1972 Moskouberaad - Geskiedenis

1972 Moskouberaad - Geskiedenis


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Vanaf November 1969 begin onderhandelinge tussen die Verenigde State en die Sowjetunie oor die beperking van antiballistiese missielstelsels. Die twee leiers het beide 'n verdrag teen ballistiese missiele onderteken wat beide kante beperk het tot die aantal staanplekke tot twee plekke wat deur ABM's beskerm word, sowel as om die aantal ballistiese missiele wat beide kante beperk het tot die getalle wat hulle tans het, te beperk.



SALT -ooreenkomste onderteken

Die Sowjet -president Leonid Brezjnev en die Amerikaanse president Richard Nixon, wat in Moskou vergader, onderteken die Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) ooreenkomste. Destyds was hierdie ooreenkomste die mees ingrypende pogings om kernwapens ooit te beheer.

Nixon en Brezjnef het onwaarskynlike kandidate gelyk vir die Amerikaanse en Sowjet -staatsmanne wat 'n baanbrekende verdragsbeperkingsverdrag sou onderteken. Beide mans het hul reputasie as hardnekkige Koue Oorlog-krygers gedra. Tog, teen 1972, was albei leiers gretig vir nouer diplomatieke betrekkinge tussen hul onderskeie nasies. Die Sowjetunie was besig met 'n toenemend vyandige woordeoorlog met kommunistiese China -grensgeskille tussen die twee nasies wat die afgelope paar jaar uitgebreek het. Die Verenigde State het hulp gesoek om hulself te bevry van die ongewilde en duur oorlog in Viëtnam. In die besonder wou Nixon die Amerikaanse publiek daarvan weerhou dat hy gedurende byna vier jaar as president nie daarin kon slaag om die konflik te beëindig nie. Die beraadvergadering van Mei 1972 tussen Nixon en Brezjnev was 'n geskikte oomblik om die nouer verhoudings na te streef wat elkeen verlang.

Die belangrikste element van die beraad was die SALT -ooreenkomste. Besprekings oor SALT het ongeveer twee-en-'n-half jaar plaasgevind, maar met min vordering. Tydens die ontmoeting tussen Mei 1972 tussen Nixon en Brezjnef is 'n monumentale deurbraak egter behaal. Die SALT -ooreenkomste wat op 27 Mei onderteken is, het twee belangrike kwessies behandel. Eerstens het hulle die aantal antiballistiese missielterreine (ABM) beperk wat elke land kan hê tot twee. (ABM's was missiele wat bedoel was om inkomende missiele te vernietig.) Tweedens is die aantal interkontinentale ballistiese missiele en ballistiese missiele wat met onderzee gelanseer is, op bestaande vlakke gevries. Daar was egter niks in die ooreenkomste oor veelvuldige onafhanklike doelwitte vir herontvangsvoertuie (enkele missiele met veelvuldige kernkoppe) of oor die ontwikkeling van nuwe wapens nie. Nietemin het die meeste Amerikaners en Sowjette die SALT -ooreenkomste as geweldige prestasies beskou.  


1972 SOMMIT REEKS

Die 1972 -beraadreeks tussen nasionale hokkiespanne uit Kanada en die USSR was die eerste keer dat Kanadese professionele hokkiespelers die nasionale span van die Sowjetunie konfronteer. Baie glo dat hierdie spesiale reeks hokkie vir altyd verander het. Terwyl die Kanadese baie trots was op die beste hokkiespelers ter wêreld, het die USSR sedert die Tweede Wêreldoorlog 'n elite -hokkieprogram ontwikkel en 'n nasionale span opgelewer wat die sport vinnig by internasionale kompetisies oorheers het. Die reëls van die International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) het professionele hokkiespelers uitgesluit, wat Kanada gedwing het om spanne uit amateurs te stuur, terwyl die Sowjet -spanne nominaal aan die amateur -kriteria voldoen. Kanada het aanvanklik in die 1920's oorheers toe yshokkie eers bekendgestel is, maar teen die laat 1950's het Kanadese spanne gereeld verloor teen Europese, veral Sowjet -spanne. In 1968 het premier Pierre Trudeau 'n taakspan op die been gebring om die internasionale status van Kanada in sport te ondersoek, wat gelei het tot die stigting van Hockey Canada. Na onderhandelinge met Sowjet-amptenare en staatsbesoeke tussen Trudeau en die Sowjet-premier Alexei Kosygin, is 'n reeks van agt wedstryde aangekondig vir September 1972, die eerste vier wedstryde wat in Kanada gespeel word en die res in die Sowjetunie.

Hoewel afrigter Harry Sinden daarteen gewaarsku het, was die Kanadese vol vertroue dat hulle maklik sou wen. Baie spelers het uit hul vorm by die oefenkamp aangekom en sukkel om tred te hou met die uiters goed gekondisioneerde Sowjet-spelers. Toe kom die verwoestende nederlaag van 7-3 in die eerste wedstryd op die Montreal Forum. Team Canada hergroepeer ná hierdie skokkende verlies en wen die tweede wedstryd (4-1) in Toronto, maar maak die derde wedstryd in Winnipeg (4-4) gelyk en verloor in Vancouver (5-3). Media en aanhangers was gefrustreerd, geskok en kwaad. Sommige ondersteuners het selfs die Kanadese spelers opgejou, wat Phil Esposito aangespoor het om 'n passievolle toespraak met Kanadese op nasionale televisie te hou. Die span het na Europa vertrek waar hulle twee uitstallingswedstryde in Swede gespeel het om gewoond te raak aan Europese bediening en die groter ysoppervlak. Die span het na Moskou gegaan waar die vier oorblywende wedstryde gespeel is. Die aanvanklike plan om spelers uit elke NHL -span ten minste een wedstryd te laat speel, moes egter geskrap word ten gunste van die spelers wat die beste by die hoogs bekwame en gekondisioneerde Sowjet -span pas.

Team Canada het die volgende wedstryd met 5-4 verloor, maar het saamgespan om die Spele 6 en 7 te wen met tellings van 3-2 en 4-3 met Paul Henderson wat die wendoel in albei wedstryde aangeteken het. In die laaste wedstryd was die reeks gelykop. Volgens IIHF -reëls kan die Sowjets met hul uitstekende doelverskil die oorwinning in die reeks opeis as die wedstryd gelykop eindig. Kanada moes wen! In die derde periode wat met 'n telling van 5 op 3 voorgeloop het, het die Sowjetunie verseker van oorwinning gelyk, maar die Kanadese het die hart, vasberadenheid en individuele inspanning getoon wat die Sowjets sou bewonder. Phil Esposito en Yvan Cournoyer het aangeteken om die wedstryd gelyk te maak, en met slegs 34 sekondes oor het Henderson sy beroemde doel aangeteken, wat sommige nog steeds as die grootste oomblik in die Kanadese sportgeskiedenis beskou.

Die reeks genereer passievolle nasionalisme in beide Kanada en die Sowjetunie, terwyl sommige Kanadese aanhangers na Moskou reis om Team Canada aan te moedig, en ander stuur telegramme wat die spelers gebruik het om hul kleedkamers se mure te bedek. Die reeks het die Kanadese meer verenig as enige ander sportbyeenkoms, terwyl ondersteuners agter Team Canada saamgedrom het in die hoop om hul nou aangetaste beeld te red as die land wat die hokkiebaan regeer het. Na raming het 15 uit 20 miljoen Kanadese ingeskakel, en baie skole en besighede het televisiestelle opgerig sodat almal na die laaste wedstryd kon kyk, gebring deur satelliettegnologie. Kanadese juig ekstaties toe Paul Henderson se doel die oorwinning vir Kanada behaal en Foster Hewitt aankondig dat "Henderson vir Kanada aangeteken het!"

Die reeks was buitengewoon intens in die konteks van die Koue Oorlog. Weerspieël in twee baie verskillende hokkiestyle was 'n kultuurbotsing tussen twee nasies met baie verskillende politieke stelsels. Die Sowjetunie het 'n gedissiplineerde spanwedstryd gespeel met vinnige skaats, skerp aangee en die klem op strategie, terwyl die Kanadese klem gelê het op skiet en liggaamskontrole. Baie Kanadese het geglo dat Team Canada wen as gevolg van die 'hart' en passie van spelers soos Paul Henderson en Phil Esposito, wat die demokratiese, kapitalistiese stelsel en die klem op individuele vryhede weerspieël. Nog nooit tevore of sedertdien het 'n reeks sulke intensiteit ontlok nie. Die 1972 Summit Series behou sy ikoniese status as 'n bepalende oomblik wat alle Kanadese bymekaar gebring het om Team Canada te juig.


'Three Days in Moscow' herinner Reagan se pogings in Rusland op die herdenking van die beraad in Moskou

'Drie dae in Moskou'

Bret Baier kyk na die einde van die Koue Oorlog en die rol van president Reagan by die ineenstorting van die Sowjetunie.

'Dit is 'n epiese verhaal met 'n onwaarskynlike held', het Fox Baai -gasheer en skrywer Bret Baier opgemerk toe hy berig oor die gebeure in Fox Nation se 'Three Days in Moscow'.

Op 29 Mei 1988 het Ronald Regan na Moskou gereis vir 'n gebeurtenis van 3 dae wat 'n beduidende verandering in die verhouding tussen die VSA en Rusland sou veroorsaak. Toe hy die eerste keer aankom, het die boodskap dat die Amerikaanse president na hulle [Russe] gekom het, onaangekondig, onmiddellik versprei. Duisende storm op straat, en die 77-jarige Reagan het eintlik op 'n groentekar geklim om die skare toe te spreek.

Dit was die eerste keer dat 'n Amerikaanse president 'n toespraak gehou het oor menseregte op Russiese bodem.

'Die toneel in die Arbat was die dramatiese openingsdaad in 'n botsing van beelde, woorde en idees wat die wêreld aangedui het dat die Koue Oorlog allesbehalwe gewen het,' het Baier gesê. boek met dieselfde naam as die special.

Amerikaanse presidente het dekades lank probeer om die Sowjetunie met min sukses na die tafel te bring. Ronald Reagan het uiteindelik vordering gemaak. Waarom het Reagan, 'n toegewyde anti-kommunis, besluit om met die Sowjet-leier, Mikhail Gorbatsjof, te onderhandel? Min presidente was so skerp in hul retoriek as Reagan, wat na die Sowjetunie verwys het as 'die bose ryk', en voorspel dat dit na die 'ashoop van die geskiedenis' sou oorgedra word. Maar Reagan sien 'n opening met Gorbatsjof, 'n verfrissende gematigde leier wat werklik daartoe verbind was om die kernbedreiging te verminder.

Ondanks hul ideologiese verskille was Reagan en Gorbatsjof vennote in die belangrikste werk van hul era. Hulle verhouding het die weg gebaan vir vriendeliker verhoudings in die komende dekades.

33 jaar nadat die top van Moskou op 3 Junie 1988 geëindig het, is die verhouding tussen twee van die wêreld se supermoondhede op sy beste uitdagend. Verken die geskiedenis van die betrekkinge tussen die VSA en Rusland op Fox Nation.

Bret Baier van Fox News het tot hierdie verslag bygedra.

Fox Nation programme is op aanvraag en vanaf u mobiele toestel-app sigbaar, maar slegs vir Fox Nation-intekenare. Gaan naFox Nationom 'n gratis proeftydperk te begin en kyk na die uitgebreide biblioteek van u gunsteling Fox News -persoonlikhede.


Onlangse verskynings

Pentagon Papers herdenking

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Haldeman Tapes: 1972 -beraad in Moskou

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Haldeman Diaries-Nixon se besoek aan China

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Haldeman Diaries: November 1972

Die nasleep van die verkiesing in 1972 met president Richard Nixon se stafhoof, Bob Haldeman, se dagboek van November 1972 ...


1972 Moskouberaad - Geskiedenis

ABH -webwerfindeks

Tydlyn - Die 1970's

Watergate. Die einde van Viëtnam. Normale betrekkinge met China. Aarde dag. Dit was 'n volksvolk, wat in klein mate tot 'n rekenaarouderdom verander het, selfs al was die rekenaar oorspronklik so groot soos 'n huis.

Meer 1900's


Met die stemming van die Senaat in 1978 om die Panamakanaal in 1999 terug te keer na Panama, sou die byna honderd jaar lange geskiedenis van Washington se betrokkenheid by die kanaal tot 'n einde kom. Foto: Panamakanaalwerkers, omstreeks 1906.


Kyk na die kollig op geskiedenis waarvan u moontlik nie weet nie, ons maandelikse funksie by America's Best History.

Foto bo: President Richard Nixon. Met vergunning van die Nasionale Argief. Regs: standbeeld van die sekretariaat in Belmont Park, 2014, met vergunning van Wikipedia Commons.

Amerikaanse tydlyn - die 1970's

Borg hierdie bladsy vir $ 100 per jaar. Jou banier of teksadvertensie kan die ruimte hierbo vul.
Klik hier na Borg die bladsy en hoe om u advertensie te bespreek.

1972 - Detail

22 Mei 1972 - President Richard M. Nixon maak die eerste reis van die Amerikaanse president na Moskou. Die week van beraadbesprekings sou lei tot 'n strategiese wapenverdrag, SALT I, wat op 26 Mei deur Nixon en premier Leonid Brezjnev onderteken sou word. Op 8 Julie sou die Withuis die verkoop van Amerikaanse koring aan die Sowjetunie aankondig.

Dit was die Koue Oorlog tussen die Verenigde State en die Sowjetunie, wat sedert die einde van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog gevries het, soms gevries in 'n kernwapenwedloop met beperkte ontdooiing van militêre aangeleenthede of handel. Onderhandelinge oor veranderinge wat in November 1969 in Helsinki begin het en met Nixon se aankondiging van 'n reis na China wat sy reikwydte in internasionale aangeleenthede sou vergroot, het die Withuis aangekondig dat die president en sy vrou Moskou in Mei 1972 sal besoek om die onderhandelinge met die Sowjet -leier Leonid Brezjnev. Dit sou die eerste reis van 'n Amerikaanse president na Moskou wees, en slegs die tweede reis deur 'n Amerikaanse president na die Sowjetunie. Franklin Delano Roosevelt het die Sowjetunie besoek vir die Yalta-konferensie op 3-5 Februarie 1945 met die Britse premier Churchill om die pos te bespreek Tweede Wereldoorlog herorganisasie van Europa.

SALT I, die Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, -verdrag sou die aantal strategiese lanseerders vir ballistiese missiele op die huidige vlakke vries, missiele op grond van duikbote aanspreek en die hoeveelheid missiele wat in die noordooste van die Verenigde State gerig is, beperk. Die Verenigde State het ten tyde van die verdrag 1 054 interkontinentale ballistiese missiele en 656 ballistiese raketwerpers met duikbote gelanseer. 'N Tussentydse ooreenkoms is bereik 'n jaar voor die reis, die laaste SALT 1 -verdragte is daarna op 26 Mei 1972 onderteken.

Die verdrag sou op 3 Oktober 1972 aangaan met 'n termyn van vyf jaar. Die ondertekening daarvan het gelei tot die ontbinding van die betrekkinge met die Sowjetunie, beide op die gebied van die weermag, maar ook in die handel. Selfs voordat die verdrag in werking getree het, is 'n ooreenkoms aangegaan oor die verhandeling van koring aan die Sowjetunie op 8 Julie 1972. Onwetend sou die verkoop van koring en ander graan teen gesubsidieerde pryse tot 'n 'n styging van tien maande in die hoër graanpryse in die Verenigde State en 'n styging van vyftig persent in voedselpryse in 1973. 'n Ander positiewe uitkoms van Nixon se onderhandelingstrategie en beter betrekkinge met sowel China as die Sowjetunie was 'n vinniger einde aan die Viëtnam -oorlog. Beide lande sny terug op hul diplomatieke steun aan die Hanoi -regime en versoek Noord -Viëtnam om militêr te kom.

Vorige pogings

In 1962, die eerste poging om kernwapens te beperk. Die ontwapeningskomitee van 18 lande het in Januarie in Genève, Switserland, vergader. Die Verenigde State het voorgestel dat wapens gestop word, maar die Sowjetunie was dit nie eens nie weens die Amerikaanse meerderheid in 1964. Twee jaar later, toe die Verenigde State aangebied het om die ontplooiing van ABM -missielverdediging te staak, het die Sowjetunie aanvallende wapens op die tafel gesit . Dit het gelei tot 'n ooreenkoms van 1 Julie 1968, onderteken deur president Lyndon B. Johnson, die Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, wat ingestem het tot onderhandelinge oor aanvallende en defensiewe wapens.

Volle teks, Salt 1 -verdrag

Tussentydse ooreenkoms tussen die Verenigde State van Amerika en die Unie van Sowjet -sosialistiese republieke oor sekere maatreëls ten opsigte van die beperking van strategiese aanvalswapens.

Geteken te Moskou 26 Mei 1972. Goedkeuring deur die Amerikaanse kongres goedgekeur op 30 September 1972. Goedgekeur deur die Amerikaanse president 30 September 1972. Kennisgewings van aanvaarding uitgeruil op 3 Oktober 1972. In werking getree op 3 Oktober 1972.

Die Verenigde State van Amerika en die Unie van Sowjet -Sosialistiese Republieke, hierna die partye genoem,

Oortuig dat die verdrag oor die beperking van anti-ballistiese missielstelsels en hierdie tussentydse ooreenkoms oor sekere maatreëls ten opsigte van die beperking van strategiese aanvalswapens sal bydra tot die skep van gunstiger voorwaardes vir aktiewe onderhandelinge oor die beperking van strategiese wapens sowel as die verslapping van die internasionale spanning en die versterking van die trus tussen state,

Met inagneming van die verhouding tussen strategiese offensiewe en defensiewe wapens,

Gedagtig aan hul verpligtinge ingevolge artikel VI van die Verdrag oor die nie-verspreiding van kernwapens,

Artikel I - Die partye onderneem om nie na 1 Julie 1972 die bou van addisionele vaste landgebaseerde interkontinentale ballistiese missiele (ICBM) te begin nie.

Artikel II-Die partye onderneem om nie landgebaseerde lanseerders vir ligte ICBM's, of vir ICBM's van ouer tipes wat voor 1964 ontplooi is, om te skakel in lanseerders vir swaar tipes ICBM's wat na die tyd ontplooi is nie.

Artikel III - Die partye onderneem om op die datum van ondertekening van hierdie tussentydse ooreenkoms onderneem te word om die ondergeskikte lanseerders vir ballistiese missiele (SLBM) en moderne ballistiese missiel -duikbote te beperk tot die operasionele en onder konstruksie getalle op die datum van ondertekening van hierdie tussentydse ooreenkoms, sowel as lanseerders en duikbote deur die partye as plaasvervangers vir 'n gelyke aantal ICBM -lanseerders van ouer tipes wat voor 1964 ontplooi is of vir lanseerders op ouer duikbote.

Artikel IV - Onderhewig aan die bepalings van hierdie tussentydse ooreenkoms, kan modernisering en vervanging van strategiese offensiewe ballistiese missiele en lanseerders wat onder hierdie tussentydse ooreenkoms gedek word, onderneem word.

Artikel V - 1. Met die oog op die versekering van die nakoming van die bepalings van hierdie tussentydse ooreenkoms, gebruik elke party nasionale tegniese verifikasiemiddele tot sy beskikking op 'n manier wat in ooreenstemming is met algemeen erkende beginsels van internasionale reg.

2. Elke party onderneem om nie in te meng met die nasionale tegniese verifikasiemiddele van die ander party wat ooreenkomstig paragraaf 1 van hierdie artikel werk nie.

3. Elke party onderneem om nie doelbewuste verbergingsmaatreëls te gebruik wat die verifikasie deur nasionale tegniese middele van nakoming van die bepalings van hierdie tussentydse ooreenkoms belemmer nie. Hierdie verpligting vereis nie veranderinge in die huidige konstruksie-, monteer-, ombou- of opknappingspraktyke nie.

Artikel VI - Om die doelwitte en implementering van die bepalings van hierdie tussentydse ooreenkoms te bevorder, gebruik die partye die vaste raadplegende kommissie wat ingevolge artikel XIII van die verdrag ingestel is oor die beperking van anti -ballistiese missielstelsels in ooreenstemming met die bepalings van daardie artikel.

Artikel VII - Die partye onderneem om aktief te onderhandel oor beperkings op strategiese aanvalswapens. Die verpligtinge in hierdie tussentydse ooreenkoms maak geen afbreuk aan die omvang of bepalings van die beperkings op strategiese aanvalswapens wat in die loop van verdere onderhandelinge uitgewerk kan word nie.

Artikel VIII - 1. Hierdie tussentydse ooreenkoms tree in werking op die uitruil van skriftelike kennisgewings van aanvaarding deur elke party, wat uitruil gelyktydig sal plaasvind met die uitruil van instrumente van bekragtiging van die Verdrag oor die beperking van anti -ballistiese missielstelsels.

2. Hierdie tussentydse ooreenkoms bly vir 'n tydperk van vyf jaar van krag, tensy dit vroeër vervang word deur 'n ooreenkoms oor meer volledige maatreëls wat strategiese aanvalswapens beperk. Dit is die doel van die partye om aktiewe opvolgonderhandelinge te voer met die doel om so 'n ooreenkoms so gou as moontlik te sluit.

3. Elke party het by die uitoefening van sy nasionale soewereiniteit die reg om hom uit hierdie tussentydse ooreenkoms te onttrek as hy besluit dat buitengewone gebeurtenisse wat verband hou met die onderwerp van hierdie tussentydse ooreenkoms sy hoogste belange in gevaar gestel het. Dit sal die ander party ses maande voor die onttrekking aan hierdie tussentydse ooreenkoms aan die ander party in kennis stel. Sodanige kennisgewing moet 'n verklaring bevat van die buitengewone gebeure wat die aanmeldende party sy grootste belange in gevaar stel.

GEDOEN te Moskou op 26 Mei 1972, in twee eksemplare, elk in die Engelse en Russiese tale, albei tekste ewe outentiek.

VIR DIE VERENIGDE STATE VAN AMERIKA:
RICHARD NIXON
President van die Verenigde State van Amerika

VIR DIE UNIE VAN SOVIET SOSIALISTIESE REPUBLIEKE:
L.I. BREZHNEV
Algemene sekretaris van die sentrale komitee van die CPSU

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Protokol by die tussentydse ooreenkoms tussen die Verenigde State van Amerika en die Unie van Sowjet -sosialistiese republieke oor sekere maatreëls ten opsigte van die beperking van strategiese aanvalswapens

Die Verenigde State van Amerika en die Unie van Sowjet-Sosialistiese Republieke, hierna die partye genoem, nadat hulle in die tussentydse ooreenkoms ooreengekom het oor sekere beperkings rakende ballistiese missielwerpers en moderne ballistiese missiel-duikbote en vervangingsprosedures,

Die partye verstaan ​​dat, ingevolge artikel III van die tussentydse ooreenkoms, vir die tydperk waarin daardie ooreenkoms van krag is:

Die Verenigde State mag nie meer as 710 ballistiese missielwerpers op duikbote (SLBM's) en nie meer as 44 moderne ballistiese missiele -duikbote hê nie. Die Sowjetunie mag nie meer as 950 ballistiese missielwerpers op duikbote en nie meer as 62 moderne ballistiese missiele -duikbote hê nie.

Bykomende ballistiese missielwerpers op duikbote tot op bogenoemde vlakke, in die Verenigde State-meer as 656 ballistiese raketwerpers op kern-aangedrewe duikbote, en in die USSR-meer as 740 ballistiese raketwerpers op kern-aangedrewe duikbote, operasionele en in aanbou, kan in werking tree as plaasvervangers vir gelyke getalle ballistiese missielwerpers van ouer tipes wat voor 1964 ontplooi is, of vir ballistiese missielwerpers op ouer duikbote.

Die implementering van moderne SLBM's op enige duikboot, ongeag die tipe, sal afgetel word teen die totale vlak van SLBM's wat toegelaat word vir die Verenigde State en die USSR.

Hierdie protokol word beskou as 'n integrale deel van die tussentydse ooreenkoms.

GEDOEN te Moskou op die 26ste dag van Mei 1972

VIR DIE VERENIGDE STATE VAN AMERIKA:
RICHARD NIXON
President van die Verenigde State van Amerika

VIR DIE UNIE VAN SOVIET SOSIALISTIESE REPUBLIEKE:
L.I. BREZHNEV
Algemene sekretaris van die sentrale komitee van die CPSU

Foto bo: Richard Nixon en Leonid Brezhnev tydens 'n vergadering in die Withuis, 18 Junie 1973, Walter K. Leffler. Met vergunning Library of Congress. Foto hieronder: SLBM -missiel word gelanseer uit 'n Amerikaanse duikboot, 9 Oktober 1984, Oscar Sosa, USN. Met vergunning van die nasionale argief via Wikipedia Commons. Broninligting: Amerikaanse ministerie van buitelandse sake, NTI.org Wikipedia Commons.

Geskiedenis Foto Bom


Die Watergate Office Complex vertoon foto. Verhoor van 17 Junie 1972 inbraak van die Demokratiese Nasionale Komitee. Bron: Amerikaanse distrikshof vir die District of Columbia.


Konstruksie op die terrein van Ekspo 74, Spokane, Washington, 'n jaar voor die opening. Die tema is die omgewing. Mei 1973. Foto: Environmental Protection Agency.


Camp David Peace Accord onderhandel by Camp David binne Catoctin Mountain Park. Met vergunning van die Nasionale Argief.


In 1972 kook Hockey's Cold War op

Veertig jaar later bly dit in die Kanadese bewussyn verbrand. Die Summit -reeks van September 1972: agt wedstryde wat nie net hokkie verander het nie, maar ook 'n bepalende nasionale byeenkoms geword het.

Vir Kanadese was die reeks teen die Sowjetunie, wat die eerste keer was dat N.H.L. spelers teen die Sowjetunie skaats, is groter as die Miracle on Ice van die Olimpiese Spele in 1980 vir Amerikaners. Dit word algemeen beskou as 'n diepgaande verenigende ervaring, met gevolge buite sport. 'N Opname deur die Dominion Institute, 'n gerespekteerde geskiedenisbewaringsgroep, is die wendoel in die laaste wedstryd as die vyfde grootste byeenkoms in die geskiedenis van Kanada, net onder die aanval van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog op Vimy Ridge en voor die land se bydraes tot die geallieerde oorwinning in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog.

Op die hoogtepunt van die koue oorlog het twee hokkiestyle gebots: die vinnige, presiese en kontak-afkeer van die Sowjette teen die hardnekkige, harde, strafspel van die Kanadese. Die reeks speel af voor 'n opgewonde gehoor aan weerskante van die ystergordyn. Terwyl dit oor Kanada en na Moskou beweeg het, het die wedstryde toenemend wanhopig geword, hoewel byna almal aangeneem het dat die Kanadese al agt wedstryde sou wen. Die druk het die spelers tot nuwe hoogtes van vaardigheid gedryf en veral vir die Kanadese twyfelagtige gedrag.

"Ek het nog nooit 'n straf vir wangedrag gekry nie - ek weet nie of ek ooit voorheen uit 'n wedstryd geskop is nie," het JP Parise verlede week gesê en teruggekyk na Game 8 in Moskou, toe hy sy stok na die Duitser gelig het. skeidsregter in 'n blinde woede en het dit amper op sy kop neergesit.

Vladislav Tretiak, die groot Sowjet-doelwagter, het verlede week per e-pos gesê: "Ek het die onbeskoftheid en onbeskoftheid van die Kanadese spelers ten volle besef."

Tyd het die rande van die Summit -reeks versag. Na baie herdenkings en reünies het die ou vegters vriende geword. Nou fokus die terugskoue op die onwaarskynlike einde van die Kanadese, wat herstel het van 'n 1-3-1-agterstand om te wen, 4-3-1, met spannende oorwinnings van een doel in elk van die laaste drie wedstryde.

Sondag, die herdenking van die reeksopening, waarin die Sowjette die te selfversekerde N.H.L. professionele persone met 7-3 by die Forum in Montreal, Parise en 13 ander veterane in Kanada, vlieg na Rusland vir 'n reeks geleenthede. Later die maand besoek die Sowjet -veterane Kanada.

Daar sal weer gehoor word van Phil Esposito, Ken Dryden, Boris Mikhailov en Alexander Yakushev. En hokkieliefhebbers hoop dat die kanker wat Paul Henderson, die Maple Leafs-reisiger wat die afgelope drie wedstryde die wendoele aangeteken het en 'n nasionale held geword het, die kanker geteister het, hom in staat sal stel om die herdenking op 28 September van sy doelwit met 34 te vier met 34 sekondes oor.

Selfs vandag nog kan Kanadese van 'n sekere ouderdom presies onthou waar hulle was toe hulle Foster Hewitt se oproep van Moskou hoor: "Henderson het vir Kanada gedruk." Dryden, die doelwagter van Kanada en later 'n skrywer en parlementslid, het geskryf dat dit "die enigste Kanadese gebeurtenis was wat 'n soortgelyke spoor van herinnering nagelaat het" as die moord op John F. Kennedy aan Amerikaners.

Tog, in 1972 en jare daarna, het baie gedink dat Kanada se oorwinning deur buitensporige geweld besmet is. Kyk na die katalogus van voorvalle wat die reeks gemerk het.

¶ In wedstryd 1 het Bobby Clarke Alexander Maltsev opgehef en hom daarna met sy stok oor die kop gekap.

¶ In wedstryd 6 het Clarke, op voorstel van die assistent John Ferguson, 'n voormalige handhawer van Canadiens, die stylvolle ster Valery Kharlamov agtervolg en sy enkel gebreek met 'n brutale tweehandige slag.

¶ In spel 7 het Esposito Mikhailov, die Sowjet -kaptein, gedreig deur sy vinger oor sy keel te trek. Later het Gary Bergman dit ook gedoen. Maar Mikhailov het Bergman ook tydens 'n hoekskrum in die been geskop, met 'n bloedige Bergman.

Beeld

¶ In wedstryd 8 swaai Bergman na die tydhouer Parise, woedend oor 'n strafskop, swaai in met 'n stok omhoog en dreig die skeidsregter, afrigter Harry Sinden, gooi stoele op die ys en stokbranderige Kanadese spelers loop neus tot neus met die polisie in Moskou wat Alan Eagleson, die spanorganiseerder, probeer keer het nadat Eagleson verskeie rye sitplekke gewel het om die doelregter uit te daag.

Die Kanadese verdedig hul optrede, toe en nou, deur dit met oorlogvoering te vergelyk. En die Summit-reeks was inderdaad 'n meer dramatiese botsing tydens die koue oorlog as selfs die mans se Olimpiese basketbalfinaal tussen die Verenigde State en die Sowjets wat daardie maand in München plaasgevind het, of die Fischer-Spassky-skaakkampioenskap van 'n maand tevore.

'Vir my was dit oorlog,' het Esposito in 1989 gesê en sedertdien verskeie kere. 'Daar is geen twyfel in my gedagtes dat ek dink ek sou doodgemaak het om te wen nie.'

Clarke het in die dokumentêre film "Cold War on Ice: Summit Series '72 van 2011" gesê oor die breek van Kharlamov se enkel: "Ek weet glad nie wat ek gedink het nie - dit was 'n vreeslike ding om te doen. Dit het beslis goed gevoel. ”

Voor sy dood in 1981 het Kharlamov oor die voorval gesê: 'Ek het in sy woedende oë gekyk, sy stok gesien wat hy soos 'n swaard geswaai het, en nie verstaan ​​wat hy doen nie. Dit het niks met hokkie te doen gehad nie. ”

Selfs vandag kyk die spelers terug op wat hulle gedoen het en sê dat dit 'n produk was van wen om die soort hokkie wat hulle gespeel het, en die ideologie van hul samelewing te bekragtig.

"Die druk wat op albei spanne geplaas is om te wen, was ongelooflik," het Ron Ellis, Clarke en Henderson se saggeaarde gesinslede in 1972, verlede week gesê. 'Ek het ook dinge gedoen wat vir my nie kenmerkend was nie, en dit was as gevolg van die emosie. Ons het gevoel ons verteenwoordig ons lewenswyse. ”

Parise, vader van die huidige N.H.L. ster Zach Parise, onthou dat hy kwaad was vir die Duitse skeidsregter Josef Kompalla, wat hom 'n wangedrag van 10 minute gegee het omdat hy gekla het oor drie vroeë strawwe teen Kanada in die eerste minute van Game 8.

'Ek het gesê:' As ek 10 kry, is dit beter dat u nie meer tieners bel nie, want u gaan hier sterf, 'het Parise gesê.

'Dit is nie wat atlete doen nie - u moet u emosies beheer,' het Parise gesê, wat later sy seun by Shattuck St. Mary's, 'n voorskool buite Minneapolis, afgerig het. 'My kinders moes daarna kyk.'

Maar hy het bygevoeg: 'Ek dink in my wêreld doen jy wat jy moet doen om te wen. As dit oor sulke goed kom, was ek nooit spyt oor enigiets nie. ”

Die vyandighede van 1972 is lankal verby. Parise is 70, Ellis is 69 en Eddie Johnston, die oudste lid van die groep wat na Rusland reis, is 76. Wat oorbly, is die waardering dat die Summit -reeks die eerste stap was om die Noord -Amerikaanse en Europese style in 'n vinnige kombinasie te kombineer, harde spel van vandag.

"Die mense onthou dit as die wedstryde tussen die twee beste spanne ter wêreld," het Tretiak gesê oor hoe die Russe die reeks vandag beskou. 'Meestal onthou hulle die vreugde wat die speletjies vir hulle gebied het.'


Die reeks

Spel 1

In Game One, wat op 2 September in Montreal gehou is, het Phil Esposito ná slegs 30 sekondes speel vir Kanada aangeteken. Toe Kanada ses minute later 'n voorsprong van twee doele bereik het, was die Kanadese toeskouers en kenners van mening dat voorspellings van 'n roete korrek bewys is. Die hardwerkende Sowjette het egter 'n terugkeer behaal en die telling gelykgemaak voor die einde van die eerste periode. In die tweede periode het Valery Kharlamov twee keer gedruk en die Sowjetunie 'n voorsprong van twee doele gegee. Bobby Clarke het aangeteken om Kanada binne een te bring, maar die Sowjets het met nog drie doele in die derde plek weggetrek en met 7-3 gewen. Die Kanadese spelers het later kommentaar gelewer op die uitstekende fisieke kondisie van die Sowjets, sowel as hul gedissiplineerde en meedoënlose speelstyl. Hierdie algemene skema van die Kanadese wat aanvanklik goed gespeel het, maar teen die einde van die wedstryd afgeneem het weens onvoldoende fisieke kondisionering, was 'n algemene kenmerk van die reeks. 'N Ander verskil was dat die Sowjets die hele jaar in 'n fisieke toestand gebly het, terwyl die Kanadese 'n somer buite seisoen gehad het en op die laaste minuut oefenkamp vertrou het om weer in vorm te kom.

Die Forum was ook baie, baie warm in die somerweer.

Spel 2

Spel 2 is gespeel in Maple Leaf Gardens in Toronto. Team Canada het gereageer op hul vorige nederlaag met sterk spel in hierdie wedstryd, met Tony Esposito wat die doelwitte van Ken Dryden oorgeneem het. With the score at 2-1 in the third period, Peter Mahovlich scored a remarkable shorthanded goal, in which he deked both the Soviet defender 1-on-1, then Tretiak to give Canada a two-goal lead. With enough momentum from the goal to successfully defend their lead, Team Canada won the game 4-1 and tied the series.

Spel 3

Game 3 was held in Winnipeg on September 6th. Team Canada held leads of 3-1 and 4-2, but the Soviet side responded and the game ended in a 4-4 tie.

Spel 4

Team Canada played poorly in Game Four in Vancouver, losing 5-3, and the crowd of 15,570 fans echoed the rest of Canada's sentiments: Team Canada was booed off the ice at game's end. Responding to the negative public and media reaction in light of the expectation for an overwhelming Team Canada sweep of the series, Phil Esposito made an emotional outburst on Canadian national television:

"To the people across Canada, we tried, we gave it our best, and to the people that boo us, geez, I'm really, all of us guys are really disheartened and we're disillusioned, and we're disappointed at some of the people. We cannot believe the bad press we've got, the booing we've gotten in our own buildings. If the Russians boo their players, the fans. Russians boo their players. Some of the Canadian fans—I'm not saying all of them, some of them booed us, then I'll come back and I'll apologize to each one of the Canadians, but I don't think they will. I'm really, really. I'm really disappointed. I am completely disappointed. I cannot believe it. Some of our guys are really, really down in the dumps, we know, we're trying like hell. I mean, we're doing the best we can, and they got a good team, and let's face facts. But it doesn't mean that we're not giving it our 150%, because we certainly are. I mean, the more - everyone of us guys, 35 guys that came out and played for Team Canada. We did it because we love our country, and not for any other reason, no other reason. They can throw the money, uh, for the pension fund out the window. They can throw anything they want out the window. We came because we love Canada. And even though we play in the United States, and we earn money in the United States, Canada is still our home, and that's the only reason we come. And I don't think it's fair that we should be booed."

Great turmoil ensued in Canada as Team Canada prepared to travel to the Soviet Union to play the remaining four games, and Canada contemplated the end to its perceived dominance in the sport of hockey.

Swede

During a two-week hiatus, the Canadians played two exhibition games versus the Swedish national team on September 16 and September 17 at the Hovet arena in Stockholm. Canada won game one 4-1 the second game was a 4-4 tie. The second game included an outburst from both teams, which resulted in Wayne Cashman getting his tongue cut open, requiring 50 stitches and forcing him to miss the rest of the Summit Series, although he stayed with the team. The first exhibition game also introduced Canada to two West German referees, Josef Kompalla and Franz Baader. These two referees would figure prominently in Games 6 and 8 of the remainder of the series.

Team Canada was heavily criticized by the Swedes for its "criminal"-style play during the two games. The games in Sweden, however, helped bring Canada together as a team and focused them for the final four games.

Spel 5

Team Canada went to the Soviet Union for the final four games at the Luzhniki Ice Palace, accompanied by 3,000 Canadian fans. Team Canada players Vic Hadfield, Rick Martin, and Jocelyn Guevremont left the team and all went home for various reasons. On September 22, in Game Five in Moscow, Canada led 4-1, but ended up losing the game 5-4. Team Canada was now faced with the hard fact that with three games remaining in the series, the Soviets were ahead by two victories. To add to the Canadian struggles, Gilbert Perreault left Team Canada to focus on Buffalo Sabres training camp.

Spel 6

Game Six was a Canadian 3-2 victory. Prior to the game, the Canadians became upset over a shipment of beer that they believed the Soviets had deliberately "lost" at the airport. Following the game, the Canadians complained that the German referees (the same ones who refereed the controversial Sweden game) was biased, since Canada was handed 31 penalty minutes during the game, while the Soviets only received four. This game also saw the most controversial play of the entire series. In the second period, Bobby Clarke deliberately slashed Valery Kharlamov's ankle, fracturing it. Years later, John Ferguson, Sr., the assistant coach of Team Canada, was quoted as saying "I called Clarke over to the bench, looked over at Kharlamov and said, 'I think he needs a tap on the ankle.'" Kharlamov was the Soviets' best forward, and although he played the rest of the game, he missed Game Seven and was largely ineffectual in Game Eight.

Game 7

Canada won Game Seven by the score of 4-3, with Paul Henderson scoring the winning goal late in the third period on a strong individual effort. The game also featured a controversial incident: During the third period, a small scuffle broke out between Canada's Gary Bergman, and Russia's Boris Mikhailov, in which the future Soviet captain committed a cardinal sin in hockey, using his skate as a weapon, kicking Gary Bergman two times before the fight ended.

Game 8

Phil Esposito was the scoring leader in the 1972 Summit Series.

Heading into Game Eight, each team had three wins and three losses, with one tie. Only a win in Game Eight would deliver victory in the series. In Canada, the entire country just about shut down for the game, with many watching it at work or school. Team Canada took a number of questionable early penalties (which wasn't surprising to Canadians, as one referee was the same who were accused of being biased in Game 6. The game was delayed after a marginal call against J. P. Parise, and emotions boiled over. Parise nearly swung his stick at Josef Kompalla and got a match penalty. Sinden threw a chair on the ice. Despite the penalties, the score was 2-2 after the first period, but the Soviets pulled ahead 5-3 after two. Things looked grim for Team Canada. During the second intermission, goalie Ken Dryden was reported to have thought, "If we lose this one, I'll be the most hated man in Canada."

But the Canadians came out roaring in the third period, and Phil Esposito and Yvan Cournoyer scored to even it up. After Cournoyer's goal, Alan Eagleson (seated across the ice from the Team Canada bench) caused a ruckus in the crowd because the goal light had not come on. As he was being subdued by the Soviet police, the Canadian players headed over, Peter Mahovlich actually going over the boards to confront police with his stick. Eagleson was freed, and the coaches escorted him across the ice to the bench. In anger, he shoved his fist to the Soviet crowd, as a few other Canadian supporters also gave the finger to the Soviets.

At that point, with the score tied 5-5 and the series tied 3-3-1, a member of the Soviet delegation unexpectedly informed Canada that, if the score and the series remained tied, the Soviets would claim victory on goal differential.

Celebrating the winning goal by Paul Henderson in Game 8.

In the final minute of play, with Phil Esposito, Yvan Cournoyer and Peter Mahovlich out on the ice, Paul Henderson stood up at the bench and called Mahovlich off the ice as he was skating by. Then, with just 34 seconds remaining in the game, Henderson, in perhaps the most famous moment in Canadian sports history, scored for Canada, jamming in a rebound behind Soviet goaltender Vladislav Tretiak. "I jumped on the ice and rushed straight for their net. I had this strange feeling that I could score the winning goal", recalls Henderson. This play is widely known as "the goal heard around the world" and was captured on film by cameraman Frank Lennon. The picture became one of Canada's most famous photographs. Canada held on for the win in the game and thus the series.

This truly memorable moment for Canada was not viewed as a fair win in the Soviet Union. Many Soviet citizens believed that their country would have won had Bobby Clarke not fractured the ankle of their best player, and if Anatoli Firsov and Vitaly Davydov had not sat out the series to protest a coaching change. In response, some offer that Canada was without Bobby Orr due to injury as well as Bobby Hull (due to his departure from the NHL to the newly-formed WHA) These were arguably the best Canadian players at the time (besides Phil Esposito), so neither team had its greatest talent on the ice.

In addition to the eight games against the Soviets and two against the Swedes, the Canadians also played an exhibition game against Czechoslovakia. The game took place on September 29 at the Sportovní hala, and ended in a tie.


1972 Moscow Summit - History

By mutual agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the President of the United States and Mrs. Richard Nixon paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from May 22 to May 30, 1972. The President was accompanied by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, and other American officials. During his stay in the U.S.S.R. President Nixon visited, in addition to Moscow, the cities of Leningrad and Kiev.

President Nixon and L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, N.V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. conducted talks on fundamental problems of American-Soviet relations and the current international situation.

Also taking part in the conversations were:

On the American side: William O. Rogers, Secretary of State Jacob D. Beam, American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security affairs Peter M. Flaningan, Assistant to the President and Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

On the Soviet side: A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., N.S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade V.V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., A.F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA A.M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU G.M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

The discussions covered a wide range of questions of mutual interest and were frank and thorough. They defined more precisely those areas where there are prospects for developing greater cooperation between the two countries, as well as those areas where the positions of the two Sides are different.

I. Bilateral Relations
Guided by the desire to place U.S.-Soviet relations on a more stable and constructive foundation, and mindful of their responsibilities for maintaining world peace and for facilitating the relaxation of international tension, the two Sides adopted a document entitled: "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," signed on behalf of the U.S. by President Nixon and on behalf of the U.S.S.R. by General Secretary Brezhnev.

Both sides are convinced that the provisions of that document open new possibilities for the development of peaceful relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between the USA and the U.S.S.R.

Having considered various areas of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations, the two Sides agreed that an improvement of relations is possible and desirable. They expresses their firm intention to act in accordance with the provisions set forth in the above-mentioned document.

As a result of progress made in negotiations which preceded the summit meeting, and in the course of the meeting itself, a number of significant agreements were reached. This will intensify bilateral cooperation in areas of common concern as well as in areas relevant to the cause of peace and international cooperation.

Limitation of Strategic Armaments
The two Sides gave primary attention to the problem of reducing the danger of nuclear war. They believe that curbing the competition on strategic arms will make a significant and tangible contribution to this cause.

The two Sides attach great importance to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded between them.

These agreements, which were concluded as a result of the negotiations in Moscow, constitute major steps towards curbing and ultimately ending the arms race.

They are a concrete expression of the intention of the two Sides to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of confidence between states, as well as to carry out the obligations assumed by them in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Article VI). Both Sides are convinced that the achievement of the above agreements is a practical step towards saving mankind from the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war. Accordingly, it corresponds to the vital interests of the American and Soviet Peoples as well as to the vital interests of all other people.

The two Sides intend to continue active negotiations for the limitation of strategic offensive arms and to conduct them in a spirit of good will, respect for each other's legitimate interests and observance of the principle of equal security.

Both Sides are also convinced that the agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the USA and the U.S.S.R., signed in Washington on September 30, 1971, serves the interests not only of the Soviet and American peoples, but of all mankind.

Commercial and Economic Relations
Both Sides agreed on measures designed to establish more favorable conditions for developing commercial and other economic ties between the USA and the U.S.S.R. The two Sides agree that realistic conditions exist for increasing economic ties. These ties should develop on the basis of mutual benefit and in accordance with generally accepted international practice.

Believing that these aims would be served by conclusion of a trade agreement between the USA and the U.S.S.R., the two Sides decided to complete in the near future the work necessary to conclude such and agreement. They agreed on the desirability of credit arrangements to develop mutual trade and of early efforts to resolve other financial and economic issues. It was agreed that a lend-lease settlement will be negotiated concurrently with a trade agreement.

In the interests of broadening and facilitating commercial ties between the two countries, and to work out specific arrangements, the two Sides decided to create a US-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission. Its first meeting will be held in Moscow in the summer of 1972.

Each side will help promote the establishment of effective working arrangements between organizations and firms of both countries and encouraging the conclusion of long-term contracts.

Maritime Matters-Incidents at Sea
The two Sides agreed to continue the negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement on maritime and related matters. They believe that such an agreement would mark a positive step in facilitating the expansion of commerce between the United States and the Soviet Union.

An Agreement was concluded between the two Sides on measures to prevent incidents at sea and in air space over it between vessels and aircraft of the US and Soviet navies. By providing agreed procedures for ships and aircraft of the two navies operating in close proximity, this agreement will diminish the chances of dangerous accidents.

Cooperation in Science and Technology
It was recognized that the cooperation now underway in areas such as atomic energy research, space research, health and other fields benefits both nations and has contributed positively to their over-all relations. It was agreed that increased scientific and technical cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit and shared effort for common goals is in the interest of both nations and would contribute to a further improvement in their bilateral relations. For these purposes the two Sides signed an agreement for cooperation in the fields of science and technology. A US-Soviet Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation will be created for identifying and establishing cooperative programs.

Cooperation in Space
Having in mind the role played by the US and the USSR in the peaceful exploration of outer space, both Sides emphasized the importance of further bilateral cooperation in this sphere. In order to increase the safety of man's flights in outer space and the future prospects of joint scientific experiments, the two Sides agreed to make suitable arrangements to permit the docking of American and Soviet spacecraft and stations. The first joint docking experiment of the two countries piloted spacecraft, is contemplated for 1975. The planning and implementation of this flight will be carried out by the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the USSR Academy of Sciences, according to principles and procedures developed through mutual consultations.

Cooperation in the Field of Health
The two Sides concluded an agreement on health cooperation which marks a fruitful beginning of sharing knowledge about, and collaborative attacks on, the common enemies, disease and disability. The initial research efforts will concentrate on health problems important to the whole world-cancer, heart diseases, and the environmental health sciences. This cooperation subsequently will be broadened to include other health problems of mutual interest. The two Sides pledged their full support for the health cooperation program and agreed to continue the active participation of the two governments in the work of international organizations in the health field.

Environmental Cooperation
The two Sides agreed to initiate a program of cooperation in the protection and enhancement of man's environment. Through joint research and joint measures, the United States and the USSR hope to contribute to the preservation of a healthful environment in their countries and throughout the world. Under the new agreement on environmental cooperation there will be consultations in the neat future in Moscow in specific cooperative projects.

Exchanges in the Fields of Science, Technology, Education and Culture
Both Sides note the importance of the Agreement on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields in 1972-1973, signed in Moscow in April 11, 1972. Continuation and expansion of bilateral exchanges in these fields will lead to better understanding and help improve the general state of relations between the two countries. Within the broad framework provided by this Agreement the two Sides have agreed to expand the areas of cooperation, as reflected in new agreements concerning space, health, the environment and science and technology.

The US side, noting the existence of an extensive program if English speaking language instruction in the Soviet Union, indicated its intention to encourage Russian language programs in the United States.

II. International Issues
Europe
In the course of the discussions on the international situation, both Sided took note of favorable developments in the relaxation of tensions in Europe.

Recognizing the importance to world peace of developments in Europe, where both World Wars originated, and mindful of the responsibilities and commitments they share with other powers under appropriate agreements, the USA and the USSR intend to make further efforts to ensure a peaceful future for Europe, free of tensions, crises and conflicts.

They agree that the territorial integrity of all states in Europe should be respected.

Both Sides view the September 3, 1971 Quadripartite Agreement relating to the Western Sectors of Berlin as a good example of fruitful cooperation between the states concerned, including the USA and the USSR. The two Sides believe that the implementation of that agreement in the near future, along with other steps, will further improve the European situation and contribute to confidence and cooperation among the European states.

Both Sides welcomed the treaty between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany signed on August 12, 1970. They noted the significance of the provisions of this treaty as well as of other recent agreements in contributing to confidence and cooperation among the European states.

The USA and the USSR are prepared to make appropriate contributions to the positive trends on the European continent toward a genuine d tente and the development of relations of peaceful cooperation among states in Europe on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, sovereign equality, independence and renunciation of the use or threat of force.

The US and USSR are in accord that multilateral consultations looking toward a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could begin after the signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol of the Agreement of September 3, 1971. The two governments agree that the conference should be carefully prepared in order that it may concretely consider specific problems of security and cooperation and thus contribute to the progressive reduction of the underlying causes of tension in Europe. This conference should be convened at a time to be agreed by the countries concerned, but without undue delay.

Both Sides believe that the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe would be served by a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in Central Europe. Any agreement on this question should not diminish the security of any of the Sides. Appropriate agreement should be reached as soon as practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special forum.

Die Midde-Ooste
The two Sides set out their positions on this question. They reaffirm their support for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242.

Noting the significance of constructive cooperation of the parties concerned with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Ambassador Jarring, the US and the USSR confirm their desire to contribute to his mission's success and also declare their readiness to play their part in bringing about a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. In the view of the US and the USSR, the achievement of such a settlement would open prospects for the normalization of the Middle East situation and would permit, in particular, consideration of further steps to bring about a military relaxation in that area.

Indochina
Each side set forth its respective standpoint with regard to the continuing war in Vietnam and the situation in the area of Indochina as a whole.

The US side emphasized the need to bring and end to the military conflict as soon as possible and reaffirmed its commitment to the principle that the political future of South Vietnam should be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide for themselves, free from outside interference.

The US side explained its view that the quickest and most effective way to attain the above-mentioned objectives is through negotiations leading to the return of all Americans held captive in this region, the implementation of an internationally supervised Indochina-wide cease-fire and the subsequent withdrawal of all American forces stationed in South Vietnam within four months, leaving the political questions to be resolved by the Indochinese peoples themselves.

The United States reiterated its willingness to enter into serious negotiations with the North Vietnamese Side to settle the war in Indochina on a basis just to all.

The Soviet Side stressed its solidarity with the just struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia for their freedom, independence and social progress. Firmly supporting the proposals of the DRV and the Republic of South Vietnam, which provide a realistic and constructive basis for settling the Vietnam problem, the Soviet Union stands for a cessation of bombings of the DRV, for a complete and unequivocal withdrawal of the troops of the USA and its allies from South Vietnam, so that the peoples of Indochina would have the possibility to determine for themselves their fate without any outside interference.

Disarmament Issues
The two Sides expressed their positions on arms limitations and disarmament issues.

The two Sides note that in recent years their joint and parallel actions have facilitated the working out and conclusion of treaties which curb the arms race or ban some of the most dangerous types of weapons. They note further that these treaties were welcomed by a large majority of the states in the world, which became parties to them.

Both Sides regard the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, as and essential disarmament measure. Along with Great Britain, they are the depositories for the Convention which was recently opened for signature by all states. The USA and USSR will continue their efforts to reach an international agreement regarding chemical weapons.

The USA and the USSR, proceeding from the need to take into account the security interest of both countries on the basis of the principle of equality, and without prejudice to the security issues of third countries, will actively participate in negotiations aimed at working our new measures designed to curb and end the arms race. The ultimate purpose is general and complete disarmament, under strict international control. A world disarmament conference could play a role in this process at an appropriate time.

Strengthening the United Nations
Both Sides will strive to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations on the basis of strict observance of the UN Charter. They regard the United Nations as an instrument for maintaining world peace and security, discouraging conflicts, and developing international cooperation. Accordingly, they will do their best to support United Nations efforts in the interests of international peace.

Both Sides emphasized that agreements and understandings reached in the negotiations in Moscow, as well as the contents and the nature of these negotiations, are not in any way directed against any other country. Both Sides proceed from the recognition of the role, the responsibility and the prerogatives of other interested states, existing international obligations and agreements, and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter.

Both sides believe that positive results were accomplished in the course of the talks at the highest level. These results indicate that despite the differences between the USA and the USSR in social systems, ideologies, and policy principles, it is possible to develop mutually advantageous cooperation between the peoples of both countries, in the interests of strengthening peace and international security.

Both Sides expressed the desire to continue close contact on a number of issues that were under discussion. They agreed that regular consultations on questions of mutual interest, including meetings at the highest level, would be useful.


Resolutions of the Moscow Summit (1988)

In May-June 1988 United States president Ronald Reagan visited the USSR and participated in a five day Moscow summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The following is an abridged version of their joint statement:

“The President and the General Secretary view the Moscow summit as an important step in the process of putting US-Soviet relations on a more productive and sustainable basis. Their comprehensive and detailed discussions covered the full agenda of issues… Serious differences remain on important issues. The frank dialogue which has developed between the two countries remains critical to surmounting these differences…

They reaffirmed their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, their determination to prevent any war between the United States and Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional, and their disavowal of any intention to achieve military superiority.

The two leaders are convinced that the expanding political dialogue they have established represents an increasingly effective means of resolving issues of mutual interest and concern. They do not minimise the real differences of history, tradition and ideology which will continue to characterise the US-Soviet relationship. But they believe that the dialogue will endure because it is based on realism and focused on the achievement of concrete results… It is a process which the President and the General Secretary believe serves the best interests of the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and can contribute to a more stable, more peaceful and safer world.

The President and the General Secretary, having expressed the commitment of their two countries to build on progress to date in arms control, determined objectives and next steps on a wide range of issues in this area. These will guide the efforts of the two Governments in the months ahead as they work with each other and with other states toward equitable, verifiable agreements that strengthen international stability and security…

Ronald Reagan and Mr Gorbachev expressed their joint confidence that the extensive work done provides the basis for concluding the treaty on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms which will promote strategic stability and strengthen security not only of the peoples of the USSR and the USA, but of all mankind.

Guided by this fundamental agreement… the delegations of the two countries have been instructed to return to Geneva on July 12th 1988. It has been agreed as a matter of principle that, once the remaining problems are solved and the treaty and its associated documents are agreed, they will be signed without delay…”


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