens' '). Om Sokrates 'n nie -konformis te noem, sê Gocer, het 'n mens baie beter historiese inligting nodig oor wat hy sou konformeer aan (123-125).

Gocer kan verder gaan. Nie net waar Sokrates gestaan ​​het in vergelyking met sy mede -Atheners nie, maar selfs wat hulle verstaan ​​het dat hy vir hulle gesê het, bly onbepaald in die afwesigheid van 'n duidelike beeld van die godsdiens van sy medeburgers. Wanneer Sokrates die byvoeglike naamwoord gebruik daimonion , wil hy vermoedelik iets kommunikeer oor die boodskap wat hy gekry het. So wat is dit? Wat is daimonion in pre-platoniese Athene en hoe word daaroor gepraat?

Die geskiedenis van die Griekse godsdiens sal nooit die ondersoek van elke Platoniese gedeelte wat die goddelike teken noem, vervang nie. Die bydraers tot hierdie bloemlesing stel tereg moeilike vrae oor die gedeeltes wat hulle noem. Vrae is nie altyd die werk van die filosoof nie.

Maar as die filosoof 'n antwoord wil hoor, probeer die historikus van die filosofie dit intussen verby hoor 'n verre antwoord op 'n nou byna onhoorbare vraag. Dit is waar die studie van godsdienstige praktyk inkom. Om uit te vind wat die Atheners vir mekaar geprewel het of wat Plato vir hulle gesê het, moet vandag se afluisteraar weet hoe die gesprek verloop het voordat Sokrates ooit daar aangekom het.


1. Konseptuele raamwerk vir die debat

Psigologiese egoïsme is 'n tesis oor motivering, gewoonlik met die fokus op die motivering van menslike (opsetlike) optrede. Dit word geïllustreer in die soort beskrywings wat ons soms gee van mense se optrede in terme van verborge, bybedoelings. 'N Beroemde verhaal met Abraham Lincoln illustreer dit nuttig (sien Rachels 2003, p. 69). Lincoln het na bewering aangevoer dat ons almal uiteindelik eiebelang het toe hy skielik stop om 'n groep varkies te verdrink. Sy gespreksgenoot het die oomblik aangegryp in 'n poging om daarop te wys dat Lincoln 'n lewende teen-voorbeeld is van sy eie teorie. Maar Lincoln het na bewering geantwoord: 'Ek moes die hele dag geen gemoedsrus gehad het as ek die ou lywige soggie verlaat het wat my oor die varke bekommer nie. Ek het dit gedoen om gemoedsrus te kry, sien jy nie? ”

Die sielkundige egoïsme meen dat beskrywings van ons motivering, soos Lincoln s’n, in elk geval op ons almal van toepassing is. Die verhaal illustreer dat die verdediger van sielkundige egoïsme baie subtiele bewegings moet tref. Dit is dus belangrik om 'n duidelike idee te kry van die mededingende egoïstiese versus altruïstiese teorieë en die terme van die debat tussen hulle.

A. Die kaal stellings

Egoïsme word dikwels gekontrasteer met altruïsme. Alhoewel die egoïsme-altruïsme-debat die moontlikheid van altruïsme in 'n sekere sin betref, is die gewone term “altruïsme ” moontlik nie die kwessie wat hier van primêre belang is nie. In ten minste een gewone gebruik van die term, hang iemand daarvan af om altruïsties op te tree, dat sy slegs gemotiveer word deur die besorgdheid oor die welsyn van 'n ander, sonder enige bybedoelings om haarself te bevoordeel. Altruïsme hier is 'n kenmerk van die motivering wat die aksie ten grondslag lê (Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 199). ('N Ander gevoel van “altruïsme ” - wat dikwels in 'n redelik tegniese sin in die biologie gebruik word - is bloot gedragswyses, sien §4a.) In hierdie mate is hierdie gewone idee van altruïsme naby aan filosofiese belang. Maar daar is verskille. Byvoorbeeld, dit lyk asof ons die term "altruïsme" gewoonlik slegs toepas op redelik atipiese optrede, soos dié van groot selfopoffering of heldhaftigheid. Maar die debat oor sielkundige egoïsme handel oor die motiverings wat daaraan lê almal van ons optrede (Nagel 1970/1978, p. 16, n. 1).

Ongeag die gewone terminologie, het die siening wat filosowe 'sielkundige egoïsme' noem, sekere sleutelkenmerke. Die ontwikkeling van 'n duidelike en presiese weergawe van die debat oor egoïsme en altruïsme is moeiliker as wat dit aanvanklik mag lyk. Om die taak makliker te maak, kan ons begin met 'n baie kaal en skematiese definisie van die standpunte in die debat (Mei 2011, bl. 27, vergelyk ook Rosas 2002, bl. 98):

  • Sielkundige egoïsme: Al ons uiteindelike begeertes is egoïsties.
  • Sielkundige altruïsme: Sommige van ons uiteindelike begeertes is altruïsties.

Ons sal die term "begeerte" hier in 'n redelike breë sin gebruik om eenvoudig a te beteken motiverende geestelike toestand- wat ons in ten minste een sin van hierdie terme gewoonlik 'n 'motief' of 'rede' kan noem. Maar wat is 'n 'uiteindelike' begeerte, en wanneer is dit 'altruïsties' eerder as 'egoïsties'? Die beantwoording van hierdie en verwante vrae bied die nodige raamwerk vir die debat.

B. Egoïstiese versus altruïstiese begeertes

Ons kan begin om inhoud aan ons blote stellings toe te voeg deur te karakteriseer wat dit is om 'n altruïstiese teenoor 'n egoïstiese begeerte te hê. Soos sommige filosowe uitgewys het, beweer die sielkundige egoïs dat al sy uiteindelike begeertes kommer het jouself in 'n sekere sin. Ons moet egter duidelik maak dat 'n egoïstiese begeerte uitsluitlik die eie wil het welstand, voordeel of welsyn. 'N Kwaadwillige uiteindelike begeerte na die vernietiging van 'n vyand raak nie jouself nie, maar dit is skaars altruïsties (Feinberg 1965/1999, §9, p. 497 Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 229).

Ondanks die algemene gebruik in hierdie konteks, is die term "selfsugtig" ook nie hier gepas nie. Die sielkundige egoïst beweer dat ons uiteindelik net omgee vir (wat ons as ons beskou) ons eie welsyn, maar dit hoef nie altyd neerkom op selfsug. Beskou die uiteindelike begeerte om 'n middagslapie te neem wat welverdiend is en niemand negatief sal beïnvloed nie. Alhoewel dit jou eie voordeel aangaan, is daar geen sin dat dit selfsugtig is nie (Henson 1988, §7 Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 227). Die term “eiebelang” is meer gepas.

Met hierdie punte in gedagte, kan ons egoïstiese en altruïstiese begeertes op die volgende manier kenmerk:

  • 'N Mens se begeerte is egoïsties as (en slegs as) dit betrekking het op (wat 'n mens beskou) die voordeel van jouself en nie van iemand anders nie.
  • 'N Mens se begeerte is altruïsties as (en slegs as) dit betrekking het op (wat 'n mens beskou) die voordeel van ten minste iemand anders as jouself.

Dit is belangrik dat die begeerte in 'n sekere sin die persoon verteenwoordig as jouself (of, na gelang van die geval, as 'n ander). Gestel byvoorbeeld dat John wil help om 'n vuur te blus in die hare van 'n man wat voor hom lyk, maar hy weet nie dat hy eintlik in 'n spieël kyk nie, en dit is sy eie hare wat aan die brand steek. As John se begeerte die uiteindelike is en bloot om die man met sy hare in vlamme te help, is dit nodig om sy begeerte te ag as iemand anders as homself, al is hy in werklikheid die man met sy hare aan die brand (Oldenquist 1980, pp. 27-8 Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 214).

C. Uiteindelike/intrinsieke begeertes

Die rede vir die fokus op uiteindelike begeertes is dat sielkundige egoïste nie ontken dat ons dikwels begeertes het wat altruïsties is nie. Hulle beweer egter dat al hierdie altruïstiese begeertes uiteindelik afhang van 'n meer basiese egoïstiese begeerte. Met ander woorde, ons het 'n bybedoelings as ons ander help - een wat waarskynlik neig om onder die radar van bewussyn of introspeksie te vlieg.

Ons moet dus 'n gemeenskaplike filosofiese onderskeid tref tussen begeertes wat 'n doel is en begeertes vir 'n doel op sigself. Instrumentele begeertes is daardie begeertes wat 'n mens na iets het as 'n middel vir iets anders uiteindelike begeertes is daardie begeertes wat 'n mens na iets het as 'n doel op sigself, nie as 'n middel tot iets anders nie (sien Sober & amp; Wilson 1998, pp. 217-222). Eersgenoemde word dikwels "ekstrinsieke begeertes" genoem en laasgenoemde "intrinsieke begeertes" (sien bv. Mele 2003 Ch. 1.8.). Begeerte na plesier en die vermyding van pyn is paradigmatiese uiteindelike begeertes, aangesien mense dit dikwels as doel op sigself begeer, nie as 'n blote middel tot iets anders nie. Maar die klas van uiteindelike begeertes kan veel meer as dit insluit.

D. Oor egoïsme en altruïsme

Daar is twee belangrike aspekte om uit te lig oor hoe sielkundige egoïsme en altruïsme met mekaar verband hou. Eerstens maak sielkundige egoïsme 'n sterker, universele bewering dat almal van ons uiteindelike begeertes is egoïsties, terwyl sielkundige altruïsme slegs die swakker beweer sommige van ons uiteindelike begeertes is altruïsties. Eersgenoemde is dus 'n monisties tesis, terwyl laasgenoemde 'n pluralisties tesis (Sober & Wilson 1998, p. 228). Gevolglik is sielkundige egoïsme makliker om te weerlê as die teenoorgestelde siening. As 'n mens suksesvol sou demonstreer dat sommige - selfs net een - van 'n persoon se uiteindelike begeertes altruïsties is, dan kan ons sielkundige egoïsme veilig verwerp. As Thomas byvoorbeeld sy hak van 'n ander se jigspeen verwyder omdat hy die uiteindelike begeerte het dat die persoon daarby baat, is sielkundige egoïsme vals.

Tweedens, die standpunte in die debat is nie presies die ontkenning van mekaar nie, mits daar begeertes is wat nie altruïsties of egoïsties is nie (Stich, Doris, & amp Roedder 2010, sekt. 2). Om 'n voorbeeld van Bernard Williams te neem, kan 'n 'mal' 'n uiteindelike begeerte hê om ''n teeparty van 'n sjimpansee in die katedraal te hou' (1973, p. 263). Hy begeer dit nie as 'n middel tot 'n ander doel nie, soos genot by die aanskoue van so 'n skouspel (hy kan dit byvoorbeeld in sy testament verseker na sy dood). As die begeerte vir so 'n teeparty nie altruïsties of egoïsties is nie (omdat dit nie met iemand se welstand te doen het nie), sou dit die egoïsme-altruïsme-debat besleg? Nie heeltemal nie. Dit sou toon dat sielkundige egoïsme onwaar is, aangesien dit sou aantoon dat sommige van ons uiteindelike begeertes nie egoïsties is nie. Dit sou egter nie wys dat sielkundige altruïsme waar is nie, aangesien dit nie toon dat sommige van ons uiteindelike begeertes altruïsties is nie. Veronderstel ook dat sielkundige altruïsme onwaar is omdat geen van ons uiteindelike begeertes die voordeel van ander het nie. As dit waar is, is sielkundige egoïsme daardeur nie waar nie. Dit kan ook vals wees as ons soms ultieme begeertes het wat nie egoïsties is nie, soos dié van die mal. Die punt is dat die stellings teenstrydig is: hulle kan nie albei waar wees nie, maar hulle kan beide vals wees.


Definieer grys literatuur

Die Grey Literature -verslag definieer grys literatuur as literatuur wat deur alle regeringsvlakke, akademici, die sakewêreld en die industrie vervaardig word, maar wat nie deur kommersiële uitgewers beheer word nie (Gray Literature Report nd). Dit bevat verslae, proefskrifte, konferensieverrigtinge en amptelike dokumente wat nie kommersieel gepubliseer is nie.

Die moontlike reeks grys literatuur wat vir die doeleindes van hierdie artikel geraadpleeg kon word, is groot. Ek het onder meer gebruik gemaak van verslae en publikasies wat deur internasionale organisasies, nie -regeringsorganisasies, dinkskrums, stigtings, konsultasie -organisasies en individuele kundiges vervaardig is, hoofsaaklik op gebiede soos internasionale ontwikkeling, menseregte en politieke en beleidsvoorspraak - sommige spesifiek gefokus op navorsing opname. Sommige bronne is basters-organisasies en kundiges wat ook in ewekniebeoordeelde tydskrifte publiseer, of nie-eweknie-geëvalueerde hulpbronne wat deur universiteitsgebaseerde of onafhanklike navorsingsentrums geproduseer word. As 'n toekenningsgewer by die Open Society Public Health-program wat daarop gemik was om te leer hoe om kollegas en begunstigdes die beste te ondersteun in die bevordering van bewysgebaseerde beleid, was my belangrikste belang by die identifisering van publikasies wat inligting bied wat ek en ander kan gebruik. Vir die doeleindes van hierdie artikel het ek dus begin met organisasies en bronne wat my bekend is uit my eie werk in die veld of deur my gerespekteerde kollegas aanbeveel, en ek het oorgeslaan na bykomende hulpbronne waarna in die aanvanklike groep verwys is. Dit kan nie beweer dat dit 'n omvattende opname is nie, maar is 'n voorbeeld van 'n paar van die ryk hulpbronne wat beskikbaar is.

Die hulpbronne wat ek ingesamel het, lyk in twee hoofgroepe. Die eerste groepering, meestal gemoeid met bewyse -ingeligte beleid in die wêreldwye noorde, fokus op kognitiewe en sielkundige faktore wat die manier beïnvloed waarop individuele beleidmakers besluite neem (sien byvoorbeeld Baron, 2010 en Bales, 2015a). Hierdie hulpbronne maak gebruik van onlangse navorsing op gebiede soos kognitiewe wetenskap en neuropsigologie, en maak eksplisiet 'n skakel tussen sulke navorsing en die maniere waarop verhale voordeel trek uit wat ons weet oor menslike besluitneming. Die tweede groep, wat grootliks gefokus is op bewysgebaseerde beleid in die konteks van internasionale ontwikkeling, is geneig om meer aandag te skenk aan die politieke en organisatoriese konteks en groepsdinamika waarbinne beleidsprosesse plaasvind, en die institusionele prosesse waarmee besluite geneem word (sien sien byvoorbeeld Smutylo, 2005 Young en Mendizabal, 2009 en Young et al., 2014).


Beskuldigdes mag beweeg om bewyse wat deur die polisie of aanklaers verkry is in stryd met hul grondwetlike regte, te onderdruk, insluitend die vierde wysigingsreg teen sonder opspraak en beslagleggings, die vyfde wysigingsreg teen self-inkriminasie en die sesde wysigingsreg op 'n prokureur in 'n strafsaak . Evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s rights is known as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Sien Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The rule requiring suppression of such evidence, known as the exclusionary rule, applies in all federal and state cases, according to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

The Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule in recent years. However, proponents argue that the exclusionary rule deters police from conducting illegal searches.


Disturbing Divine Behavior: Troubling Old Testament Images of God

A dangerous book - but probably in the best possible way. I came away thinking, &aposOh wow, you mean I don&apost have to believe that God actually commanded the Israelites to commit genocide against the Caananites?&apos Of course, for some people, they may feel like this book is crumbling the foundations of their faith - if their faith is built on the Old Testament being completely true, ethically and historically. (Even the bits which don&apost agree with the other bits.)

Seibert brings the conclusions of cont A dangerous book - but probably in the best possible way. I came away thinking, 'Oh wow, you mean I don't have to believe that God actually commanded the Israelites to commit genocide against the Caananites?' Of course, for some people, they may feel like this book is crumbling the foundations of their faith - if their faith is built on the Old Testament being completely true, ethically and historically. (Even the bits which don't agree with the other bits.)

Seibert brings the conclusions of contemporary scholarship to the problem of the troubling divine images of God in the Old Testament historical narratives - images of God committing genocide (the flood) or demanding the Israelites commit genocide. He argues from historical, archaeological, theological and textual perspectives that divine behaviour which contradicts God revealed in Jesus Christ did not happen. A gap exists between the textual God and the actual God.

There are a lot of questions I need to ask about this book, and I'm working on a lengthy review for my blog. He doesn't say anything particularly new, but he articulates in a systematic and readable way things not enough of us dare say about the troubling nature of the Old Testament and possible approaches to it. He comes from an evangelical Anabaptist background and deals sensitively with issues evangelicals will be wrestling with, but he certainly doesn't maintain a conventional evangelical understanding of the authority or nature of scripture. . meer

This book promises much but delivers nothing.

Seibert&aposs main thesis is that Jesus is the ultimate revelation of God, and so any portrayal of God that appears to be different must of necessity be false. This sounds reasonable and fair.

However, Seibert proposes a "Christo-centric" hermeneutic, which depicts Jesus as and was a man of peace and love, and then uses this approach to review the validity of portrayals of God in both Old and New Testaments.
In this way Seibert concludes that most of the O This book promises much but delivers nothing.

Seibert's main thesis is that Jesus is the ultimate revelation of God, and so any portrayal of God that appears to be different must of necessity be false. This sounds reasonable and fair.

However, Seibert proposes a "Christo-centric" hermeneutic, which depicts Jesus as and was a man of peace and love, and then uses this approach to review the validity of portrayals of God in both Old and New Testaments.
In this way Seibert concludes that most of the Old Testament descriptions of God are clearly false, explaining them away as either myth or misconception. Seibert even dismisses the New Testament teaching of the Final Judgement asserting that a loving God could never send anyone to hell.

The problem is that Seibert has been very selective in the texts he has used to build his portrayal of Jesus. Seibert has chosen to ignore Jesus own teaching on the Final Judgement and heaven and hell. Jesus described hell as a terrible place using terms such as blackest darkness where there is gnashing of teeth. He also ignores times when Jesus was clearly angry, and exercised direction action to right evil practices, such as the tuning over the money changers tables and driving out the money changers with a whip.

And so Seibert has actually constructed an unscriptural caricature of Jesus, and has used this to construct a false god in his own image.

Moreover, Seibert does not consider the ultimate result of the false god he has created. He does not seem to understand that a truly good God MUST punish evil. We can illustrate this by considering an earthly court room. Imagine what would happen if a person found guilt of child abuse, rape and mass murder appealed to the goodness of the not let restrict his liberty with a prison sentence, but rather release him. The judge is never going to consent, but because the judge is a god man he will ensure that the crimes are punished, and that the man's freedom is restricted so that he can commit no further crimes.

The same is true with God. God is good. There are two sides to this first it means that God is love but it also means that God is just and righteous, and hence must of necessity punish evil.

Seibert misses the point that many of the Old Testament prophecies emphasise both God's love and righteousness. Hosea is a perfect example of this, where God is pictured as a spurned husband who clearly longs for reconciliation with his adulterous wife, and yet ultimately will take action to close the relationship when all notion of reconciliation is exhausted.

This book, then, is academically lightweight, building an image of God which is not based on a sound analysis of the evidence, but rather ignores most of the evidence in order to support a god of Seibert's creation. . meer

Readers of the Bible expect to encounter stories of human beings behaving badly, but they are sometimes taken aback by stories depicting God behaving badly. In the Old Testament, there are approximately 1,000 passages that speak of Yahweh’s anger, threats, punishments, revenge, and killing. “No other topic is as often mentioned as God’s bloody works.”

Eric Seibert, an associate professor of Old Testament, calls the troubling or dark side of God “disturbing divine behavior.” Some Christians who vi Readers of the Bible expect to encounter stories of human beings behaving badly, but they are sometimes taken aback by stories depicting God behaving badly. In the Old Testament, there are approximately 1,000 passages that speak of Yahweh’s anger, threats, punishments, revenge, and killing. “No other topic is as often mentioned as God’s bloody works.”

Eric Seibert, an associate professor of Old Testament, calls the troubling or dark side of God “disturbing divine behavior.” Some Christians who view God’s character as immensely merciful, just and compassionate find it troubling when they encounter God who could also be so merciless, vengeful, violent, not to mention unjust in the mass killing of children for the sins of their parents.

This book was written for those who are perplexed by and struggle with the apparent contradictions in God’s character, while those who see no such contradictions probably wouldn't enjoy it. Seibert wrote the book to make sense of the contradictions and “to help people think as accurately as possible about God.”

“Who are you to second-guess God?” say those who believe in Biblical inerrancy. Seibert believes Christians should be encouraged, not discouraged, to ask hard questions about God. The Old Testament provides a model of questioning God, with Abraham, for instance, debating with him about destroying Sodom. “Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is just?” Abraham asks when arguing that innocent should not be killed along with the guilty. (Gen 18:25) Moses also argued with God about destroying Israel after Aaron made a golden calf, and God changed his mind. (Ex 32:11-14) In short, “there’s nothing inherently wrong with raising questions about God’s behavior in the Old Testament.” Nor is questioning the accuracy of some parts of the Old Testament inconsistent “with affirming scripture’s inspiration and authority.”

Seibert provides a long description of disturbing divine behavior. Many readers already know about the genocide the Lord ordered the Israelites to commit on the seven nations in the Promised Land, “utterly destroying anything that breathes. Show them no mercy.” (Deut 7:1-2) Joshua reports carrying out the divine orders. (Josh 10:40)

The rationale given for this genocide is that “so that they may not teach you to do all the abhorrent things that they do for their gods.” (Deut 20:18) At least a few readers might find genocide to be a disproportionate and extreme response to this perceived threat. In addition to genocide, there are many other examples of divine behavior that can lead readers to ask what the behavior says about the character of God:

+ God reportedly gave Moses 613 laws, with death required for fortune telling, cursing one’s parents, adultery, homosexual acts, bestiality and blasphemy, among other things. One man found out the hard way that picking up sticks on the Sabbath also meant death. He was brought before Moses. “Then the Lord said to Moses, ‘The man shall be put to death all the congregation shall stone him outside the camp.’” Which is exactly what happened. (Num 15:32-36)

+ Yahweh personally executed individuals on three occasions: two sons of Judah, Er and Onan, whom He had found to be “wicked” and “displeasing” (Genesis 38) two novice rabbis – Nadab and Abihu - who committed a single ritual offense of making an “unholy fire” (Leviticus 10:1-2) and a man named Uzzah who had reached up to steady the ark of the covenant when it was being transported he was instantly struck dead by God. (2 Sam 6:7)

+ Yahweh also engaged in mass killing, most notably when the great flood wiped out nearly all of humanity, when Sodom and Gomorrah were destroyed by a rain of sulfur and fire, when all the firstborn children in Egypt were killed to punish the Pharaoh. (Ex 12:29), during 40 years in the wilderness, when Yahweh sent plagues that killed hundreds of thousands of Israelites (Numbers 26:65 21:6 16:46, 49 14:36-37), and when the Lord sent a pestilence in Israel to punish King David for taking a census, killing 70 thousand. (2Sam 24:15), even though God had incited David to take the census.

+ Yahweh was an afflicter. Saul sinned, for example, and “the spirit of the Lord departed from Saul, and an evil spirit from the Lord tormented him” (1Sam16:14). When the Israelites tried to flee Egypt, God repeatedly hardened the Pharaoh’s heart so he refused to allow the departure, while God inflicted 10 plagues on the land. Job was “blameless and upright, one who feared God and turned away from evil,” yet was subjected by God to horrible afflictions. After Job suffers one tragedy after another, God says, “He still persists in his integrity, although you incited me against him, to destroy him for no reason.” (2:3)

What kind of God destroys an innocent man and kills his children and servants “for no reason”? How does one reconcile the God of the Old Testament with loving enemies, turning the other cheek, and doing unto others as we would have them to do us? Those who would deny any conflict don’t want to see it.

There are two ways Christians can deal with the contradictions: 1) We can simply say, “when God does it, that makes it moral,” even though we think bashing babies heads against the rocks is grossly immoral any other time, or 2) We can decide we cannot accept a literal reading of the Bible and still worship God, so we discard literalism. After carefully considering the alternatives, Seibert opts for the second option.

We shouldn’t have to defend genocide and mass killing of children to punish their parents. It’s appropriate we know war crimes are wrong. We are correct that the hyper-violent depiction of God conflicts with our image of who God is. The questionable passages are likely war propaganda, written generations after the purported events. Seibert contends the Old Testament descriptions of genocide are historically inaccurate. Archeological evidence and biblical passages indicate the Canaanites were not annihilated the way Joshua claims.

So how can Christians know what God is really like? The New Testament tells us that in Jesus, we get the “image of the invisible God” (Col 1:15), and a revelation of God that surpasses anything offered in the Old Testament (Heb 1:1-3). Jesus said, “anyone who has seen me has seen the father.”(John 14:9)
What about the extreme, punitive violence by Jesus described in Revelations? Seibert responds “that the God Jesus reveals is known though Jesus’ life and teachings while on earth, not descriptions of Jesus’ supposed behavior at the end time.”

Consequently, Seibert recommends that Christ-followers rely upon the forgiving, non-violent image of Jesus to understand the character of God. It means applying a “christocentric hermaneutic” to problematic passages, by which violent depictions of God are rejected. There are still useful, constructive lessons to be learned from disturbing passages by discerning readers.

The author understands that a believer’s view about God’s role in writing Scripture determines how that individual perceives disturbing divine depictions. Those who see God as the author, and writers as simply the instruments, usually accept that everything in the Bible must be accurate. Those who see God’s role as inspiring, rather than dictating to, the writers, find it easier to recognize that human error was inevitable.

In sum, Disturbing Divine Behavior explains why Christ-followers should not redefine evil as good in trying to justify behaviors that are grossly immoral. One need not agree with everything in this book to recognize Seibert’s careful scholarship and clear analysis about how to know divine character. ###

Disturbing divine behaviour is a well thought out book. It is very concise and easy to understand what the author is trying to say. Eric is clearly knowledgeable and we&aposll researched on this topic. It takes quite a while to get to the point as Eric chose to use the first 2/3s of the book to explain the issue of troubling portrayals of God in the OT and why they can be disturbing. He also spends a lot of time speaking to some of the other views that people hold. It never feels like the author is Disturbing divine behaviour is a well thought out book. It is very concise and easy to understand what the author is trying to say. Eric is clearly knowledgeable and we'll researched on this topic. It takes quite a while to get to the point as Eric chose to use the first 2/3s of the book to explain the issue of troubling portrayals of God in the OT and why they can be disturbing. He also spends a lot of time speaking to some of the other views that people hold. It never feels like the author is trying to shove his opinions down your throat, but is it quite evident what Eric believes and he does a good job of backing up his point. The book is very scripturally based and doesn't have too much meaningless hand-waving to explain things away.

I would recommend this book to anyone who is searching for answers to the troubling war-like depictions of God in the OT, though I would not give this book to a new Christian or someone who is not able to discern the scripture well for themselves. Though Eric gives all the different views, he quickly tries to shoot them full of holes as well as plug the holes in his own theories. I would encourage this to be on the reading list with other books of varying opinions but it is not to be read by itself. The views of the author can be a stumbling block for those weak in their faith or easily manipulated.

Eric stretched my faith and caused me to question some of my own beliefs about the wars in the OT. Though this was a good thought exercise, I am not convinced that Eric has hit the mark. In fact I think he is troubling too far out in left field. Regardless, I am encouraged by his desire to wrestle with the text and come up with an answer to this problem that works for him, and probably many others. There is not enough discussion on the troubling portions of the OT, and too many people ignoring the beauty that this Testament has to offer to the Christian today. . meer

Provocative book I wouldn&apost necessarily recommend starting with this if you haven&apost read something How to Read the Bible for All it&aposs Worth. I was talking to my nine year old nephew about the Old Testament, and I was amazed at how quickly he has developed a theology (all of which will cause him problems when he starts asking questions). So like a good uncle, I gave him some easy questions to chew on, and I told him it&aposs ok to ask questions because God wants a deep and real relationship with us Provocative book I wouldn't necessarily recommend starting with this if you haven't read something How to Read the Bible for All it's Worth. I was talking to my nine year old nephew about the Old Testament, and I was amazed at how quickly he has developed a theology (all of which will cause him problems when he starts asking questions). So like a good uncle, I gave him some easy questions to chew on, and I told him it's ok to ask questions because God wants a deep and real relationship with us this is the thesis for DDB.

I read this much slower than I have read other books because I was challenged in every chapter. I had to keep wrestling with whether or not I could accept the claims being made, and if not, why not. Ultimately there was nothing in the book that didn't settle with me. If anything, I was challenged to think differently and for that, I can see some ways already that my relationship with the Trinity will be significantly improved. I desire a deep and meaningful, authentic relationship with the Creator, and in doing so, we should feel free to ask difficult questions, one of my favorites is whether or not scripture is divinely inspired, and while I have made some conclusions about that in the past, I see a new perspective, one that allows for a more open interpretation.

Some places I would have liked more information:
1) other lenses other than a Christ0centric lens by which to understand the OT. Perhaps eliminate other possible lenses, such a legal lens, or a Jewish/Israel-centric lens, etc. The prophets for example haven't seen or known Christ, so they would not understand a Christocentric story. If God's nature is love, we should be able to see the love of God without knowing Christ, and I think the Bible can be read in such a way.
2) When discussing the first testament, I'd like more sources to be from Jewish scholars frankly I see wide gaps in Protestant (maybe all Christian) scholarship in seeing every story from a Christological perspective. I want to know what Jewish scholars have to say about the warrior God or whether or not they see love as God's primary nature. To reiterate my previous point, God reveals a loving nature through the law/judges/prophets, it's just more difficult to see through the lens of the New Covenant.
3) Some apologetic discourse: Seibert states a few ways in which he may or may not ask questions of a pastor or someone else that teaches/preaches from a systematic theology that largely ignores the divine violence, but I think that section should be a bit longer: how to talk to Catholics/Jews/Muslims/Calvinists/Wesleyans etc about interpreting scripture would be helpful. I recognize that work is up to the reader, but I think each category of believer will respond differently, and for that, some preparations should be provided maybe.

Seibert's argument is solid and well-researched. Prior to reading this book, I have tried to talk about the good, the bad, and the ugly honestly, but I feel that I have a greater tool in this book to use for those conversations.

The greatest use of this book for me is to help people understand that they cannot use scripture to justify/promote/cause violence. In fact, this book helps me to repent on behalf of the history of the Christian church. We should be so moved. Our wrong interpretations are dangerous and damaging, especially to LGBTQ+ people, American Islamophobia, and mistreatment of women and minorities.

I'm already looking forward to reading this book again. . meer

I am giving this book 1 star because I find Seibert’s approach to Biblical interpretation seriously flawed. He argues that we do not have to accept any verse in the Bible as true if it might give the impression that God is anything less than perfectly good. While he tries to use a number of approaches to justify his selectivity, I was not convinced by any of them. I find he is overly influenced by liberal, postmodern approaches to scripture which attempt to preserve some “meaning” in scripture w I am giving this book 1 star because I find Seibert’s approach to Biblical interpretation seriously flawed. He argues that we do not have to accept any verse in the Bible as true if it might give the impression that God is anything less than perfectly good. While he tries to use a number of approaches to justify his selectivity, I was not convinced by any of them. I find he is overly influenced by liberal, postmodern approaches to scripture which attempt to preserve some “meaning” in scripture while simultaneously saying it does not accurately record real historical events. Yet this runs counter to any viable idea of Biblical inerrancy and authority.

Seibert has a preconceived picture of what God is like, which leads him to selectively choose which Bible verses he accepts as authoritative and which he tries to explain away. His argument is not based on any real evidence other than “this verse doesn’t match the Jesus I believe in”. But how do we truly know what God is like unless we accept all of His self-revelation in the Bible? Who is Seibert to say that some verses are inaccurate in their picture of God simply because he can’t understand how God can act in certain ways and still be good? I think he forgets that God is also holy and is just when He judges sin, whether that is historically or eschatologically.

One example of Seibert’s flawed approach is his argument from silence which says that Jesus rejected problematic portrayals of God in the Old Testament because Jesus did not teach or preach from these texts. But he forgets that the gospels represent only a small glimpse of Jesus’ life and ministry (John 21:25), and thus not everything that Jesus said is recorded for us today. So just because we don’t have a record of Jesus endorsing some specific troubling passage in the Old Testament does not mean Jesus thought it was an inaccurate portrayal of God’s character. Indeed, Jesus himself discusses many “disturbing” images of God in his parables, criticisms of the Pharisees, and warnings of future judgement. Yet Seibert rejects these words of Jesus as well! So if Seibert is trying to base his picture of God on Jesus, he is being unfairly selective with what texts he accepts as truly revealing Jesus.

He also claims archaeological evidence proves there was no historical Exodus and subsequent conquest of Canaan, and so we should not take these stories literally. Yet as pointed out in the excellent documentary “Patterns of Evidence: Exodus” by Timothy P. Mahoney, there is plenty of archaeological evidence for both the Exodus and Joshua’s victories in Canaan, yet this evidence is rejected simply because mainstream archaeologists say it occurs in the wrong time period. If the Exodus and conquest really did happen, then we need to take these “disturbing” stories and what they reveal about God seriously, which undermines Seibert’s entire argument.

Throughout the entire book, Seibert only mentions the right of God to finally judge sin a handful of times, and never explores this theme in-depth. While he reluctantly admits that the final judgement is real, he still argues that God never judges anyone in historical times. I fail to see why if God has the right to judge eschatologically why he cannot judge historically and still be good and just. If Seibert believes annihilation to be the best interpretation of God’s final judgement, then why does he exclaim so many times throughout this book that God is unjust when He instantly kills certain people?

I find Seibert’s discussion of Biblical inerrancy dangerous. While I agree that we might not want to always take a word-for-word approach, his argument is circular. He says that the presence of the difficult portrayals of God in the Bible proves that God did not exercise meticulous control over Biblical inspiration. But that rests on his previous argument that these passages do not accurately reveal God’s character. Yet if these texts do reveal God’s true character, then a more meticulous theory of inspiration becomes likely. So Seibert wants to throw out the traditional understandings of Biblical inspiration in order to make his own theory acceptable, rather than accepting that the Bible is inspired and inerrant which would make his theory impossible.

Once we start labelling parts of the Bible as uninspired, then we lose all objectivity and cannot be sure which parts of the Bible are inspired (if any). Any claim for Biblical authority would rest on only our personal preferences and judgements (as Seibert does in this book), which destroys any confidence we can have in the Bible as God’s revelation to us, and also destroys any power the Bible has to convict of sin and the need for faith in Jesus. If one takes this approach, then why not also get rid of anything else we don’t like in the Bible? Or why not just get rid of the Bible altogether and let everyone live according to their own preferences and judgements? That is the direction that Seibert’s proposal is leading, and therefore anyone who cares about the Bible having any authority at all should be extremely cautious of Seibert’s approach in this book.

There are many more criticisms I could offer here, yet I think anyone who has some spiritual discernment and common sense could see that Seibert’s approach is defective. While Seibert may indeed be trying his hardest to make sense of what the Bible reveals about God’s character, and I applaud his effort to try to uphold God’s goodness, there are many better approaches which take the Biblical text seriously and are still able to justify God as good (for example, see Merrill, Gard, and Longman in Show Them No Mercy: Four Views on God and Canaanite Genocide, or perhaps extend William J. Webb’s hermeneutical approach in his book Slaves, Women, & Homosexuals to include the problem of divine violence as well).


The Spark Of Divine Love For The Divine

This spark of divine love for the Divine in and through and as you has brought you here. And soon it will open the spiral and set you on the mystical path. This spark is the same spark of love that called Moses, Mirabai, Rumi, Francis of Assisi, Kabir, Teresa of Ávila, Hildegard of Bingen, Paramahansa Yogananda, and all the mystics through time. And now it is calling you, as it has been calling you your entire life.

Welcome to your first adventure on the sacred spiral. On this loop you will feel that divine spark of love and respond with a sacred desire of your own heart. You will meet your guides and companions, consider the wonders of the spiral, and finally, enter the spiral and experience it for yourself. To help you open to all the beauty and possibility of this first spiral walk, I offer you six deep soul explorations. Each exploration begins with something to read, followed by several sensory, imaginal, and soul writing activities. Think of these offerings as a spiritual smorgasbord. Taste all that look appealing and experiment with others. Dit is jou sacred spiral adventure listen to the guid­ance of your soul and follow where she leads.


Referent Power

As the 44th elected president of the United States, Barack Obama has legitimate power. As commander-in-chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, he also has coercive power. His ability to appoint individuals to cabinet positions affords him reward power. Individuals differ on the degree to which they feel he has expert and referent power, as he received 52% of the popular vote in the 2008 election. Shortly after the election, he began to be briefed on national security issues, providing him with substantial information power as well.

Referent power Power that stems from the personal characteristics of the person such as the degree to which we like, respect, and want to be like them. stems from the personal characteristics of the person such as the degree to which we like, respect, and want to be like them. Referent power is often called charisma The ability to attract others, win their admiration, and hold them spellbound. —the ability to attract others, win their admiration, and hold them spellbound. Steve Jobs’s influence as described in the opening case is an example of this charisma.


Narrowing Our Options

These four observations provide us with a foundation from which to answer the question, “Why morality?” We need only determine the possible options, then ask which option best accounts for our observations.

A word of caution here. At this point our discussion gets personal, because the ultimate answer to our question has serious ramifications for the way we live our lives. It’s tempting to abandon careful thinking when conclusions that make us uncomfortable come into focus. Faced with a limited number of options, no one sits on the fence. When the full range of choices is clear, rejection of one means acceptance of another remaining.

Our options are limited to three. One: Morality is simply an illusion. Two: Moral rules exist, but are mere accidents, the product of chance. Three: Moral rules are not accidents, but instead are the product of intelligence. Which option makes most sense given our four observations about morality?

Some want to argue that morals just don’t exist. They’re nothing but illusions, useful fictions that help us to live in harmony. This is the relativist’s answer. This view is not an option for those who raise the problem of evil. Their complaint about the injustice of the universe is a tacit admission of morality. C.S. Lewis observed:

Thus in the very act of trying to prove that God did not exist—in other words, that the whole of reality was senseless—I found I was forced to assume that one part of reality—namely my idea of justice—was full of sense. Consequently, atheism turns out to be too simple. If there were no light in the universe and therefore no creatures with eyes, we should never know it was dark. Donker would be without meaning [emphasis in the original]. 2

Some take a second route. They admit that objective moral laws must exist, but contend they are just accidents. We discover them as part of the furniture of the universe, so to speak, but they have no explanation, nor do they need one.

This won’t do for a good reason: Moral rules that have no ground or justification need not be obeyed. An illustration is helpful here. One evening in the middle of a Scrabble game, you notice the phrase “do not go” formed in the random spray of letter tiles on the table. Is this a command that ought to be obeyed? Natuurlik nie. It’s not a command at all, just a random collection of letters.

Commands are communications between two minds. Chance might conceivably create the appearance of a moral rule, but there can be no command if no one is speaking. Since this phrase is accidental, it can safely be ignored.

Even if a person is behind the communication, one could ignore the command if it isn’t backed by appropriate authority. If I stood at an intersection and put my hand up, cars might stop voluntarily, but they’d have no duty to respond. They could ignore me with no fear of punishment because I have no authority to direct traffic. If, on the other hand, a policeman replaced me, traffic would come to a halt.

What is the difference between the policeman and me? My authority is not grounded. It doesn’t rest on anything solid. The policeman, however, represents the government, so his authority is justified. The state can appoint legitimate representatives to carry out its will because it is operating within its proper domain.

We learn from this that a law has moral force when it is given by an appropriate authority, one operating within its legitimate jurisdiction. If one violates such a law, he could be punished. The same is true of moral laws. They have incumbency—force to them—if there is a proper authority behind them. Moral rules that appear by chance have no such grounding.

Our second option fails because it doesn’t explain three important features we observed about morality. Chance morality fails to be a communication between two minds, and therefore, cannot be imperative. It doesn’t account for the incumbency of moral rules, nor does it make sense of the guilt and expectation of punishment one feels when those rules are violated.


Fear-Based Appeals Effective at Changing Attitudes, Behaviors After All

WASHINGTON — Fear-based appeals appear to be effective at influencing attitudes and behaviors, especially among women, according to a comprehensive review of over 50 years of research on the topic, published by the American Psychological Association.

“These appeals are effective at changing attitudes, intentions and behaviors. There are very few circumstances under which they are not effective and there are no identifiable circumstances under which they backfire and lead to undesirable outcomes,” said Dolores Albarracin, PhD, professor of psychology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and an author of the study, published in the journal Sielkundige bulletin ® .

Fear appeals are persuasive messages that emphasize the potential danger and harm that will befall individuals if they do not adopt the messages’ recommendations. While these types of messages are commonly used in political, public health and commercial advertising campaigns (e.g., smoking will kill you, Candidate A will destroy the economy), their use is controversial as academics continue to debate their effectiveness.

To help settle the debate, Albarracin and her colleagues conducted what they believe to be the most comprehensive meta-analysis to date. They looked at 127 research articles representing 248 independent samples and over 27,000 individuals from experiments conducted between 1962 and 2014.

They found fear appeals to be effective, especially when they contained recommendations for one-time only (versus repeated) behaviors and if the targeted audience included a larger percentage of women. They also confirmed prior findings that fear appeals are effective when they describe how to avoid the threat (e.g., get the vaccine, use a condom).

More important, said Albarracin, there was no evidence in the meta-analysis that fear appeals backfired to produce a worse outcome relative to a control group.

“Fear produces a significant though small amount of change across the board. Presenting a fear appeal more than doubles the probability of change relative to not presenting anything or presenting a low-fear appeal,” said Albarracin. “However, fear appeals should not be seen as a panacea because the effect is still small. Still, there is no data indicating that audiences will be worse off from receiving fear appeals in any condition.”

She noted that the studies analyzed did not necessarily compare people who were afraid to people who were unafraid, but instead compared groups that were exposed to more or less fear-inducing content. Albarracin also recommended against using only fear-based appeals.

“More elaborate strategies, such as training people on the skills they will need to succeed in changing behavior, will likely be more effective in most contexts. It is very important not to lose sight of this,” she said.

Article: “Appealing to Fear: A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeal Effectiveness and Theories,” by Melanie Tannenbaum, PhD, Kristina Wilson, PhD, and Dolores Abarracin, PhD, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Justin Hepler, PhD, University of Nevada, Reno Rick Zimmerman, PhD, University of Missouri, St. Louis and Lindsey Saul, PhD, and Samantha Jacobs, MPH, Virginia Commonwealth University, Sielkundige bulletin, published online Oct. 23, 2015.

Dolores Albarracin can be contacted by email or by phone at (217) 224-7019.


Kyk die video: die Kerk. Oordenking. Moedhou Maandag. n Gelukkige, betekenisvolle lewe. Ds Janine Fourie