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Ek probeer veral die naam onthou van die werk wat hy geskep het wat 'waardeloos' gemaak is en 'n baie lae loon betaal het. Sulke voorbeelde was om duiwe weg te skrik en appels te verkoop. Dit was alles om die werkloosheidsyfers beter te laat lyk en om mense doel te gee.
Watter ander strategieë het hy egter ontwerp om die slag van die Groot Depressie te versag?
Hierdie artikel blyk 'n onbevooroordeelde ontleding te wees van Herbert Hoover se reaksie op die ineenstorting van 1929. Dit skets hom as 'n relatiewe aktivis ekonomies volgens die standaarde van die dag, maar albei is tydens die verkiesing van 1928 oorweldig en oorweldig deur die groot skaal. van die ineenstorting wat plaasgevind het.
Dit is die moeite werd om te onthou dat hy begin bou het aan die gelyknamige Hooverdam (wat in Desember 1928 deur Coolidge goedgekeur is) as een poging om die werkloosheid van die depressie te verlig.
Boondoggle, die term waarin ek gesoek het, het vandag by my opgekom toe die ekonoom Max Keizer dit op die politieke paneelprogram 'Have I got News for You' gebruik het. Hy gebruik dit as verwysing na die beplande HS2 (hoëspoedspoor) wat Londen met Birmingham in die Verenigde Koninkryk verbind.
By verdere navorsing het ek gevind dat die woord die eerste keer in 1935 in 'n New York Times -verslag oor die New Deal gebruik is nadat dit aan die lig gekom het dat $ 3 miljoen dollar bestee is aan ontspanningsaktiwiteite vir werkloses. Die definisie daarvan is '' 'n projek wat as 'n nuttelose vermorsing van tyd en geld beskou word, maar dit word dikwels voortgesit weens vreemde beleidsmotiverings '.
President Hoover het in 1931 die President's Organization on Unemployment Relief (POUR) gestig om privaat bydraes te lewer om werkloses by te staan, maar teen die middel van 1932 het dit gesluit weens 'n gebrek aan geld. Hy het 'n paar programme vir openbare werke soos die Grand Coulee -dam in Washington onderskryf om arbeiders in diens te neem. Die Hawley-Smoot-tarief het ook invoerbelasting op buitelandse goedere tot nuwe hoogtes verhoog in die hoop om binnelandse vervaardiging en landbou aan te moedig. In werklikheid het dit die internasionale handel net belemmer omdat ander lande hul eie beskermende tariewe geskep het.
Dit is belangrik om daarop te let dat Hoover in 'n baie beperkte regering geglo het, en selfs hierdie paar optrede het sy ideologie baie gerek.
Wat was Hoover se benadering tot die groot depressie?
President Herbert Hoover het die probleem van die Groot Depressie aangepak deur sy visie op die private sektor en die regering se samewerking te bevorder en ondernemings, banke en die regering aan te spoor om in die beste belang van die land op te tree. Namate die depressie vererger het, onderteken hy wetgewing vir openbare werke en verhoogde staatsbesteding.
Hoover het die depressie begin bekamp deur ondernemings aan te spoor om aan te hou om werkers in diens te neem en die lone te verlaag ondanks die daling van die wins. Hy het 'n soortgelyke benadering met die finansiële sektor gevolg en in 1931 die National Credit Corporation georganiseer, wat gepoog het om banke aan te moedig om aan ander banke wat nie kon slaag nie, te leen sodat hulle kan herstel. Hierdie strategie was grootliks ondoeltreffend in die private sektor, aangesien dit te riskant en nie winsgewend was nie.
Namate die depressie voortduur, werkloosheid die hoogte ingeskiet het en meer banke misluk het, het Hoover na ander maniere gewerk om die ekonomie te stimuleer. In 1930 het die kongres die Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act goedgekeur. Die wet het belasting op ingevoerde goedere uit ander lande verhoog in 'n verkeerde poging om die aankoop van huishoudelike goedere aan te moedig. Die wet het vergeldingstariewe van ander lande aangemoedig, wat internasionale handel ontmoedig en die depressie op wêreldwye vlak vererger het.
Teen die einde van sy termyn, aangesien werkloosheid byna 25 persent bereik het, het Hoover effens meer effektiewe wetgewing uitgevaardig. Die Federal Home Loan Bank Act het gepoog om nuwe huise te bou en het die sukkelende behuisingsektor aangespreek. Die Inkomstewet van 1932 het die belasting op ondernemings en persoonlike inkomste verhoog tot ongekende vlakke om die depressie te bekamp.
Die laaste poging van die Hoover-administrasie om die Groot Depressie te stuit, was die Wet op Noodleniging en Konstruksie, wat ook in 1932 onderteken is. Hierdie bloudruk is grootliks uitgebrei deur Hoover se opvolger, Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt se New Deal, tesame met die ekonomies stimulerende aanvang van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, sou die Groot Depressie effektief beëindig.
Die president en die ekonomie tydens die groot depressie
Toe die aandelemark in Oktober 1929 neerstort, het president Herbert Hoover sakeleiers aangemoedig om 'n intervensionistiese benadering te volg om die dreigende ekonomiese nood te bekamp, want "dit is aksie wat tel." 1 In die volgende drie jaar het Hoover egter tevergeefs gewerk om die ekonomiese krisis van die Groot Depressie te versag. Korporatiewe welsynsbeloftes het misluk. Staatshulppogings het verdwyn. Die federale regering was nie net te klein om die krisis te hanteer nie, maar individue en ondernemings regoor die politieke spektrum was gekant teen federale ingryping. Selfs die destydse goewerneur van New York, Franklin Roosevelt, het privaat geskryf: "Ek is baie gekant teen die uitbreiding van die federale optrede in die meeste sosiale probleme van die ekonomie." 2
Maar toe hy as die Demokratiese presidentskandidaat optree, het Roosevelt 'n ander boodskap gebring - hy belowe dat die federale regering die dek sal hervorm om individue 'n 'New Deal' te gee. Nadat hulle gekies is, het Roosevelt se New Deal -programme die rol van die federale regering en die uitvoerende gesag uitgebrei in die ekonomiese, sosiale, kulturele en politieke lewens van Amerikaners. Die magsverskuiwing van die howe en politieke partye van die negentiende eeu na die administratiewe staat en van die kongres na die uitvoerende gesag, wat tydens die progressiewe era begin het, het toegeneem. Franklin Roosevelt het gewerk om vas te stel wat historici die New Deal Order genoem het-die tydperk van 40 jaar vanaf die vroeë 1930's tot die vroeë 1970's toe arbeid, kapitaliste en die regering 'n Keynesiaanse oortuiging gedeel het om die federale regering te gebruik om ekonomiese groei deur monetêre beleid te stimuleer en die bevordering van 'n 'verbruikersburgerskap' vir almal. 3
Wikimedia Commons
Hierdie afdeling ondersoek beide die maniere waarop die verhouding tussen die mense en die president gedurende die dertigerjare verander het, asook die debatte oor die rol van die president in die aanvang en oplossing van oplossings vir ekonomiese krisisse. Soos Lizabeth Cohen opgemerk het, het Roosevelt 'persoonlike federale mag' gemaak, wat die president verander het in 'n kulturele, sowel as 'n politieke ikoon. 4 Deur op die New Deal se programme en ideologie te fokus, bied hierdie afdeling insig in die twintigste-eeuse debatte oor die rol van die federale regering in die ekonomie, die kollektiewe staat teenoor individuele regte, die plek van belangegroepe in beleidvorming en die groeiende belangrikheid van mediaboodskappe aan politieke leierskap.
Alhoewel historici soos Arthur Schlesinger jr. Vroeër op die kragtige persoonlikheid van FDR aangedui het dat hierdie hervorming die hoof was, toon onlangse geleerdheid in politieke geskiedenis dat Roosevelt reageer op veldtogte van groepe verbruikersaktiviste, druk van kongreslede in die suide en eise van belangegroepe - van die Amerikaanse Federasie van Arbeid aan boere. Gewone Amerikaners het die president briewe neergeskryf waarin hy om verligting gevra het, en net soos sy voorgangers het Franklin Roosevelt nuwe mediategnologie gebruik om op persoonlike en emosionele basis met individuele kiesers te skakel. Soos Margaret O'Mara sê: "Roosevelt was nie 'n revolusionêr nie, maar 'n eksperimenteerder." 5 Sy presidentskap bied 'n geleentheid om die maniere waarop Amerikaners na ekonomiese regte en geleenthede gestreef het, te ondersoek. Die New Deal het politieke debatte oor kollektiewe veiligheid en individuele regte veroorsaak wat die kontoere van moderne liberalisme en konserwatisme gedurende die res van die twintigste eeu gevorm het.
Skep 'n New Deal -bestelling:
Volgens historikus Meg Jacobs, "het die Groot Depressie die verband tussen die middel- en werkersklasbelange versterk deur 'onderverbruik' skynbaar bloot te lê as die grootste probleem van die land." 6 The New Deal het maniere gevind om verbruik te bevorder deur middel van regulering wat lone verhoog en pryse bepaal, wetgewing wat werk en sekuriteit bied, en Keynesiaanse monetêre beleid om deflasie te bekamp. In plaas daarvan om die New Deal bloot te fokus op die persoonlikheid van FDR, gebruik hierdie afdeling nuwe studies in die politieke ekonomie om die invloed van belangegroepe en intellektuele te toon in die vorming van Roosevelt se agenda tydens die Groot Depressie en Tweede Wêreldoorlog.
Boonop het historici onlangs beklemtoon hoe die Tweede Wêreldoorlog 'n geleentheid geword het om die New Deal -staat uit te brei en dit verder in die lewens van Amerikaners in te sluit. 7 Gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het beloftes oor verbruikersregte, of "vryheid van gebrek", toegeneem namate die nasie sy wêreldwye plek as die 'arsenaal van demokrasie' inneem. Hierdie afdeling toon hoe presidente leiers geword het in ekonomiese beleid en ondersoek die nuwe samewerkingsverhouding wat mettertyd tussen korporasies en die regering ontwikkel het. Dit moedig studente aan om na te dink oor die maniere waarop hierdie ekonomiese rol van die presidentskap die verhouding tussen Amerikaners en die verwagtinge van die staat tydens depressie en oorlog verander het. Hierdie primêre en sekondêre bronne belig hoe FDR reageer op aktivisme ter plaatse van burgers en arbeidsgroepe, asook die nuut gewilde ekonomiese teorieë wat die Britse ekonoom John Maynard Keynes uitgespreek het.
Aanbevole leesstof oor monetêre beleid
SEKONDARYRE BRON
- Sien Eric Rauchway, "Reflasie en herstel in die 1930's en hul implikasies vir die 2000's, oor die bekamping van deflasie met monetêre beleid, in Making the American Century: Essays on the Political Culture of Modern America,red. Bruce Schulman, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 215–27.
PRIMARYRE BRONNE
- Franklin Roosevelt se eerste Fireside Chat, "On Banking" gelewer op 12 Maart 1933. Tekstrede op https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-12-1933-fireside-chat-1-banking -krisis
- Individue regoor die land het gereageer op die baanbrekende verklaring van Franklin Roosevelt om die land van die goudstandaard te verwyder, wat sedert sy stigting as 'n heilige komponent van ons land se monetêre beleid beskou is. http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/8126
BESPREKINGSVRAE
- Hoe word Franklin Roosevelt beïnvloed deur die idees van John Maynard Keynes?
- Hoe gebruik FDR monetêre beleid om ekonomiese oplossings te bevorder wat ook 'die sterkte van 'n land se instellings en die betroubaarheid van sy waardes' bevorder?
- Hoe word ekonomiese kwessies morele kwessies waaroor die president gesag het?
Aanbevole leesstof oor verbruikersregte
SEKONDARYRE BRONNE
- Oor die mobilisering van verbruikersbelangegroepe, sien Meg Jacobs, "Pocketbook Politics: Democracy and the Market in Twentieth Century America", in Die demokratiese eksperiment: nuwe rigtings in die Amerikaanse politieke geskiedenis, reds. Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak en Julian E. Zelizer, (Princeton en Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), 250-275.
PRIMARYRE BRONNE
BESPREKINGSVRAE
- Soos Meg Jacobs aanvoer: "Vakbonde het hulself verkoop en openbare steun gewen as agente van herstel en voorspoed deur die koopkrag van die land te verhoog deur hoër lone." 8
- Hoe verander Franklin Roosevelt se retoriek en beleid oor arbeid en sy poging om koopkrag en ekonomiese regte vir alle Amerikaners te verseker in die loop van die New Deal en Tweede Wêreldoorlog?
- Hoe kweek FDR verhoudings met vakbondleiers om die ondersteuning van werkers in sy Arbeidsdag -toespraak te verseker?
- Wat vertel hierdie toesprake ons oor die historiese baan van die belofte oor “ekonomiese regte”? Hoe verander dit van die Groot Depressie deur die Tweede Wêreldoorlog?
NAVORSINGSAKTIWITEIT
Ondersoek na die New Deal
CPC is 'n webwerf wat saam met vennote werk om 'n plek vir gebruikers te skep om in presidensiële versamelings te soek. Lees meer op presidentialcollections.org!Laat studente 'n wetgewing uit die New Deal ondersoek en 'n voorlegging van die program vir die klas voorberei. Benewens die Connecting Presidential Collection -argief, moet studente hierdie twee New Deal -webwerwe gebruik:
Nadat studente 'n stuk New Deal -wetgewing gekies het, moet studente die program en beleid aan die klas voorlê en die volgende vrae beantwoord.
- Wat was die doel van die New Deal -program?
- Wat het die program bereik?
- Hoe het FDR die program aan die Amerikaanse publiek verkoop?
- Hoe het historici die doeltreffendheid van die program bespreek?
- Watter nuwe verwagtinge van die regering en die president spruit uit hierdie wetgewing voort?
- Bestaan die wetgewing nog?
THE ROOSEVELT LEGACY: NARRATOR-IN-CHIEF
Volgens Alice O'Connor het die presidente ekonomiese krisisse ondergaan deur 'n posisie van 'hoofverteller' te aanvaar. Deur ekonomiese verhale te beheer, het suksesvolle presidente soos Franklin Roosevelt en Ronald Reagan elkeen die land 'n verduideliking gegee van 'ekonomiese probleme en vooruitsigte, 'n verklaring van nasionale doelwitte en beleid en 'n visie van nasionale identiteit en doel wat sy eie stryd kan ondersteun program vir ekonomiese herstel en hervorming. ” 9 O'Connor voer aan dat FDR en Reagan hierdie vertelling gebruik het om publisiteit en ondersteuning vir hul ekonomiese programme te kry en 'uitvoerende gesentreerde hervorming' deur te dring.
Deur die volgende toesprake te ondersoek, evalueer wat 'n suksesvolle of 'n onsuksesvolle 'hoofverteller' maak. Watter vertellings het hierdie presidente tydens tye van ekonomiese krisisse gevestig? Hoe omskryf elke president die oorsprong van die ekonomiese krisis en sy oplossings?
Hoe suksesvol was die vertellings om hul breër ekonomiese agendas te bevorder?
Franklin Roosevelt het sy ekonomiese agenda uiteengesit tydens sy eerste inhuldigingstoespraak op 4 Maart 1933.
Jimmy Carter worstel met die oliekrisis en stagflasie tydens die Groot Inflasie van die sewentigerjare in sy televisietoespraak op 15 Julie 1979.
Ronald Reagan het op 27 Julie 1981 sy agenda vir ekonomiese herstel uiteengesit, wat gelei het tot die goedkeuring van die Wet op Belasting op Ekonomiese Herstel van 1981 op 13 Augustus 1981.
Barack Obama het op 6 Desember 2011 'n toespraak gehou in Osawatomie, Kansas, om sy ekonomiese agenda te bespreek wat deur 'n Republikeinse oorheersde kongres gestop is.
Die Wet op Ekonomie van 1932
President Hoover saam met die New York Young Republikeine. Junie 1932
Op 30 Junie 1932 onderteken president Herbert Hoover die “Economy Act van 1932 ” om die salarisse van die regering te verlaag, wat bedoel was om die federale begroting te balanseer wat weens die Groot Depressie erg in die rooi was. Destyds was byna alle ekonome en politici van mening dat 'n gebalanseerde begroting van kardinale belang was vir ekonomiese herstel, maar vandag is die meeste ekonome dit eens dat dit 'n slegte idee was om die regering se besteding te verminder. Die vermindering van staatsamptenare en salarisse was 'n effektiewe manier om geld te bespaar, maar dit beteken ook dat hulle nie die geld in hul gemeenskappe spandeer nie.
Sommige bepalings van die nuwe wet het werklike ontberings opgelê: vakansieverlof is verminder en pensioenarisse moet hul pensioen prysgee as hulle ander inkomste of werk van meer as $ 3000 het. Die mees omstrede bepaling, artikel 213, vereis dat departemente, indien hulle werkers moet ontslaan om die bestedingsdoelwitte te bereik, afgedank word, werknemers wie se eggenoot ook vir die regering gewerk het. Gewoonlik beteken dit dat vroue hul werk sou verloor, omdat hul mans gewoonlik hoër lone verdien het.
Waarom het die kongres gedink dat dit 'n goeie idee was? Dit was destyds algemeen aanvaar dat vroue voor die huwelik buite die huis kon werk en dat vroue wat nie getroud was nie, 'n loopbaan kon hê, maar daar word aangeneem dat die vrou in 'n twee -inkomste -gesin óf werk vir ligsinnige geld. #8221 of nalatig van haar gesin. Namate werkloosheid tydens die depressie toegeneem het, word werkende getroude vroue daarvan beskuldig dat hulle selfsugtig werk vervul het wat 'n broodwinner (veronderstel dat dit 'n man is) kon help om sy gesin te onderhou.
President Hoover het alle departemente beveel om permanente afdankings te vermy indien hy enigsins wou hê dat staatswerkers hul werk moes verloor. Hy was van mening dat die vermindering van ure en lone oor die algemeen die beste benadering is om werknemers af te dank, net die aantal werkloses toeneem. Die oplossing van president Hoover was om die federale werkweek van 44 uur tot 40 uur te verminder (op daardie tydstip het die meeste federale werknemers Saterdag 'n halfdag gewerk), in wese 'n loonverlaging van 9%. Sommige agentskappe het gekies om op 'n week van 5 dae te werk, ander het hul bedrywighede van 6 dae voortgesit en werknemers toegelaat om te besluit wanneer hulle verlofdae moet neem. Daar was verskillende uitsonderings, dus het sommige werkers groter of kleiner salarisverminderings ondervind, en die wet vereis dat salarisverlagings soveel as moontlik op werknemers met 'n hoër loon val.
Die salaris van Hoover as president is deur die wet bepaal en kon nie in die middel van sy termyn verander word nie, en daarom het hy vrywillig 20%teruggegee. Vir die res van sy termyn het hy elke maand twee tjeks ontvang, een vir $ 5000 en een vir $ 1250, sodat hy die tweede tjek net aan die tesourie kon teruggee. Die groter tjek het na liefdadigheid gegaan, soos altyd sy praktyk was, en hy het nooit sy salaris vir enige openbare diens behou nie.
Kabinetsbeamptes was tegnies nie onderhewig aan die Wet op Ekonomie nie, maar hulle het almal ingestem om 15% betaal te verminder.
Die Wet op Ekonomie bly van krag lank nadat die artikel 213 van die Hoover -administrasie wat diskrimineer teen getroude persone uiteindelik in 1937 herroep is.
Lone van depressie
Die beleid van die Federale Reserweraad oor die afgelope jaar is deels gemotiveer om sommige van die beleid van die dertigerjare, insluitend deflasionêre monetêre beleid, nie te herhaal nie. Die huidige Fed -beleid het gehelp om deflasie te vermy, wat beslis belangrik was, maar histories veroorsaak deflasie op sigself nie altyd groot depressies nie.
Professore Andrew Atkeson van UCLA en Patrick Kehoe van Princeton het deflasie en depressie bestudeer en verklaar dat met die uitsondering van die dertigerjare in die res van die data vir 17 lande en meer as 100 jaar feitlik geen bewys is van 'n verband tussen deflasie en depressie. " Dit dui daarop dat daar gedurende die dertigerjare faktore was, maar nie op ander tye wat die impak van deflasie op die ekonomie verskerp het nie.
My navorsing dui daarop dat ekonomiese beleid belangrik is om te verstaan waarom die depressie aanvanklik so ernstig was en waarom deflasie in die dertigerjare meer neerdrukkend was. Hierdie navorsing dui spesifiek daarop dat president Herbert Hoover se beleid wat industriële kartelle geskep en bevorder het, en wat industriële lone bo hul markvrystellingsvlak gehou het, belangrike faktore was.
Hoover se siening oor mededinging verskil aansienlik van die huidige ekonomiese denke van vandag. Ekonome bevoordeel vandag gewoonlik sterk mededinging in baie markomgewings, aangesien mededinging die laagste pryse vir verbruikers bevorder en slegs die doeltreffendste produsente kan oorleef. Maar Hoover het gedink dat daar in die 1920's te veel mededinging in die Amerikaanse ekonomie was. Hoover het geglo dat industriële sinchronisasie en samewerking, en kodes van 'billike mededinging' tussen sakeondernemings in dieselfde bedryf, uitstekende ekonomiese uitkomste sal oplewer. Nie verrassend nie, het Hoover se inisiatiewe wat die industrie gehelp het om sameswerende handelsgroepe te ontwikkel, 'n hoë industriële konsentrasie en aansienlike monopolievervormings in die twintigerjare bevorder.
Hoover se siening oor loonbeleid en sy interpretasie van die feit dat hoë lone en welvaart hand aan hand loop, was ook anders. 'N Aantal ekonome interpreteer vandag hoë reële lone as 'n weerspieëling van die hoë produktiwiteit van werknemers wat voortspruit uit 'n geskoolde arbeidsmag wat met 'n groot voorraad kapitaal en doeltreffende tegnologie werk. Met ander woorde, produktiwiteit van werknemers dryf reële lone en voorspoed aan.
Maar Hoover interpreteer hierdie korrelasie anders en meen dat die verhoging van lone op sigself belangrik was om welvaart te bevorder, terwyl hy blykbaar die impak van die verhoging van lone bo produktiwiteit van werknemers op besigheidsaanstellingsbeslissings verdiskonteer het.
Hoover se beleidsbeskouings het die weg gebaan vir vergaderings wat hy laat in 1929 in die Withuis gehou het met die groot nywerheid
Maar dalende pryse en produktiwiteit, tesame met Hoover se program om lone vas te stel, het die industriële arbeidskoste aansienlik verhoog. Kort na Hoover se vergaderings het die industriële sektor vinnig begin saamtrek. Tussen Oktober 1929 en September 1930 het die industriële ure gewerk met byna 30%afgeneem. Die industriële sektor was dus ongeveer 'n jaar in die depressie erg depressief, voor die meeste groot dalings in die geldvoorraad wat deur Milton Friedman en Anna Schwartz beklemtoon is, en voor die meeste bankpaniek wat Ben Bernanke, voorsitter van die Federale Reserweraad, beklemtoon het.
Namate die industriële agteruitgang toeneem, het die bedryfsleiers aan Hoover gevra of hy salarisverlagings ondersteun wat eweredig is aan die deflasie wat plaasgevind het. Hoover het egter nie versoeke in die bedryf ondersteun nie, ondanks toenemende kritiek uit verskillende oorde dat sy program lone ver bo hul markvrystellingsvlakke hou.
Hierdie siening word ondersteun deur navorsing deur die ekonomiese historikus Curtis Simon, wat advertensies in die dertigerjare met 'situasie gesoek' ontleed het, wat deur individue uitgeneem is wat werk soek. Professor Simon het bevind dat die aanbodprys van arbeid-die loonkoers wat werksoekers in hul advertensies vra-ver onder die loonkoerse is wat betaal word. En voor die depressie was daar baie min verskil tussen die loon wat werksoekers vra en die loon wat betaal word.
Die industrie het in die herfs van 1931 die lone begin verlaag, nadat die industriële ure se werk met ongeveer 40%gedaal het, maar die industriële reële lone bly hoog, aangesien deflasie aansienlik versnel het. Hoover se arbeidsprogram het 'n uitwerking op die nywerheid gehad, maar nie op die landbousektor nie, wat destyds ongeveer dieselfde deel van die werk as die industrie gehad het. En die landbou -indiensneming het gedurende die vroeë dertigerjare min verander.
Hierdie navorsing dui daarop dat die depressie en die verlies aan werkgeleenthede ligter sou gewees het as Hoover nie die industrie versoek het om industriële lone vas te stel nie. Hoover se programme was beslis nie die enigste faktor wat by die depressie betrokke was nie, en meer navorsing is nodig oor die impak van onbuigsaamheid en ander faktore om die patologie van die Groot Depressie te verstaan, maar hierdie bevindinge dui wel daarop dat beleid wat mededinging voorkom die ekonomie kan onderdruk .
Die bevindinge het ook 'n paar implikasies vir beleid vandag. Die meeste ekonome en beleidmakers is veral bekommerd oor die feit dat die loongroei vir 'n aantal lae- en middelinkomste-werkers die afgelope drie dekades relatief traag was. Een boodskap uit hierdie navorsing is dat beleid wat daarop gemik is om lone te verhoog sonder om produktiwiteit te verhoog, werkverlies in gevaar stel, veral in wêreldwye mededingende sektore van die ekonomie. Maar daar is alternatiewe beleide wat werkers kan help deur produktiwiteit te verhoog deur verhoogde beurse en opleidingstoelaes wat toegang verhoog en die koste van post-sekondêre onderwys verlaag.
President Obama se onlangse voorstel om die federale steun aan gemeenskapskolleges met $ 12 miljard te verhoog om produktiwiteit en vaardighede van werknemers te verbeter, is 'n uitstekende eerste stap in hierdie rigting. Dit is in ooreenstemming met onlangse navorsing wat fokus op die belangrikheid van post-sekondêre skoolopleiding en opleiding vir die verhoging van langtermyn loongroei. En die belangrikheid van toenemende en verbeterde werksopleiding sal waarskynlik nog belangriker word namate Amerikaanse werkers en besighede in die toekoms meer wêreldwye mededingingsdruk ondervind.
Lee E. Ohanian is 'n professor in ekonomie en die direkteur van die Ettinger Family Program in Macroeconomic Research aan UCLA. (Forbes -rubriekskrywer Thomas F. Cooley is hierdie week weg.)
4. Eet tuis
Vir die meerderheid Amerikaners in die dertigerjare was uiteet - vergewe die woordspeling - van die tafel af. Byna elke maaltyd is tuis gekook, en die resepte van die dag was op die minste kreatief.
Klassieke geregte uit die depressie bevat onder meer asynpastei, paardebloemslaai en iets met die naam Hoover Stew, wat macaroni, worsbroodjies en enigiets anders bevat wat ietwat eetbaar lyk.
Alhoewel u miskien nie so desperaat is nie, bly u maaltye tuis en eintlik die voedsel wat u in u spens het, opgebruik, maar dit is nog steeds 'n goeie manier om geld te bespaar-veral as u 'n terugbetaalkaart gebruik om u kruideniersware te koop.
Die COVID -krisis in vergelyking met die groot depressie
Mense het gevra hoe die Groot Depressie en die New Deal vergelyk met die huidige COVID-19-krisis. Die ekonomiese situasies is nie dieselfde nie, en die huidige reaksie deur Amerikaanse regerings is verskeie ordes van grootte groter as die New Deal -reaksie op die Groot Depressie.
Tans weet ons presies waarom die ekonomie van 'n krans afgeval het. Om die uitbreiding van 'n nare siekte wat tot gruwelike sterftes kan lei, te stop, het amptenare van alle regeringsvlakke vereis dat almal behalwe 'noodsaaklike werkers' tuis moet bly en sosiale afstand moet doen wanneer hulle na kruidenierswinkels en dwelmwinkels gaan. Die stap het die kromme “platgemaak” en die oordrag van die siekte verminder. As gevolg hiervan het ekonomiese sektore wat van aangesig tot aangesig betrokke is, meestal geslaap, wat veroorsaak het dat werkers werkgeleenthede verloor en dat ondernemings sukkel om te oorleef.
Daarteenoor verstaan ons selfs nou nog nie die oorsake van die Groot Depressie van die dertigerjare ten volle nie. Die werklike produksie in beide 1932 en 1933 was 30 persent laer as in 1929. Dit het eers in 1937 die vlak van 1929 bereik. Werkloosheidsyfers het gestyg van ongeveer 2 persent in 1929 tot byna 10 persent in 1930 en dan tot 1940 bo 10 persent gebly, insluitend vier jaar bo 20 persent. Ons weet dat ons beleidsfoute gemaak het: die Hawley-Smoot-tarief, monetêre beleid wat te min aangebied het, en die belastingverhoging van 1932 wat inkomstebelasting vir die top 10 persent verhoog het en nuwe aksynsbelasting bygevoeg het wat alle lede van die ekonomie getref het. Tog was daar ander faktore wat nie so maklik is om te identifiseer nie, wat bygedra het tot so 'n groot afname in ekonomiese aktiwiteit.
Voor 1929 het die bevolking nie veel van die federale regering gevra nie. Staats- en plaaslike regerings het verantwoordelikheid gehad vir arbeids- en armoedebeleid. Uitgawes van die federale regering was 3 persent van die BBP in 1929. Min mense besef dat die regering van Herbert Hoover teen 1932 die federale uitgawes tot 6 persent van die BBP van 1929 verhoog het (8 persent van 'n gekrimpte BBP van 1932) omdat Herbert Hoover dit gedoen het binne bestaande programme, hardop gevra gebalanseerde begrotings en het nie die uitgawes in sy laaste ampstermyn verhoog nie. Franklin Roosevelt se New Deal het toe tientalle nuwe programme gestig terwyl federale uitgawes in 1939 uitgebrei is tot 11 persent van die BBP van 1929 (10 persent van die BBP van 1939). Die meeste uitgawes is bestee aan armoede-werkverligtingsprogramme soos die FERA en die WPA, wat lone van ongeveer die helfte tot twee-derdes van die lone betaal het vir openbare werke. As 'n deel van die verlore lone was die uitbetalings ietwat beter as die moderne werkloosheidsversekeringsvoordele, maar daar was 'n werkvereiste in die programme van die 1930's. 'N Deel van die New Deal -geld het gegaan aan projekte vir openbare werke wat volle lone betaal het. Ongeveer 10 persent gaan na betalings aan boere wat hulle gehelp het, maar huurders, boere en plaaswerkers uit die landbou gedryf het. Ander programme sluit in leningsprogramme vir boere, huiseienaars en besighede, erkenning van nuwe finansiële regulasies van vakbonde en die ongrondwetlike poging van die National Recovery Administration om elke bedryf toe te laat om mededinging te vermy deur pryse, lone, weeklikse ure en kwaliteit van goedere te bepaal. Op lang termyn het die Wet op Sosiale Sekerheid ouderdomspensioene, federale bypassende toelaes vir armoedeprogramme vir die staat en werkloosheidsversekering ingestel. Net soos Hoover, het Roosevelt ook probeer om die begroting te balanseer, en die tekorte as 'n deel van die BBP was laer as die tekorte in verskeie jare onder Reagan, die eerste Bush, Obama en Trump.
Iemand het my onlangs gevra of die samelewing vandag die wil het om 'n beroep op regerings te doen om te help soos hulle tydens die New Deal gedoen het. Dit het my as 'n vreemde verklaring opgeval. Hierbo het ons getoon dat dit tien jaar geneem het om federale uitgawes te verhoog om van 3 na 11 persent van die BBP van 1929 te styg. Hierdie krisis het ontstaan omdat die president, goewerneurs en burgemeesters in die poging om lewens te red, mense beveel het om tuis te bly en ondernemings te sluit. Die Federale Reserweraad het die afgelope paar weke op ongekende maniere leningsfasiliteite in die hele ekonomie oopgemaak. Werkloosheidsvoordele gaan vir die eerste keer na werkers wie se werkgewers nie tot die stelsel bygedra het nie, en die federale regering voeg $ 600 weeklikse betalings by wat die voordele ver bo die gewone 50 persent van die weekloon verhoog. Uiteindelik het 'n skerp verdeelde kongres en president 2.7 biljoen dollar aan uitgawes in noodpakkette gestig wat federale uitgawes van ongeveer 21 persent tot 34 persent van die BBP van 2019 verhoog. Dit sal die federale tekort van 5 tot minstens 18 persent van die BBP verhoog, en byna elke staat sal ook aansienlike tekorte hê. Nancy Pelosi het Donderdag 'n ekstra triljoen dollar gevra vir steun aan die staat en plaaslike regerings. Hierdie biljoen verhoog die regeringsuitgawes as 'n deel van die BBP tot 39 persent, net minder as die 40 persent wat die Amerikaner bestee het aan die Tweede Wêreldoorlog op die hoogtepunt van die oorlog in 1944. Die Amerikaanse publiek en leiers aan weerskante van die paadjie is vandag duidelik bereid om regerings toe te laat om stappe te doen wat veel verder gaan as wat die New Deal -regering in die dertigerjare gedoen het. Hulle kan binnekort teen federale uitgawes teen die hoogtepunt van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog meeding.
Price Fishback is die Thomas R. Brown -professor in ekonomie aan die Universiteit van Arizona.
Die omstrede New Deal
President Franklin Roosevelt, wat in 1933 in die amp gestem is, beloof groot verandering. Die New Deal wat hy begin het, was 'n innoverende, ongekende reeks binnelandse programme en handelinge wat ontwerp is om Amerikaanse sake te versterk, werkloosheid te verminder en die publiek te beskerm.
Die idee was losweg gebaseer op die Keynesiaanse ekonomie dat die regering die ekonomie kan en moet stimuleer. Die New Deal stel hoë doelwitte om die nasionale infrastruktuur, volle werk en gesonde lone te skep en in stand te hou. Die regering het begin om hierdie doelwitte te bereik deur prys-, loon- en selfs produksiebeheer.
Sommige ekonome beweer dat Roosevelt baie van Hoover se ingrypings net op groter skaal voortgesit het. Hy het sy fokus op prysondersteuning en minimum lone streng gehou en die land van die goudstandaard verwyder en individue verbied om goue munte en goud op te vang. He banned monopolistic, some consider them competitive, business practices, and instituted dozens of new public works programs and other job-creation agencies.
The Roosevelt administration paid farmers and ranchers to stop or cut back on production. One of the most heartbreaking conundrums of the period was the destruction of excess crops, despite the need for thousands of Americans to access affordable food.
Federal taxes tripled between 1933 and 1940 to pay for these initiatives as well as new programs such as Social Security. These increases included hikes in excise taxes, personal income taxes, inheritance taxes, corporate income taxes, and an excess profits tax.
Groot depressie
Texans were optimistic about the future in January 1929. Over the past decade the state population had increased to 5,824,715, representing a gain of more than one million people, or almost 25 percent. Although geared to one crop&mdash"Cotton is King"&mdashthe economy was somewhat diversified. In Oos -Texas the Piney Woods accounted for a substantial lumber industry in the lower Rio Grande valley, with the introduction of besproeiing, both truck and citrus farming had proved extremely profitable on the Edwards Plateau and in West Texas, livestock had established the state as the nation's number-one producer of hides and wool and mohair and at many oftentimes isolated sites such as Desdemona and Wink, wildcatters pursued the legacy of the Spindletop oilfield by producing vast amounts of oil and gas. In fact, Texans prided themselves on their situation, in being the largest state&mdashindeed more spacious in area than any western European nation&mdashand in maintaining the American frontier traits of rugged individualism, of fierce competitiveness, of unblushing patriotism. At the same time they had solidified and strengthened their economic position through political action. On the state level in 1928 they had reelected Dan Moody as governor, a brilliant lawyer versed in administrative efficiency and dedicated to "wiping out debts and lowering taxes," while on the national front they had for the first time voted for a Republican for the presidency. Herbert Clark Hoover of Iowa, with a strong belief in future prosperity for the country, had touched their wallets and won their purse-string allegiance. In addition to the prosperity factor was the issue of controversial Democratic nominee Alfred E. Smith. Catholic, urban-born, progressive in policies, yet educated politically by boss-dominated Tammany Hall, Smith was anathema to a majority of Texans, who were Protestant, agrarian conservatives and who openly embraced the return of morality and traditional American values nominally espoused by the Ku klux klan.
But on "Black Tuesday," October 29, 1929, all such optimism ended, as 16,000,000 shares of stock changed hands and the New York Tye industrial average plunged nearly forty points, thus marking the worst day in Wall Street history to that point. Over the next few weeks stocks on the New York exchange fell by 40 percent, a loss of $26 billion. Concerned and apprehensive, President Hoover reasoned that since the stock market was responsible for the collapse, the way to recovery was to correct the weaknesses within that institution. Having fashioned United States domestic policy over the past nine years, both as secretary of commerce and as president, he could not conceive that the entire economy was unsound. He therefore inundated the news media with expressions of confidence, with continual testimonials by cabinet members and business leaders. For instance, on November 4, 1929, Henry Ford announced that "things are better today than they were yesterday." To keep up the prevailing tempo Hoover also resorted to numerous meetings and conferences at the White House and time and again predicted that the depression was at an end or soon would be. Almost to a person Texans agreed. Through 1930 they persisted in their optimism, in their belief that the depression affected only those moneyed "gamblers" in the stock market, and in their denunciation of greedy Easterners who tried to undermine the sound United States economy. They therefore readily supported Hoover's morale crusade. After all, they relied upon the land of their forefathers as well as cattle and oil&mdashand fortunately the 1929 cotton crop had already been harvested and sold at a healthy price. Besides, New York and financial chaos were far away and, if need be, Texans could always produce enough from their farms to keep from going hungry.
Even in urban Texas this mind-set prevailed, with both community leaders and news media indulging in unrealistic logic and provincial pride. In Fort Worth the Record-Telegram en Star-Telegram, until the spring of 1931, pointed to increased construction, railroad traffic, oil production, and cattle and poultry sales as stabilizing, if not propitious, influences. "As a matter of fact, in America, we don't know what hard times are," a 1930 Star-Telegram editorial asserted. In Austin both university expenditures and state government employment bolstered the economy, while the political activities of the Forty-first Texas Legislature occupied much of the newspaper space. Even though swarms of insects had devastated a bumper crop and the stock market crash had the sobering effect of sweeping away "paper profits and some cash," local merchants, fearing that pessimistic headlines might have deleterious consequences in the economy, boomed the city through advertisements. Typical of their rhetoric was a paid plea to "talk Austin, write about Austin, work for Austin, and live for Austin." In Dallas, business in construction was flourishing in 1930 recent arrivals the year before had seen to that. The East Texas oil boom, centering around Kilgore, lessened thoughts of depression until the summer of 1931, when overproduction and falling prices affected the city economy. Oil prices plummeted so precipitously by this point that Governor Ross Sterling declared martial law and temporarily shut down the East Texas oilfield, a widely-criticized move that was followed by Texas Railroad Commission rule regulating oil production. In Houston, optimism was initially equally high at the beginning of the depression. Although fear of depression was widespread during the first months following the crash, the Post-Dispatch offered a continual salve. "More and more it appears," the editor asserted on November 17, 1929, that "the changes in stock prices are purely an affair of and for stock speculators." Again in March 1930, after the mayor had dismissed a number of city employees and 600 demonstrators had marched in protest, the Post-Dispatch announced that "Houston is comparatively free of discontent due to economic conditions." Besides, with proceeds from a busy port massaging the local economy, with oil refineries being constructed to meet increasing needs of production, and with financier-banker Jesse H. Jones as their leader, Houstonians temporarily ignored harsh realities. And in San Antonio, business leaders seemed afraid to admit depression, especially in the uit te druk, even though unemployment and bleak economic conditions were omnipresent. An October 1930 front-page article in the uit te druk reported that San Antonio was "one of five cities. to which men of billions. [were] looking to invest their money" another on October 5 debunked the "talk of `depression' and `money shortage'" and still another on September 28 noted that economists were predicting "better times. in store for San Antonio and the rest of the United States."
As depression worsened across the United States in 1931 and 1932 Texans eventually had to recognize its existence, then attempt to combat its devastating effects. Since the Hoover administration seemed incapable of meeting the people's needs, private charities shouldered the burdens of the poor and desperate until funds were exhausted, whereupon city governments and community leaders intervened. At Temple in Bell County, after two banks folded in 1931 and cotton dropped between five and six cents a pound, the Retail Merchants Association issued scrip&mdashas did the San Antonio School Board&mdashin denominations of twenty-five cents, fifty cents, and one dollar. In Midland, Dallas, and Fort Worth the chambers of commerce sponsored gardening projects, either donating land and seed or encouraging people to plant vegetables. In turn, businessmen in Fort Worth and San Antonio pledged to hire laborers on a part-time or weekly basis but at the same time passed ordinances not to hire transients hobo jungles, soon to be called "Hoovervilles," alarmed Texans. To obtain more money for relief, to provide soup kitchens and breadlines as well as shelter for the hapless, any number of cities&mdashHouston, Dallas, Fort Worth, Austin&mdashsponsored plays or musicals, the proceeds of which went to charity. In rural Texas economic conditions during 1931 and 1932 also deteriorated. But farmers, many of whom were sharecroppers and tenants, were already accustomed to some poverty and therefore did not always realize the degrees of hardship. Yet, as prices plummeted, as drought exacerbated their plight, as debts rose and foreclosures mounted alarmingly, they sought relief from their worsening situation. For example, noted celebrity Will Rogers, with the backing of Star-Telegram publisher Amon Carter, mounted a fundraising tour through Central and West Texas to raise funds for drought-stricken farmers in 1931. Yet neither Governor Ross Sterling of Texas nor the Hoover administration, although funneling some funds to farmers through the RFC (Reconstruction Finance Corporation), reversed this dire trend. The depression had indeed overwhelmed them.
Also overwhelmed by the ravages of depression were those Texans whose economic position was already tenuous. Not surprisingly, African-Americans found themselves hardest hit as the average Black family&rsquos earnings fell as well from $978 in 1928 to a low of $874 in 1933. In rural areas, plummeting farm prices and the continuing trend of mechanization of agriculture combined to take their toll on Black Texans, forcing many of them either off the land or into lower status as farm laborers. By 1935 an estimated 90 percent of African American farm laborers were unable to find gainful employment. Urban Black Texans were not any better off than their rural counterparts. For example, even though Black Austinites were just 18.5 percent of the population, 35.6 percent of the city&rsquos unemployed population was Black. And while urban Texas was not spared the worst of the depression, conditions in the countryside encouraged migration to the cities especially by Black Texans. As a matter of fact, the state&rsquos African American urban population grew by more than 180,000 during the decade, thus creating tighter competition for the shrinking blue-collar jobs typically reserved for Black Texans at the time. And while legal efforts in Texas to undermine Jim Crow accelerated during the depression in spite of low funding, any gains made through the courts were negligible, and Black Texans would have to wait several more years before rulings such as Smith v. Allwright (1944) began to weaken the structure.
Mexican Americans did not fare much better, as both migrants and urban dwellers entered the depression decade already in a tenuous socioeconomic position. Landelik Tejanos, generally paid lower wages than their White counterparts, found themselves the target of the ire of their White neighbors who struggled to find work. One Fort Bend County White tenant farmer grumbled, &ldquoThis county is literally overrun with Mexicans. &hellip I am an up-to-date cotton and truck farmer and a good gang foreman, but as I am not a Mexican, there is no work for me.&rdquo Such attitudes were not rare across agricultural regions of the state. The United States Immigration Service targeted Mexican Americans of both legal and undocumented status for deportation, and between 1929 and 1939, around 250,000 returned to Mexico from Texas either as result of said deportation or voluntary repatriation (kyk MEXICAN AMERICANS AND REPATRIATION). Of course, many of them remained. Yet, Mexican Texans refused to accept a position of passive victimhood. On the eve of the depression, delegates representing several fraternal societies met to create the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), an organization which saw its membership expand during the 1930s. In San Antonio, Tejanas such as Emma Tenayuca organized a number of strikes protesting low wages and unhealthy working conditions in the cigar and pecan industries with varying degrees of success (kyk PECAN-SHELLERS&rsquo STRIKE).
The fact that women organized and led these strikes reflected the growing number of women in the urban workforce. Granted, Texas women of all ethnicities and races discovered that the depression amplified already existing challenges, and many were criticized for seeking employment during the depression on the grounds that they took jobs from well-deserving men. Yet, more than half a million Texas women worked for wages. Many more, especially Black women, would have worked if the opportunity was available. One should not ignore the fact that many other Texas women who did not work for wages continued to toil daily on the family farm, especially as falling cotton prices in the early years of the depression led many farmers to grow more cotton and thus require more field labor. One woman, Wilma Edwards, recounted how her mother stood &ldquoover that hot stove all day long. . .pregnant with my brother, prepar[ing] hundreds of cans of beef and everything in the year of 1931 and &rsquo32, all kinds of vegetables, and preserve[ing] all kinds of fruits.&rdquo
Consequently, Texans sought new solutions to their problems. President Hoover, whom they had ardently supported for more than two years, was now a villain of huge proportions, a betrayer of capitalism and democracy, the man who was responsible for their economic calamity. With grim satisfaction they readily endorsed the debunking of their hero by calling&mdashsometimes laughingly, sometimes savagely&mdasharmadillos "Hoover hogs," tent and tar-paper hobo jungles "Hoovervilles," and pants pockets turned inside out "Hoover flags." So when Democrats nominated Governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt of New York for president and John Nance (Cactus Jack) Garner of Uvalde for vice president in the summer of 1932, the election choice was evident. Texans agreed that a "New Deal for the forgotten man" required their backing the Democratic ticket garnered 88.6 percent of the state vote. Residents of the state, hoping for immediate returns on their political decision, were not disappointed. The state representation in Washington was powerful and influential. Besides Garner, who performed the "role as liaison man between the administration and Congress" until 1937 and who was considered by some to be "the most powerful Vice President in history," Sam Rayburn of Bonham figured prominently. In the House he chaired the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and, as Garner's acknowledged protégé, he was in line for majority leader and, eventually, speaker. Six other Texans also held House chairmanships, including James P. Buchanan of Brenham on Appropriations, Hatton W. Sumners of Dallas on Judiciary, and Marvin Jones of Amarillo on Agriculture while in the upper house Morris Sheppard headed the Military Affairs Committee and Tom (Thomas T.) Connally chaired Public Buildings and Grounds. Equally if not more impressive was the position of Jesse H. Jones. As head of the RFC he managed an economic empire within the government. By 1938 he had disbursed $10 billion to financial institutions, agriculture, railroads, and public works&mdashand, remarkably, practically all of the money was later repaid.
Conservative and mostly from rural areas, the Texas delegation members were, Congressman George H. Mahon candidly stated, "Democrats first and New Dealers second." But more than anything else they were Texans interested in economic recovery for the United States, hence for their state. Philosophically most of them agreed during Roosevelt's first term with Jones, who bluntly told a convention of resentful bankers in 1933 to be smart, for once, and take the government into partnership. They therefore figured prominently in New Deal legislation. In banking, Garner and Jones&mdashover Roosevelt's opposition&mdashhelped incorporate the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation into the Glass-Steagall Banking Act. To correct many weaknesses in the stock market, Rayburn was instrumental in passing the Truth in Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. He was also important in such legislation as the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, the Federal Communications Act, the Rural Electrification Act, and the Public Utility Holding Company Act. In Agriculture, Marvin Jones helped restructure the agrarian economy in 1933 by aiding passage of the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, the Farm Credit Act, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act as well as providing drought-relief funds for the Panhandvatsel and West Texas. In 1934 he aided Texas ranchers with the Jones-Connally Act and sugar producers with the Jones-Costigan Sugar Act. The Texas delegation, overall, supported the National Industrial Recovery Act and emergency unemployment, ever mindful that a good deal of federal aid would find its way to Texas.
Officials on the state level during FDR's first term were not nearly as effective. In November 1932 former governor Miriam A. (Ma) Ferguson defeated incumbent governor Ross Sterling, who was a victim of depression politics as well as election fraud in East Texas. After her inauguration in January, she, with the help of her husband, former governor James E. (Pa) Ferguson (who had been impeached in 1917), tried to deal with the state's pressing economic problems. To avert a financial panic, she boldly&mdashand with questionable constitutional authority&mdashdeclared a bank moratorium on March 2 then, rather fortunately, three days later Roosevelt sustained her decree by proclaiming a national bank holiday and promising to reopen all suspended banks within a short time, but under federal guidelines. At the same time, with estimates that the state debt was in the $14 million range, Governor Ferguson repeatedly but unsuccessfully proposed to the legislature both state sales and income taxes. Except for the passage of a two-cent-a-barrel tax on oil, she could reduce deficits only by cutting appropriations. An even more important issue for the Ferguson administration was unemployment and relief&mdasha problematic matter that led to scandal. When late in 1932 the RFC made substantial funds available to the governor, who, in turn, was to dispense money to counties through three regional chambers of commerce, the Fergusons were delighted. Here was an excellent opportunity to build an even more powerful political machine with federal money. By executive order, therefore, Mrs. Ferguson established the Texas Relief Commission and selected Lawrence Westbrook as director. Immediately she and Pa and Westbrook brought local relief administrations into their organization and placed the funds in pet banks. Then in May 1933, after Congress passed the Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA), they had an even greater windfall to administer, with the Texas Rehabilitation and Relief Commission specifically created by the legislature to oversee and distribute federal money through a system of county boards. Jim Ferguson, at the behest of his wife, became the commission chairman, although without a legal right to do so. Together with Westbrook and several appointees, he filled county boards with constituents and friends.
To keep their political machine well oiled, the Fergusons needed money&mdashand lots of it. Consequently they pressured the legislature to approve a $20 million relief bond issue in the form of a constitutional amendment upon which the electorate would vote. Then they used every possible maneuver to get it adopted. They padded payrolls with supporters, paid poll taxes for "their voters," and financed the campaign, oftentimes with federal funds. The situation in Bexar County exemplified their tactics. Bexar County had 252 people on its payroll with monthly salaries as large as $300, whereas the average county had about fifty employees and sometimes paid them very little. Of course, the Fergusons also appealed to basic greed as well as human compassion. "We told them [social workers] if they wanted more money to give out that they had better vote with us," Bexar County relief administrator Tex Alsbury testified, "and we got them to get the precinct vote. The people. were out of work and money. They were hungry and they lined up to vote." As a final coup de grâce, the Fergusons persuaded FERA administrator Harry Hopkins to join the campaign. In a radio address three days before the election he announced that "the federal government has no intention of continuing to pay 95 percent of the Texas relief bill after the bond election on Saturday." Hence on August 26, 1933, Texans approved of relief for the unemployed. But the Fergusons' ambitious tactics brought questions of corruption, and both legislative chambers called for an investigation. During the fall of 1933 a Senate investigating committee heard conflicting testimony. Yet the issue was soon resolved after Westbrook, director of the Texas Relief Commission, admitted under oath, "I know that in some instances outright fraud has been committed, forgeries, misapplication of funds." As a result, A. R. Johnson, the Austin city manager, replaced Westbrook on February 12, 1934, thus destroying the Ferguson relief machine.
Still another issue during the Ferguson years was the lack of law and order, a problem involving the Texas Rangers, who, during the Democratic primary late in July 1932 supported Governor Ross Sterling&mdasha grave error politically, especially in the Ferguson stronghold of East Texas. In January 1933 the new governor fired every ranger for such partisanship&mdashforty-four in all. The results were disastrous. The legislature reduced new ranger salaries, eliminated longevity pay, slashed travel budgets, and limited force personnel to thirty-two men. Mrs. Ferguson then appointed new officers, many of whom "by any standard," historian Steve Schuster candidly asserted, "were a contemptible lot." In less than a year one private was convicted of murder several others in Company D, after having raided a gambling hall in Duval County, were found to have set up their own establishment with the confiscated equipment and still another, a captain, was arrested for theft and embezzlement. But even worse, the governor began using special ranger commissions as a source of political patronage. Within two years she enlarged the group of special rangers to 2,344 men, thus prompting the Austin Amerikaans to comment that "about all the requirements a person needed. to be a Special Ranger was to be a human being." The effects of the rangers' becoming a source of patronage, corruption, and ridicule directed toward state law enforcement were, of course, catastrophic. During the Ferguson years crime and violence became widespread, bank holdups and murder commonplace. Soon few states could claim a more vicious assortment of gangsters or provide a safer sanctuary for the criminal element. For instance, residents in the Dallas-Fort Worth area alone included George "Machine-Gun" Kelly, Raymond Hamilton, and "mad-dog killers" Clyde Barrow en Bonnie Parker. Who besides Ma Ferguson was responsible for this breakdown in the public defense? To most Texans the answer was obvious. As one newspaper sarcastically remarked, "A Ranger commission and a nickel will get. a cup of coffee anywhere in Texas."
Since Mrs. Ferguson decided not to seek reelection in 1934 (she honored the two-term tradition, having first served as governor from 1925 to 1927), the Democratic primary was wide open. Toe James (Jimmie) Allred stepped into the breach. Clean-cut looking and personable, the thirty-five-year-old Allred was easily the front runner in the lackluster gubernatorial campaign. As Texas attorney general for the past four years, he had the greatest name recognition of the candidates he received powerful support from such men as Vice President Garner, Jesse Jones, and former governor Ross Sterling and he had a well-financed campaign to help him tout the virtues of the New Deal as well as stricter enforcement of the law. Allred led the field of six candidates in the Democratic primary and then defeated wealthy oilman Tom Hunter of Wichita Falls by 40,000 votes in the primary runoff. In November he was the victor over Republican D. E. Wagonner. Once elected, Allred ensured his tenure as governor for four years by bringing New Deal money to Texas. He immediately sought permission to issue the remaining $3.5 million from the $20 million relief bonds passed in August 1933 and hinted that the federal government might give matching funds for old-age pensions. He next decided to replace the dole to the unemployed with direct work relief. Hence, he focused on the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), Work Projects Administration (WPA), National Youth Administration, and Public Works Administration (PWA). As a consequence Texas received, one report stated, more than $166 million by August 31, 1936, of which Washington proffered more than $96 million another source estimated the total to be $350 million by the end of the year.
The CCC, a nationwide program for young men that focused on natural resources from 1933 to 1942, was very active in Texas. At its peak in 1935 the corps had twenty-seven camps in Texas constructing recreational parks and an additional seventy camps for work in forest and soil conservation. Because assignment to states was random, many Texans participated in other states' CCC camps, joining some 2,500,000 men across the country. Most men earned thirty dollars a month and were required to send at least twenty-five dollars of that to their families. In addition to this economic aid, the CCC left an architectural legacy in Texas, seen today in buildings in thirty-one state parks and several city and county parks. The NYA also greatly benefited Texans, specifically those of ages sixteen to twenty-five. Under the leadership of twenty-seven-year-old Lyndon Baines Johnson, the state program provided support for high school students in 248 counties as well as for young people in eighty-three colleges and universities. For two years, beginning in the summer of 1935, Johnson employed 10,000 to 18,000 students a month "at various part-time clerical or maintenance jobs earning a maximum $6.00 per month in high school and $15.00 in college." In out-of-school work programs he hired more than 12,000 young Texans who, in turn, constructed 250 roadside parks, graveled the shoulders of 2,000 miles of highway, improved or built recreational facilities in seventy-six state parks, and refurbished the playgrounds of public schools. But the emergency public employment programs of the PWA and WPA were equally if not more helpful to the state economy. In Fort Worth, for example, these federal agencies expended $15 million on a variety of projects. From 1935 to 1938 they "completely modernized the entire school system," historian John McClung asserted, "making it one of the best in the state." The PWA constructed thirteen school buildings and made additions to thirteen more, while rehabilitating most of the existing structures. In conjunction with these projects, the agency "landscaped and beautified fifty-four of the existing sixty-three school grounds." These agencies also provided funds for red-brick roads, some of which are still in existence the 12,000-seat concrete high school stadium named Farrington Field Will Rogers Memorial Coliseum and Auditorium John Peter Smith City-County Hospital a new city hall and jail a new public library and the famous Fort Worth Rose Garden. Together with the Federal Writers' Project (kyk TEXAS WRITERS&rsquo PROJECT), whereby scholars were hired to index newspapers and record local history, the Federal Theater Project and the Federal Art Project provided money for artists and thespians to develop their crafts.
Not all Texans enjoyed full access to the benefits of the New Deal, though some racial and ethnic minorities were recipients of New Deal largess. Some, especially Tejanas, found employment in WPA-sponsored sewing rooms. Not all who were eligible for federal programs enrolled however, as fears of deportation kept many Tejanos from seeking these benefits. As with Tejanas, Black women discovered that the New Deal provided limited benefits. For example, only 3 percent of WPA workers in Texas were Black women, and those that were employed faced persistent discrimination. In the words of San Antonio residents B. E. Bone and I. M. Howard, &ldquoThey treated us very bad at the WPA office.&rdquo At the same time, however, through Lyndon Johnson&rsquos efforts, NYA programs helped 19,000 young Afro -Amerikaners, the primary requisite for selection being that of "need."
Another aid to the state's economy at this time was the Texas Centennial celebration in 1936. Despite the depression, the Texas Centennial Commission was formed in September 1934 to plan the celebration the legislature passed an appropriations bill for the effort in April 1935. With additional federal assistance, the state centered its activities on Dallas, where a $25 million effort was put into transforming Fair Park into a world's fair with permanent buildings. Work proceeded quickly, and with a very positive effect on the local economy, and in June 1936 President Roosevelt joined Governor Allred, who was campaigning for his second term, in visiting the grounds. In addition to the Dallas festivities, the celebration included a program of permanent monuments, markers, museums, and restorations, as well as a highly successful publicity and advertising campaign.
Allred was a willing conduit for massive amounts of federal funds. At the same time, however, he dealt with a number of state problems that greatly affected his constituency. In both regular and several special sessions the legislators, at his behest, authorized a state planning board, appropriated $11 million for higher education, and set aside $10 million for rural relief. Allred also established the Texas Department of Public Safety, which brought the famed Texas Rangers and the uniformed Highway Patrol under one aegis, thereby fulfilling one of his major campaign promises&mdashbetter law enforcement. After Congress passed the National Social Security Act in August 1935, he pushed through complementary legislation having to do with old-age pensions, unemployment compensation, teacher retirement, and aid for needy children and the blind. At the same time he increased the state deficit to $19 million. Because he made needed reforms and provided governmental service, Jimmie Allred, as the New Deal governor of Texas, governed popularly&mdashand reasonably well.
Yet in 1937&ndash38, despite great political influence in Washington, ready access to federal money, and Allred's leadership, a number of Texans began to harbor grave reservations about the New Deal and, particularly, the power of the president. After the November elections of 1936, in which Roosevelt carried all but two states (the electoral vote was 523 to 8), Vice President Garner appeared to be more and more alienated. With increasing frequency he openly criticized New Deal spending programs, while abhorring labor's newest tactic against management, the sit-down strike. Texans were further distanced from the president when, on February 5, 1937, he announced his plan to reorganize the judiciary, including a proposal to increase the membership of the United States Supreme Court. This controversial recommendation, which would allow the president to add a justice (up to six) to the court each time an incumbent member turned seventy but did not retire, was Roosevelt's attempt to overcome the high court's rulings against various New Deal laws. Garner, together with Sam Rayburn, Hatton Sumners, Tom Connally, and most of the Texas delegation, was firmly opposed. The plan ultimately failed in Congress (kyk COURT-PACKING PLAN OF 1937). Then, in the mid-year elections of 1938, Roosevelt committed the ultimate political sin, as far as they were concerned he tried to purge the Democratic party of those who had opposed New Deal programs. On his hit list were eight Texas congressmen&mdashMartin Dies, Richard M. Kleberg, Fritz (Frederick G.) Lanham, Joseph J. Mansfield, Milton H. West, Clyde L. Garrett, Nat Patton, and Sumners&mdashall of whom won against Roosevelt men in the primaries, while New Deal incumbents Fontaine Maury Maverick and W. D. McFarlane lost. These political events, coupled with the formation of a vitriolic anti-Roosevelt group who called themselves Jeffersonian Democrats (gelei deur J. Evetts Haley, Joseph W. Bailey, Jr., and J. M. West), nurtured dissent and unrest throughout the state against the New Deal.
But in the spring of 1938 a political phenomenon took place in Texas that overshadowed these party struggles and allowed Texans to focus upon one central figure&mdashWilbert Lee ("Please pass the biscuits, Pappy") O'Daniel. A Fort Worth businessman and radio personality who sold Hillbilly Flour with an accompanying band known as the Hillbilly Boys, Pappy O'Daniel announced his candidacy for governor on May 1, 1938, after receiving more than 54,000 letters in one week "begging" him to run. He then proceeded to dumbfound political analysts and stun his opponents. Using campaign techniques that resembled the old-fashioned revivalism of camp meetings, he stumped the state in a bus and played traditional songs and gospel music before passing collection plates in the form of barrels labeled "Flour-not Pork." Texans had not seen anything like him, not even Jim Ferguson. For what could opponents say about a man whose platform was the Ten Commandments and motto the Golden Rule, who pledged a pension of thirty dollars a month for every Texan over sixty-five, and who recited to attentive, enraptured audiences such poems as "The Boy Who Never Got Too Old To Comb His Mother's Hair"? When newsmen and opponents pointed out that O'Daniel had not been civic-minded enough to pay a $1.75 poll tax in order to vote, he damned the professional politicians and declared that "no politician in Texas is worth $1.75." In a field of thirteen, which included Attorney General William McCraw of Dallas, Railroad Commissioner Ernest O. Thompson of Amarillo, and Tom Hunter of Wichita Falls, O'Daniel soon became the front runner and in the July Democratic primary he won by a majority of 30,000 votes.
For almost three years the O'Daniel aura held sway in state politics, although having little legislative impact. After his inauguration in January 1939, at which 100,000 people jammed into Memorial Stadium at the University of Texas, the new governor quickly demonstrated his inability to lead, his ineptness in dealing with the legislature, and his lack of understanding of the art of government. To support his pension plan and provide money for a state budget, O'Daniel proposed a 1.6 percent tax on business transactions, actually a well-concealed multiple sales tax, which the legislature promptly rejected. He then campaigned for a constitutional amendment whereby the electorate would vote upon the merits of a state sales tax however, a militant minority in the House&mdashthe "56 Club"&mdashprevented its passage. Consequently, to cut costs as well as retaliate against hostile legislators, he line-item-vetoed a number of appropriations that were important to the well-being of Texans: new buildings for state hospitals beds for epileptics, orphans, and the feeble-minded the funds for the Texas Department of Public Safety and State Highway Department. This last economy resulted in the Texas Rangers having, at times, "to borrow ammunition from highway patrolmen." Equally inappropriate, if not laughable, were many of his appointments. For example, as state labor commissioner he selected a desk worker at Southwestern Bell Telephone Company who was not even an officer in his own union and whose only qualification was a letter he wrote praising one of O'Daniel's radio addresses. For the state highway commission O'Daniel chose oil man J. M. West of Houston, a leading Jeffersonian Democrat the Senate, fearing the possible loss of federal road funds, immediately rejected this nomination.
Despite this carnival in Austin and his lack of accomplishment, O'Daniel remained strong with the people. In the Democratic primary of 1940 he proved that his first election was not a fluke, that his vote-getting powers were a reality. Against a fairly strong field, including Ma Ferguson, Railroad Commissioner Jerry Sadler, Highway Commissioner Harry Hines, and Ernest O. Thompson, he polled a majority of a little more than 102,000 votes. In the spring of 1941 the stalemate between the governor and the legislature therefore continued&mdashthat is, until circumstances dictated a political realignment&mdashand O'Daniel staged an accompanying farce. On April 9 United States senator Morris Sheppard died, and O'Daniel, although himself desiring the position, had to appoint a "suitable and qualified" interim replacement. So on San Jacinto Day, April 21, he selected someone who would never be a threat to his own candidacy, eighty-seven-year-old Andrew Jackson Houston, the only surviving son of Sam Houston. One veteran politician observed that he was already "in his dotage," or, putting it less charitably, he stated, "That old man probably couldn't tell you whether the sun was up or had gone down." At any rate, Houston was sworn in on June 2 and filled this prestigious position until his death later in the month. In the meantime O'Daniel geared himself for the June special election to fill Sheppard's seat. The competition was formidable. Besides Congressman Martin Dies and Attorney General Gerald Mann, the young congressman Lyndon Baines Johnson, who received the support of FDR as well as most of the moneyed people in Texas, announced against him. A number of people actually wanted to get O'Daniel out of Texas, however, by sending him to Washington. Reputedly Jim Ferguson, who "had been very friendly with the liquor interests for close to three decades," feared that the governor would appoint "good clean honest Christian dry citizens" to the state Liquor Control Board and was thus campaigning for his election. But more important for O'Daniel was the tremendous support from the friends of Lieutenant Governor Coke Stevenson, who would inherit the governorship if O'Daniel went to the Senate. After a hard-fought, expensive campaign O'Daniel once again proved his resiliency by receiving a plurality of votes over LBJ of 175,590 to 174,279. In August 1941, with O'Daniel's resignation, Stevenson became governor. The turbulent rivalry between the executive and legislative branches subsided&mdashand none too soon. Within four months, on December 7, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and the United States entered Tweede Wereldoorlog.
Sien ook DUST BOWL, TEXAS IN THE 1920S.
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