Slag van Wene en Morean -oorlog: wat was Rusland se posisie?

Slag van Wene en Morean -oorlog: wat was Rusland se posisie?


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Rusland verskyn nie in Wikipedia se verslae oor die Morese oorlog of die voorafgaande Slag om Wene nie. Ek vind dit effens verrassend. Miskien is die rede dat voordat Peter minder aktief was met haar suidelike grens?

Vraag: Is daar 'n aangetekende Russiese standpunt oor hierdie konflikte?


Wene is beleër in 1683. In die Verdrag van Bakhchisarai het Rusland ingestem om nie die Ottomaanse Ryk te bestry vir die tyd tussen 1681 en 1701 nie, en het hy eintlik die belofte nagekom ... tot 1686. Daarna het hy by die Europese koalisie aangesluit en begin met die Russies-Turkse oorlog (1686-1700), wat hy gewen het, met die verkryging van Azov en Taganrog. Albei het spoedig in 1711 verlore gegaan, Azov is weer deur Turke en Taganrog herower.


Onthou dat net 'n jaar voor die Slag van Wene, tsaar Feodor Alexeyevich oorlede is, wat gelei het tot die Moskou -opstand van 1682. Gevolglik is al die krag verkry deur Sophia Alekseyevna, wat die regent van Rusland geword het. Die toekomstige tsaar, Petrus die Grote, was slegs 10 jaar oud.

Na die opstand was die interne situasie van Rusland baie onstabiel, met prins Ivan Khovansky wat probeer om die regentskap vir homself te kry. In die herfs, nadat die prins tereggestel is, het 'n ander opstand in Moskou begin, wat selfs daarin geslaag het om die Kremlin oor te neem.

In hierdie situasie het buitelandse politiek 'n rukkie minder belangrik geword, en 'n idee om die leër in sulke moeilike tye uit die land te verwyder, sal beslis as 'n risiko beskou word.


Die ergste nederlaag in die geskiedenis van die Russiese vloot

In die vroeë 20ste eeu het Japan die dominante posisie van Rusland in die Verre Ooste uitgedaag. Eens toegesluit in selfisolasie, maar nou gemoderniseer en hernu, verklaar die Land of the Rising Sun openlik sy geopolitieke belange in Korea en noordooste van China, 'n tradisionele sone van belange van die noordelike buurland.

Die Russies-Japannese oorlog, wat in 1904-1905 uitgebreek het, het die hele wêreld geskok. Niemand kon hom voorstel dat die tsaristiese weermag in die loop van dit nie 'n enkele oorwinning sou behaal nie en dat die Russiese vloot in die slag van Tsushima die ergste nederlaag in sy hele geskiedenis sou ly.

Art Media/Print Collector/Getty Images

'N Lang vaart

Op 15 Oktober 1904 het oorlogskepe van die 2de Stille Oseaan-eskader, wat aan die Oossee gevorm is, die hawe van Libava (huidige Liepaja in Letland) verlaat. Hulle sou die helfte van die wêreld reis, die Geel See bereik en hul kollegas bystaan ​​by die 1ste Stille Oseaan -eskader wat onder sterk druk van die keiserlike Japannese vloot was.

Die noodlottige reis het sleg begin. In die vroeë oggendure op 22 Oktober, terwyl die Russiese skepe naby die kus van Groot -Brittanje op plaaslike vissersvaartuie losgebrand het, het hulle hulle as Japannese sabotasiemagte verwar. As gevolg hiervan is verskeie Engelse matrose doodgemaak en dit was slegs danksy die woeste pogings van Russiese diplomate dat die konflik vreedsaam opgelos is.

Russiese vloot val Britse vistreilers aan.

Dit het die 2de Stille Oseaan -eskader sewe lang maande geneem om die Verre Ooste te bereik. Aan die kus van Frans -Indochina het die 3de Stille Oseaan -eskader van agter -admiraal Nikolai Nebogatov, wat dit ingehaal het, 'n kortpad deur die Suez -kanaal aangepak, in plaas daarvan om Afrika te omseil.

Op 27 Mei 1905 het 11 slagskepe, nege kruisers, nege vernietigers, sowel as vervoer- en hulpvaartuie onder bevel van vise -admiraal Zinovy ​​Rozhestvensky, die Koreaanse Straat naby Tsushima -eiland binnegekom, waar die vyand reeds op hulle gewag het.

Slagting

Admiraal Togo Heihachiro op die bord van die vlagskip slagskip 'Mikasa'.

Japan & rsquos Combined Fleet het nie net 'n numeriese voordeel bo die Russe (in kruisers en vernietigers) nie, maar het ook deeglik voorberei op die ontmoeting met die Russiese eskader. Admiraal Togo Heihachiro was vasbeslote om die vyand in 'n enkele aanval te vernietig.

Die Japannese het Rozhestvensky en rsquos -skepe opgemerk terwyl hulle nog 'n entjie weg was, terwyl die Russiese bevelvoerder nie net die nodige verkenning uitgevoer het nie, maar ook 'n duidelike plan van aksie opgestel het in die geval van 'n vyand, behalwe om sy weg te vind na Vladivostok.

Die Russiese eskader het met gewere gewaai en beweeg in 'n wakker kolom, die een na die ander skip op 'n vasgestelde afstand, wat hul skietbaan aansienlik vernou het. Aangesien daar behalwe die nuutste skepe ook baie verouderde skepe was, het die konvooi teen 'n gemiddelde spoed van nege knope beweeg. Togo het beveel om die stadige en lomp vyand aan te val met klein manoeuvreerbare formasies van vier of ses skepe, wat 'n snelheid van tot 16 knope ontwikkel het, die konvooi verbysteek en dit vanuit gunstige hoeke aangeval het.

Aan die begin van die geveg is die Russiese vlagskip -slagskip en prins Suvorov, waar viseadmiraal Rozhestvensky aan boord was, erg getref. & ldquoEk het omgedraai. Watter verwoesting! & Rdquo herinner 'n beampte van die bevelvoerder & rsquos -personeel, Vladimir Semyonov. Hutte vir brandende bemanning op die brûe, brandende puin op die dek, hope lyke. Sein- en afstandmeterstasies, dopwaarnemingsposte - alles is meegesleur, alles is vernietig. Agter was die & lsquoAlexander & rsquo en die & lsquoBorodino & rsquo, ook gehul in rook! & Rdquo

Mary Evans Picture Library/Global Look Press

Die gewonde Rozhestvensky is na 'n ander skip ontruim, terwyl die eskader 'n rukkie sy bevel verloor het, wat ook bygedra het tot die dreigende ramp. Admiraal Nebogatov, wat hom vervang het, het nie daarin geslaag om al die magte onder sy bevel te verenig nie en het in werklikheid slegs sy losbandigheid gelei.

Die Japannese, wat goed voorbereid was vir die geveg, het meer gevegservaring, was beter toegerus en het 'n numeriese voordeel, kon van die begin af die inisiatief aangryp en tot die einde toe volhard. Snags het hulle daarin geslaag om die Russiese eskader uiteindelik uiteen te jaag, waarna sy slagskepe, kruisers en vernietigers maklik een vir een vernietig en gevange geneem kon word.

Hulton -argief/Getty Images

Terwyl ons beste skepe die een na die ander omgekom het, deur die vyand se doppe deurboor en deur vuur vernietig is, omgeslaan het, maar nie die gevegsformasie verlaat het nie, bly die vyand feitlik onkwetsbaar, en rdquo onthou Vladimir Kostenko, 'n ingenieur van die slagskip Oryol. Die gekombineerde vloot het net drie vernietigers verloor in die slag van Tsushima. Verder is een van hulle nie deur die Russiese vuur getref nie, maar het gesink nadat hy met 'n ander Japannese skip gebots het.

Ramp

Die verliese wat die Russiese eskader gely het, was baie groter as die van die Japannese. Een en twintig skepe is óf deur die vyand vernietig óf deur hul eie bemanning opgeblaas na die skade: ses eskader-slagskepe, twee kuswaggevegskepe, vier kruisers, vyf verwoesters, een hulpkruiser en drie vervoervaartuie. Menslike verliese beloop 5.045 matrose, insluitend 209 offisiere.

Beskadig die keiserlike Russiese slagskip Oryol.

Die oorblywende vier slagskepe, 'n vernietiger en twee hospitaalskepe het uiteindelik die wit vlag gehys. In totaal is 7 282 mans deur die Japannese gevange geneem, insluitend beide bevelvoerders - Rozhestvensky en Nebogatov.

Die sewe skepe kon daarin slaag om na Manila en Sjanghai te gaan, waar hulle geïnterneer is. Slegs die kruiser & lsquoAlmaz & rsquo en die verwoesters & lsquoBravy & rsquo en & lsquoGrozny & rsquo het daarin geslaag om Vladivostok te bereik: slegs 870 offisiere en matrose uit die 16.000 mense wat die eskader voor die geveg getel het.

Die Russiese kruiser 'Izumrud' na die geveg.

Photo12/Universal Images Group/Getty Images

Die Tsushima -ramp het die einde van die oorlog met Japan tot gevolg gehad, wat vir Rusland rampspoedig geblyk het. Nadat hy byna al die hoofmagte van sy vloot verloor het, het Rusland net 'n klein vlootmag geword. Sy internasionale militêre aansien het 'n groot knou gekry, terwyl openbare ontevredenheid met die owerhede in die land vinnig toeneem, wat uiteindelik gelei het tot die Eerste Russiese Revolusie van 1905-1907.

Die Russiese Ryk het sy dominante posisie in die Verre Ooste heeltemal verloor aan Japan, wat 'n geleentheid gekry het om grootskaalse uitbreiding in Korea en China uit te voer. Dit was eers in 1945 dat die Sowjetunie die skande van Tsushima kon wreek.

Klik hier om 5 feite te lees oor die verdrag wat Rusland en die rampspoedige oorlog met Japan beëindig het.

Gee altyd 'n aktiewe hiperskakel na die oorspronklike materiaal as u enige van die inhoud van Russia Beyond gebruik, gedeeltelik of volledig.


Die jare van die geallieerde magte in Wene (1945 tot 1955) - Geskiedenis van Wene

In November 1945 is die eerste stadsraadverkiesings in Wene gehou, en die stad is herstel tot demokrasie. Die 100 setels van die Weense stadsraad is verdeel tussen die sosialiste (58 setels), die People's Party, of konserwatiewes (36 setels) en die kommuniste (6 setels). Die eerste prioriteit van die nuwe stadsregering was om welsynsprogramme vir jong en bejaardes te verseker, om die nutsdienste in die stad te herstel en die stad te herbou - 'n program wat in wese tot in die vroeë 1960's voortduur.

Reeds in 1946 is die sogenaamde & quotTerritorial Review Act & quot (Gebiets nderungsgesetz) aangeneem, wat daarop gemik was om die uitbreiding van die stad in 1938 min of meer te herroep. Die goedkeuring deur die geallieerde besettingsmagte is agt jaar lank teruggehou, aangesien veral die Sowjet -magte geglans het, sodat dit eers in 1954 in werking getree het. Sedertdien bestaan ​​die stedelike gebied uit 23 distrikte. In vergelyking met die situasie voor 1938 was die gebied wat nou die 22ste distrik noord van die Donau en die 23ste distrik aan die suidelike uiteinde van die stedelike gebied vorm, deel van Wene. 'N Jaar later, in Mei 1955, is die land in vryheid herstel deur die sluiting van die & quotAustrian State Treaty & quot (& quotStaatsvertrag & quot). In Wene neem die ekonomie 'n beslissende wending ten goede, nie ten minste nie as gevolg van hulp verleen ingevolge die Marshall -plan, maar ook omdat konfiskering van industriële eiendom deur die Sowjets opgehou het.


Russies-Japannese oorlog begin

Japan verklaar formeel oorlog teen Rusland op die dag van die Port Arthur -aanval. Maar leiers van die Russiese Ryk het eers enkele ure nadat die Asiatiese mag Port Arthur, wat as die Russiese vloot se bedryfsbasis in die streek gedien het, kennis geneem van die bedoelings van Japan.

Tsaar Nicholas is deur sy adviseurs meegedeel dat die Japannese Rusland nie militêr sou uitdaag nie, selfs nadat onderhandelinge tussen die twee moondhede ingestort het.

Die internasionale reg het veral nie 'n formele oorlogsverklaring vereis voordat 'n aanval geloods is nie, totdat die Tweede Haagse Vredeskonferensie van 1907, twee jaar nadat die geveg tussen die Russe en die Japannese geëindig het.


Slag van Wene en Morean -oorlog: wat was Rusland se posisie? - Geskiedenis

Kort na Napoléon ’s abdikasie en ballingskap in 1814 die oorwinnaars het mekaar ontmoet Wene in Oostenryk . Die Franse rewolusionêre oorloë het begin met 'n oorlog teen Oostenryk. Dus Wene, die hoofstad van Oostenryk, was 'n voor die hand liggende keuse …

Betekenis

Dit was een van die belangrikste internasionale konferensies in die Europese geskiedenis wat Europa herorganiseer het Napoleon se nederlaag . Europese monarge was vasbeslote om 'n blywende vrede te skep op grond van die herstel van die “ ou orde ”: om die nalatenskap van die Franse revolusie en al die revolusionêre ywer wat oor Europa versprei het, om seker te maak dat demokratiese, egalitêre en liberale ideale of nasionalisme, heeltemal uit Europa verwyder word. Dit het die herstel van 'n konserwatiewe orde in Europa probeer om die klok voor 1789 terug te draai.

Op 'n meer alledaagse noot was die kongres van Wene 'n kultureel Olimpiade sonder vergelyking. Wene het nege maande lank meer as 200 afgevaardigdes van regoor Europa vermaak met 'n marathon -kultuurkalender wat uit daaglikse dansballe bestaan ​​(bv. wals) en samelewingsgeleenthede om voorsiening te maak vir die nietigheid en emosionele welstand van die beste gaste

Agtergrond

Die Franse rewolusie het die naburige vorste van Frankryk begin bekommer, veral nadat Frankryk oorlog verklaar het Oostenryk (en sy bondgenote Pruise) in 1792 en nadat die Franse koning Lodewyk XVI die volgende jaar verhoor en onthoof is. Dit het tien jaar Franse Revolusionêre Oorloë (1792–1802) losgemaak, gevolg deur elf jaar Napoleontiese Oorloë (1803-14) teen die meeste Europese monargieë en lande: Brittanje, Oostenryk, Pruise, Spanje, Portugal, Nederland, Napels, ens. tot Ses verskillende koalisies om die Republikeinse Frankryk te verslaan!

Groot spelers

Die vier groot magte (teenoor Frankryk) wat die kongres oorheers het, was:

  1. Groot Brittanje
  2. Oostenryk
  3. Pruise
  4. Rusland

Ongeveer 200 regeerders en hul diplomate het na die Oostenrykse hoofstad, Wene, gestroom: 15 lede van koninklike gesinne saam met 200 prinse en 216 hoofde van diplomatieke missies. Daarbenewens het Switserland en ander Europese state het ook afgevaardigdes gestuur.

Dit het nie gegaan oor die mense en hul behoeftes aan vryheid en voorspoed nie, maar om die belange van die ou Europese dinastieë te herstel. Die kongres van Wene het in wese gegaan oor:

  • Herstel” van die absolutisties monargieë in Europa voor die Franse Revolusie in 1789
  • Legitimeer die regerende monargieë en leërs
  • Herstruktureer Duitsland
  • Verswakking en bevat Frankryk (Frankryk is feitlik beperk tot sy grense van 1791)
  • Skep reëls vir die bemiddeling en bestuur van konflikte tussen Europese heersers op 'n vreedsame manier.

Die meeste bepalings van die Congress ’ Final Act kan ondergeskik staan ​​onder die opskrifte van "Wettigheid,” “Sekuriteit, "En"Vergoeding, ”Wat die drie belangrikste beginsels was wat die kongres oorheers het.

  1. Wettigheid”Betrokke die herstel van dinastieë wat gedurende die Napoleontiese tydperk afgesit is, waaronder die herstel van Bourbons lyne na die trone van Frankryk, Spanje en die Koninkryk van die Twee Sicilië, en die herstel van die Huis van Oranje na die troon van Holland.
  2. Onder die beginsel van "Sekuriteit, ”Was die doel om bevat Frankryk met 'n gordel van “buffer state ” om enige toekomstige Franse aggressie te voorkom: die “ Koninkryk van Nederland ” (België is toe bygevoeg, maar na die Belgiese Revolusie het die suidelike deel van die nuwe staat in 1830 onafhanklik geword), Oostenryk, Pruise, die Italiaans Koninkryk Piemonte en Switserland.
  3. Onder die beginsel van "Vergoeding, "(Behalwe die omvang van die territoriale bepalings onder" Veiligheid "), het magte soos Rusland, Swede, Groot -Brittanje, Oostenryk ontvang nuwe gebiede.

Terwyl die Slag van Waterloo was steeds besig om te woed, die vyf ondertekenende state onderteken die Verdrag van Wene: Groot -Brittanje, Oostenryk, Pruise, Rusland en Frankryk.

Die kongres van Wene word as 'n groot sukses beskou, aangesien ek sy hoofdoelwitte bereik het.

  1. Brittanje en Oostenryk verseker a balans van mag in Europa, veral 'n balans tussen Pruise en Rusland. Brittanje ondersteun die versterking van die mag van Pruise wat die invloed van Rusland in Europa sal balanseer. Maar om 'n Russies-Pruisiese alliansie te bestry, het Oostenryk, Brittanje en Frankryk 'n geheime verdrag onderteken waarin hulle ooreengekom het om so 'n alliansie teë te staan.
  2. Rusland en Pruise het hul ekspansionistiese ambisies vervul. Rusland verkry groot dele van Pole
  3. Oostenryk groot gebiede in Italië ontvang en ander streke weer verkry.
  4. Switserland is in 22 kantons opgebou en verkry neutraal status.
  5. Swede het Finland verloor, maar sy Noorse gebiede is erken.
  6. Die Heilige Alliansie: Tsaar Alexander I van Rusland het die meeste Europese nasies oortuig om 'n Heilige Alliansie. Oostenryk, Pruise en Rusland het 'n reaksionêrkoalisie wat probeer het om Europa van rewolusie te bewaar.
  7. Nasionalisme: Die Anglo-Oostenrykse visie van Europees het nooit voldoen aan die strewe van mense nie nasionaal eenheid. Die teleurstelling is belangrik vir die Duits en Italiaans patriotte. Nasionaliste was nie tevrede met die gevestigde nuwe grense wat dien om die magsbalans te handhaaf nie, eerder as om 'n gegewe groep wat dieselfde taal en kultuur deel, te verenig. Duitsland slaag nie daarin om sy doelwit om 'n verenigde Duitse staat te stig nie. Die herstel van Duitsland tot sy vorige status as die chaotiese, gefragmenteerde “ Heilige Romeinse Ryk ’ het niemand gedoel nie. In plaas daarvan is 'n Duitse Konfederasie ” geskep.
  8. Frankryk: Na die slag van Waterloo het die nederlaag van Frankryk die belangrikste gebiede verloor en moes hy 700 miljoen frank betaal vrywaring en die Europese kunsskatte wat deur Napoleon gesteel is, teruggee. Frankryk het egter daarin geslaag om die koste van sy territoriale verlies te verminder en sy plek terug te kry deur die Britse standpunt oor die verbod vanslawehandel. Dit ondersteun ook die herstel van die Bourbons.
  9. Die groot moondhede het ook ingestem om gereeld oor sake van gemeenskaplike belang te konsulteer, en sodoende die sogenaamde “Congress-stelsel bekend te stel, en#8221 wat periodieke kongresse (of konferensies) behels. Hierdie reeks reëlings het min of meer die vrede (Europa het nie almal gaan vir 'n eeu tegelyk oorlog toe, nie eers nie Eerste Wêreldoorlog uitgebreek in 1914), en 'n groot rewolusie tot 1848 voorkom.

In daardie opsig was die kongres van Wene 'n triomf van diplomasie.


Koreaanse Oorlog

In Junie 1950 het kommunistiese magte uit Noord-Korea die westelike republiek van Suid-Korea binnegeval en die Koreaanse Oorlog geloods. Douglas MacArthur was in beheer van die Amerikaanse geleide koalisie van die Verenigde Nasies se troepe. In daardie val het sy troepe die Noord -Koreane afgeweer en hulle uiteindelik teruggedryf na die Chinese grens. MacArthur ontmoet president Truman, wat bekommerd was dat die kommunistiese regering van die Volksrepubliek China die inval as 'n vyandige daad sou beskou en in die konflik kon ingryp. Die generaal verseker hom dat die kans op 'n Chinese ingryping skraal is. Toe, in November en Desember 1950, het 'n massiewe mag van Chinese troepe Noord -Korea binnegedring en hulle teen die Amerikaanse linies neergeslaan en die Amerikaanse troepe teruggedryf na Suid -Korea. MacArthur het toestemming gevra om die kommunistiese China te bombardeer en nasionalistiese Chinese magte uit Taiwan teen die Volksrepubliek China te gebruik. Truman het hierdie versoeke botweg geweier, en 'n openbare geskil het tussen die twee mans ontstaan.

Op 11 April 1951 verwyder Truman MacArthur uit sy bevel vir insubordinasie. In 'n toespraak aan Amerikaners daardie dag, het die president gesê: 'Ek glo dat ons die oorlog tot Korea moet beperk om hierdie belangrike redes: Om seker te maak dat die kosbare lewens van ons vegmense nie vermors word om te sien dat die veiligheid van ons land en die vrye wêreld word nie onnodig in die gedrang gebring nie en om 'n derde wêreldoorlog te voorkom. beleid. ”

Die ontslag van MacArthur en#x2019 het 'n kort herrie onder die Amerikaanse publiek veroorsaak, maar Truman was steeds daartoe verbind om die konflik in Korea 'n beperkte oorlog te hou. het gelei tot 'n massief uitgebreide oorlog in Asië.


Hongaarse rewolusie van 1848

Ten tyde van die revolusie het Hongarye reeds sy eie parlement en aansienlike outonomie gehad, maar Europese liberale van die 19de eeu het gesorg vir die idee van nasionale soewereiniteit, en die Hapsburg -ryk, ongeag die kompromie of hervormings wat dit kon bied, het in die manier. Die idee van nasionalisme vir Hongarye was egter veral ingewikkeld, aangesien die geografiese gebied bekend as Hongarye baie verskillende etniese groepe bevat met botsende lojaliteite. Benewens Magyars, het die streek ook Slawiërs, Kroate, Serwiërs en Slowenië ingesluit, waarvan sommige lojaal aan Oostenryk was en die Hongaarse beweging vir onafhanklikheid gekant was. Kort nadat Louis Kossuth 'n onafhanklike koninkryk van Hongarye verklaar het, het die Kroate in opstand gekom teen die Hongare en hul lojaliteit aan Oostenryk verklaar. Die eerste gevegte in die Hongaarse revolusie was tussen die Kroate en Magiere, en Oostenryk se ingryping van hul getroue Kroaties onderdane het 'n opskudding in Wene veroorsaak.

Die opstand in Hongarye sou maklik afgelê kon word as dit 'n geïsoleerde gebeurtenis was. Maar omdat dit tyd was om saam te val met revolusies in Wene en Italië, kon die Oostenrykse regering nie effektief reageer nie. Oostenryk het nie die militêre hulpbronne gehad om vier gelyktydige opstand te beëindig nie, en daarom het hy groot beloftes aan die leier in Hongarye gemaak om tyd te koop. Selfs met die toegewings van Oostenryk het die Hongare egter vir opstand gekies. Hulle het 'n vrywillige weermag bymekaargemaak en verskeie vroeë oorwinnings behaal. Die meeste Slawiërs in die streek was egter gekant teen die onafhanklikheid van Hongarye, daarom het Oostenryk 'n beroep op Rusland gedoen om in te gryp. Die swak toegeruste Magyar-patriotte kon nie die uitnemendste Russiese mag weerstaan ​​nie, en die Hongaarse rewolusie is vinnig tot 'n einde gekom.


Peter Kotlyarevski

Peter Stepanovich Kotlyarevski is gebore as 'n seun van 'n dorpspriester in die ooste van Oekraïne in 1782 en sou in sy pa se voetspore volg totdat die noodlot ingegryp het. 'N Russiese offisier, luitenant-kolonel Ivan P. Lazarev, wat na 'n nuwe toewysing in die Kaukasusberge reis, moes tydens 'n strawwe winterstorm in 1792 skuiling soek by die kerk. Lazarev was so beïndruk met die intelligente 10-jarige ou seuntjie dat hy vir hom 'n pos in sy eie eenheid, die Caucasus Jaeger Corps, verseker het. Die volgende jaar is Kotlyarevski ingeskryf as privaat in die 4de Bataljon, onder bevel van Lazarev. Soos destyds algemeen was, het goedgebore jong mans in hul geledere gestyg terwyl hulle hul opleiding volg. 'N Jaar later, op 12 -jarige ouderdom, word Kotlyarevski sersant.

Mikhail Skobelev.

Die Russiese magte in die Kaukasus was voortdurend in oorlogvoering teen opstandige bergstamme betrokke, asook weerstand teen Turkse en Persiese pogings om die Russiese aantasting in hul tradisionele invloedsfere suid van die berge te stuit. Die gevegte was kwaai, sonder om te gee of te vra. In 1796 het die 14-jarige Kotlyarevski sy vuurdoop ontvang tydens die storm van die Persiese vesting Derbent aan die oewer van die Kaspiese See.

Kotlyarevski word in 1799 tot vlag bevorder en word aide-de-camp vir Lazarev, nou 'n generaal-majoor. Ongelukkig het hul vereniging gou 'n tragiese einde bereik. In 1800 het die Dowager -koningin Mariam van Georgië, ontsteld oor die afskaffing van die Georgiese monargie van tsaar Paul, persoonlik Lazarev doodgesteek toe hy by die Georgiese hoofstad Tiflis aankom om haar na Rusland te verwyder. Die nuwe bevelvoerder van die Russiese magte in die Kaukasus het Kotlyarevski 'n pos as sy persoonlike assistent-kamp aangebied. Kotlyarevski het egter geweier en verkies om eerder 'n kompanie in 'n jagerregiment te beveel. Later in die jaar, nou 'n kaptein, het Kotlyarevski deelgeneem aan die verdediging van Tiflis teen 'n groot mag rebelse stamme van Lezghin.

In Junie 1805 het 'n 40.000-sterk Persiese leër die gebied van die huidige Azerbeidjan binnegeval. Die vooruitstrewende Persiese voorhoede het 'n klein Russiese afdeling raakgeloop wat 'n klein ou fort by die Askeran -dorpie beset en die pad in 'n smal bergpas versper. Die 500 Russiese soldate, waaronder Kotlyarevski se kompanie, aangevul deur plaaslike Armeense heffings, het twee weke lank aangehou. Aangesien die steeds toenemende Persiese versterkings die Russiese posisie onhoudbaar gemaak het, het lojale Armeniërs die Russe gehelp om langs bergpaadjies te ontsnap.

Soos die jare verbygegaan het, het Kotlyarevski voortgegaan met veldtogte, terwyl hy geleidelik deur die geledere gestyg het en wonde opgedoen het. In 1807, op 25 -jarige ouderdom, word hy bevorder tot kolonel en word bevel gegee oor 'n jaegerregiment.

Russe onder generaal Peter Kotlyarevski voer veldtog teen die Perse in die bergagtige Azerbeidjan. Soos alle groot generaals, het Kotlyarevski sy terugtrekkende vyande agtervolg om hulle te vernietig.

In 1810 het 'n 30.000-sterk Persiese mag onder leiding van kroonprins Abbas-Mirza die Karabakh Khanate, 'n protektoraat van die Russiese Ryk, binnegeval. Een van die voorste Persiese afdelings was die Migri -vesting, strategies geleë op 'n belangrike kruispad. Kolonel Kotlyarevski met 'n mag van 400 jaers en grenadiers is gestuur om die vesting weer in te neem.

Met behulp van plaaslike gidse het Kotlyarevski sy manne deur moeilike bergagtige terrein gelei en in die onmiddellike omgewing van Migri aangekom. 'N Skielike Russiese aanval het geleidelik die een na die ander versterkte vesting verwyder, wat uiteindelik die grootste deel van die garnisoen van 2 000 man genoop het om uit die vesting terug te trek. Kotlyarevski, wat hom aan die hoof van die aanval gestel het, het 'n wond aan sy linkerarm opgedoen. Twee dae later nader Abbas-Mirza Migri met sy hoofmag. Nadat verskeie onsuksesvolle ondersoeke gevind is en die vesting te goed verdedig is om 'n aanranding te waag, het die Persiese prins sy mag beveel om terug te keer na die grens.

Maar dit was nie in die aard van Kotlyarevski om die vyand onbetwis te laat wegglip nie. Verhoog deur 'n paar plaaslike heffings, het hy gejaag en die terugtrek van die Persiese leër ingehaal terwyl hy snags oor die Araksrivier ry. Die Russiese mag van effens meer as 400 man was grootliks in die getal deur die Persiese leër van meer as 10 000. Omdat hy geweet het dat enige huiwering dodelik sou wees en dat geen mans gespaar kon bly om gevangenes te bewaak nie, beveel Kotlyarevski sy mans om geen gevangenes te neem nie. 'N Woedende Russiese bajonetaanval wat uit die duisternis ontplof het, het die Persiese magte heeltemal verras. Wanorde en paniek vloei deur hul geledere en die Persiese leër het weggesmelt.

Die volgende jaar, 1811, het Kotlyarevski nog 'n gewaagde maneuver uitgevoer deur twee infanteriebataljons en 100 Kosakke deur sneeubedekte berge te neem om die Akhalkalak-vesting deur 'n nagaanval te verower. Vir hierdie gewaagde optrede is Kotlyarevski bevorder tot generaal -majoor.

In 1812 het Abbas-Mirza weereens 'n groot leër teen die Russies-beheerde gebied gelei. Die dun verspreide Russiese magte kon nie al die sleutelpunte beskerm nie, en die Perse het vinnig verskeie strategiese posisies beklee. Generaal -majoor Kotlyarevski het die reg gekry om op eie inisiatief te werk om die gebied te herower. Die mag onder sy bevel tel 2 200 man en ses kanonne waarmee hulle ongeveer 30 000 Perse in die gesig gestaar het.

Kotlyarevski, wat die Araksrivier, die grens tussen Rusland en Persië, oorgesteek het, val die Perse op 19 Oktober by Aslanduz aan en verslaan hulle, terwyl hulle die fort later in die nag verower. Vir hierdie oorwinning is Kotlyarevski bevorder tot luitenant -generaal.

Die Lenkoran -vesting, omring deur moerasse, beskerm deur sterk vestings en deur 4 000 Perse beset, was die volgende. Op 26 Desember het Kotlyarevski by Lenkoran aangekom. By gebrek aan swaar artillerie was die vyf dae lange bombardement nutteloos. Met kanon -ammunisie op en met berigte van 'n sterk naderende Persiese hulpmag, het Kotlyarevski die besluit geneem om die vesting stormagtig te neem.

Op die vooraand van aanranding beveel Kotlyarevski: 'Daar sal geen terugtog wees nie. Ons moet die vesting inneem of almal sterf ... Moenie luister na die herroepsein nie, dit kom nie! ” Plundery is verbied onder die doodstraf totdat die aanranding verby was.

'N Eietydse skildery van die Slag van Shipka -pas toon hoe Russiese troepe 'n desperate aanval deur die Turke afweer. Die Russiese generaal Mikhail Skobelev het hom tydens die Russies-Turkse oorlog van 1877-1878 onderskei deur die strategiese bergpas vas te lê.

Die aanranding het voor dagbreek op 31 Desember 1812 begin. Die oprukkende Russiese kolomme het 'n verwoestende vuur gekry. Veral swaar ongevalle was onder Russiese offisiere, gewoonlik van voor af. Toe 'n kolonel wat een van die kolomme lei, val, plaas Kotlyarevski hom aan die hoof van sy manne. 'N Koeël steek sy been deur, maar die dapper generaal begin op 'n aanrandingsleer klim. Toe hy die bokant van die muur bereik, slaan twee koeëls hom in die kop en Kotlyarevski tuimel van die muur af.

Toe hulle hul geliefde generaal sien val, het die woedende Russiese soldate die vesting per bajonet gedra. Geen kwartaal is gegee nie en 'n meerderheid van die Persiese verdedigers is deur die vesting gejag. Wonder bo wonder het Kotlyarevski sy ernstige wonde oorleef.

Die val van Lenkoran het die uitkoms van die Russies-Persiese Oorlog bepaal, met Persië wat groot gebiede suid van die Kaukasusberge afgestaan ​​het. Weens sy wonde bedank Kotlyarevski uit die weermag en vestig hom in die Oekraïne.

Toe die volgende oorlog met Persië in 1826 begin, bied tsaar Nicholas I aan Kotlyarevski bevel oor die Russiese magte in die Kaukasus. Kotlyarevski het egter geweier weens swak gesondheid. Kotlyarevski het die res van sy lewe in afsondering geleef. Hy is in 1852 oorlede.

Gebeure in die Kaukasus is oorskadu deur Rusland se titaniese stryd teen Napoleon, en die naam van Kotlyarevski is selfs in die moderne Rusland feitlik onbekend. Nietemin het die 'Scourge of Kaukasus' 'n briljante bladsy in die Russiese militêre geskiedenis geskryf.


Koreaanse oorlog: 'n vars perspektief

As die vergete oorlog van die hand gewys, was Korea in werklikheid een van die belangrikste konflikte in Amerika. Alhoewel dit uit 'n wanbegrip ontstaan ​​het, het die Koreaanse Oorlog die opbou van Amerikaanse magte in die Noord -Atlantiese Verdragsorganisasie (NAVO) veroorsaak, het dit Amerikaanse betrokkenheid by die Viëtnam -oorlog begin, en hoewel dit destyds as 'n afwyking beskou is, dien dit nou as 'n voorbeeld vir Amerika se oorloë van die toekoms.

Een van die redes waarom die belangrikheid van die Koreaanse Oorlog nie beter besef word nie, is dat die konflik van die begin af verwarrende en teenstrydige boodskappe gelewer het. Die historikus en Koreaanse oorlogsgeveg veteraan T.R. Fehrenbach het in sy klassieke geskryf Hierdie soort oorlog: ‘ Amerikaners het in 1950 iets herontdek wat hulle sedert Hiroshima vergeet het: jy kan vir ewig oor 'n land vlieg, jy kan dit bombardeer, dit verstuiver, dit verwoes en dit skoonvee, maar as jy dit wil verdedig, beskerm dit en hou dit vir die beskawing, jy moet dit op die grond doen soos die Romeinse legioene gedoen het, deur jou jongmanne in die modder te steek. ’

Fehrenbach het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom: Teen April 1951 het die Agtste Weermag weer bewys dat Erwin Rommel beweer het dat Amerikaanse troepe minder weet, maar vinniger geleer het as enige vegtende manne wat hy teëgestaan ​​het. Die tragedie van Amerikaanse wapens is egter dat Amerikaners met 'n onvolmaakte gevoel van geskiedenis soms net so vinnig vergeet as wat hulle leer.

Twee jaar later, toe die oorlog tot 'n einde gekom het, verklaar die sekretaris van die lugmag, Thomas K. Finletter, dat ‘Korea 'n unieke, nooit herhaalde afleiding van die ware verloop van strategiese lugmag was. ’ Vir die volgende kwarteeu het kernwapens die Amerikaanse militêre strategie oorheers. Gevolglik het generaal Maxwell D. Taylor, die agtste weermag se laaste oorlogsbevelvoerder (en later voorsitter van die gesamentlike stafhoofde tydens die Viëtnam -oorlog), gekla dat daar nooit 'n deeglike ontleding van die lesse was nie geleer uit Korea, en later het beleidsmakers baie van dieselfde foute herhaal. ’

Die mees verdoemende fout wat beleidmakers gemaak het, was om die ware aard van die oorlog verkeerd te beoordeel. Soos Karl von Clausewitz, die beroemde Pruisiese oorlogsfilosoof, in 1832 geskryf het: Die eerste, hoogste, mees ingrypende oordeel wat die staatsman en die bevelvoerder moet doen, is om die soort oorlog teen wat hulle aanpak …. Dit is die eerste van alle strategiese vrae en die belangrikste. ’

As President Harry S. Truman’s June 27, 1950, war message makes evident, the U.S. assumption was that monolithic world communism, directed by Moscow, was behind the North Korean invasion. ‘The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt,’ said Truman, ‘that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.’

That belief, later revealed as false, had enormous and far-reaching consequences. Believing that Korea was a diversion and that the main attack would come in Europe, the United States began a major expansion of its NATO forces. From 81,000 soldiers and one infantry division stationed in Western Europe when the war started, by 1952 the U.S. presence had increased to six divisions–including the National Guard’s 28th and 43rd Infantry divisions� aircraft, 82 warships and 260,800 men, slightly more than the 238,600 soldiers then in combat in Korea.

Another critical action was the decision to become involved in Vietnam. In addition to ordering U.S. military forces to intervene in Korea, Truman directed ‘acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indo-China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.’

On September 17, 1950, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Indochina was formed, an organization that would grow to the half-million-strong Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) before U.S. involvement in that country came to an end almost a quarter century later. As in Korea, the notion that monolithic world communism was behind the struggle persisted until almost the very end.

The fact that such an assumption was belied by 2,000 years of Sino-Vietnamese hostility was ignored, and it was not until Richard Nixon’s diplomatic initiatives in 1970 that the United States became aware of, and began to exploit, the fissures in that so-called Communist monolith. By then it was too late, for the American people had long since given up on Vietnam.

The fact that the U.S. response to both the Korean War and the Vietnam War was built on the false perception of a Communist monolith began to emerge after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. At a July 1995 conference I attended at Georgetown University, Dr. Valeri Denissov, deputy director of the Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, revealed the true nature of the Korean War’s origins.

Drawing from the hitherto secret documents of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Denissov revealed that far from being the instigator of the war, Soviet Premier Josef Stalin was at best a reluctant partner. In September 1949, the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party rejected an appeal from North Korea’s Kim Il Sung to assist in an invasion of the South. But in April 1950, says Denissov, Stalin changed his mind and agreed to provide assistance for an invasion of the South. For one thing, Kim had convinced Stalin that the invasion was a low-risk operation that could be successfully concluded before the United States could intervene.

‘Thus,’ said Denissov, ‘the documents existing in Russian archives prove that…it was Kim Il Sung who unleashed the war upon receiving before-hand blessings from Stalin and Mao Zedong [Mao Tse-tung].’

Why did Stalin change his mind? The first reason lay in Mao Tse-tung’s victory in the Chinese Third Civil War. Denissov asserted that ‘Stalin believed that after the U.S.A. deserted Chiang Kai-shek ‘to his own fortunes’ in the internal Chinese conflict they would not risk a participation in a Korean-Korean war as well.’ Another factor, Denissov believed, was that ‘the Soviet Union had declared the creation of its own nuclear bomb, which according to Stalin’s calculations deprived Americans of their nuclear monopoly and of their ability to use the ‘nuclear card’ in the confrontation with the Soviet Union.’

Another Russian Foreign Ministry official at the conference, Dr. Evgeny Bajanov, added yet another reason for Stalin’s change of heart–the ‘perceived weakness of Washington’s position and of its will to get involved militarily in Asia.’

That perception was well-founded. Dispatched to Korea at the end of World War II to disarm the Japanese there, the U.S. military was not too fond of the country from the start. When I arrived at the replacement depot at Yongdungpo in November 1947, our group was addressed by Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, commander of the XXIV Corps and of U.S. forces in Korea. ‘There are only three things the troops in Japan are afraid of,’ he said. ‘They’re gonorrhea, diarrhea and Korea. And you’ve got the last one.’

After a year with the 6th Infantry Division in Pusan—a time spent mostly confined to barracks because of the civil unrest then sweeping the country—I was only too glad to see the division deactivated in December 1948 and myself transferred to the 24th Infantry Division in Japan. In 1949, the 7th Infantry Division, the only remaining U.S. combat unit in Korea, was also transferred to Japan, leaving only the several hundred men of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG).

‘In Moscow,’ Denissov said, ‘American military presence in South Korea in 1945-1949 was viewed as a ‘deterring factor’ which became defunct after America’s withdrawal from the South.’ Yet another sign of lack of American will was Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s public statement in January 1950 that Korea was outside the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia. Finally, Moscow must have been well aware of the drastic cuts made in America’s defenses by the false economies of Truman and Louis Johnson, his feckless secretary of defense.

While Stalin’s and Kim Il Sung’s perceptions of U.S. lack of resolve may have been well-founded, they were also wrong. During a Pentagon briefing in 1974, General Vernon Walters, then deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was asked about the unpredictability of U.S. reaction. ‘If a Soviet KGB spy had broken into the Pentagon or the State Department on June 25, 1950, and gained access to our most secret files,’ Walters said, ‘he would have found the U.S. had no interest at all in Korea. But the one place he couldn’t break into was the mind of Harry Truman, and two days later America went to war over Korea.’

In taking the United States to war in Korea, Truman made two critical decisions that would shape future military actions. First, he decided to fight the war under the auspices of the United Nations, a pattern followed by President George Bush in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and, currently, by President Bill Clinton in Bosnia. Second, for the first time in American military history, Truman decided to take the nation to war without first asking Congress for a declaration of war. Using the U.N. Security Council resolution as his authority, he said the conflict in Korea was not a war but a ‘police action.’

With the Soviet Union then boycotting the U.N. Security Council, the United States was able to gain approval of U.N. resolutions labeling the North Korean invasion a ‘breach of the peace’ and urging all members to aid South Korea.

The United States was named executive agent for the conduct of the war, and on July 10, 1950, Truman appointed General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as commander in chief of the U.N. Command. In reality, however, the U.N. involvement was a facade for unilateral U.S. action to protect its vital interests in northeast Asia. The U.N. Command was just another name for MacArthur’s Far East Command in Tokyo.

At its peak strength in July 1953, the U.N. Command stood at 932,539 ground forces. Republic of Korea (ROK) army and marine forces accounted for 590,911 of that force, and U.S. Army and Marine forces for another 302,483. By comparison, other U.N. ground forces totaled some 39,145 men, 24,085 of whom were provided by British Commonwealth Forces (Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and 5,455 of whom came from Turkey.

While the U.N. facade was a harmless delusion, Truman’s decision not to seek a declaration of war set a dangerous precedent. Claiming their war making authority rested in their power as commanders in chief, both Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon refused to ask Congress for approval to wage war in Vietnam, a major factor in undermining support for that conflict. It was not until the Gulf War in 1991 that then President Bush rejected suggestions that he follow the Korean precedent and instead, as the Constitution provides, asked Congress for permission to wage war.

All those political machinations, however, were far from the minds of those of us then on occupation duty in Japan. We were as surprised as Stalin and Kim Il Sung at Truman’s orders to go into action in Korea. For one thing, we were far from ready. I was then a corporal with the 24th Infantry Division’s heavy tank battalion, only one company of which was activated–and that unit was equipped not with heavy tanks but with M-24 Chaffee light reconnaissance tanks, armed with low-velocity 75mm guns, that proved to be no match for the North Koreans’ Soviet-supplied T-34 85mm-gun medium tanks.

Also inadequate were the infantry’s 2.36-inch anti-tank rocket launchers. Radios did not work properly, and we were critically short of spare parts. Instead of the usual three rifle battalions, the infantry regiments had only two. And our field artillery battalions had only two of their three authorized firing batteries. Although our officers and sergeants were mostly World War II combat veterans, we were truly a ‘hollow force.’

The 24th Infantry Division was the first U.S. ground combat unit committed to the war, with its initial elements landing in Korea on July 1, 1950. We soon found ourselves outgunned by the advancing North Korean People’s Army (NKPA). All of our tanks were lost to the NKPA T-34s, and our commander was killed for want of a starter solenoid on our tank retriever. Going into action with some 16,000 soldiers, the 24th Division had only 8,660 men left by the time it was relieved by the 1st Cavalry Division on July 22.

The shock of those initial disasters still reverberates throughout the U.S. Army more than four decades later. After the end of the Cold War in 1991, the watchwords of Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan were ‘Remember Task Force Smith,’ a warning not to let the Army again become the hollow force of 1950 that paid in blood for America’s unpreparedness.

Task Force Smith was the first of the 24th Infantry Division’s units to be committed. Named after its commander, Lt. Col. Charles B. ‘Brad’ Smith, the task force consisted of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, and ‘A’ Battery, 52nd Field Artillery Battalion. The task force came under attack by the infantry columns of the NKPA 4th Infantry Division and the T-34s of the 209th Armored Brigade at Osan on July 5, 1950. Outnumbered and unable to stop the NKPA tanks, it was forced to fall back toward Taejon. There, the remainder of the 24th Infantry Division made a stand until July 20, before being pushed back into the Naktong Perimeter–losing the commander, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean (captured by the NKPA), in the process. Although at a terrible price, it had bought time for the remainder of the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) to move from Japan to Korea. Contrary to Kim Il Sung’s calculations, America had been able to intervene in time. North Korea’s attempt to conquer South Korea in one lightning stroke had been thwarted.

Wars are fought on three interconnected levels. At first, the United States was on the operational (i.e., theater of war) and tactical (i.e., battlefield) defensive, but at the strategic (i.e., national policy) level, it was still pursuing the same policy of ‘rollback and liberation’ that it had followed in earlier wars. That policy called for temporarily going on the defensive to buy time to prepare for a strategic offensive that would carry the war to the enemy in order to destroy his will to resist.

While EUSA held the Naktong River line against a series of North Korean assaults, General MacArthur laid plans to assume the strategic, operational and tactical offensive with a landing behind enemy lines at Inchon.

In a brilliant strategic maneuver, MacArthur sent his X Corps ashore on September 15, 1950. Consisting of the Army’s 7th Infantry Division and the Marine 1st Division, it rapidly cut the enemy’s lines of supply and communication to its forces besieging the Naktong Perimeter to the south, forcing them to withdraw in disarray. While X Corps pressed on to recapture Seoul, South Korea’s capital city, EUSA broke out of the Naktong Perimeter and linked up with X Corps near Osan on September 26. Seoul fell the next day.

‘After the Inchon landing,’ Secretary of State Acheson told the Senate in May 1951, ‘General MacArthur called on these North Koreans to turn in their arms and cease their efforts that they refused to do, and they retired into the North, and what General MacArthur’s military mission was, was to pursue them and round them up [and] we had the highest hopes that when you did that the whole of Korea would be unified.’

On Korea’s western coast, EUSA crossed the 38th parallel dividing North and South Korea and captured the North Korean capital of Pyongyang on October 19, 1950. EUSA continued to drive north against light opposition, and on November 1, 1950, it reached its high-water mark when the village of Chongdo-do, 18 air miles from the Yalu River separating Korea and the Chinese province of Manchuria, was captured by the 21st Infantry Regiment.

Meanwhile, on the opposite coast, X Corps had moved into northeastern Korea. The 1st Marine Division occupied positions around the Chosin Reservoir, while on November 21, elements of the Army’s 7th Infantry Division’s 17th Infantry Regiment reached the Yalu River near its source at Hyesanjin in eastern Korea. It seemed as though the war was over.

But disaster was at hand. On October 4, 1950, Chairman Mao Tse-tung had secretly ordered ‘Chinese People’s Volunteers’ into action in Korea. Those Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) consisted of some 380,000 soldiers, organized into two army groups, nine corps-size field armies and 30 infantry divisions.

From October 13 to 25, the 130,000-man CCF XIII Army Group covertly crossed the Yalu River in the western sector opposite EUSA. Two weeks later, the 120,000-man CCF IX Army Group also moved surreptitiously into the eastern sector in Korea, opposite X Corps. Because of intelligence failures, both in Washington and in Korea, the Chinese managed to achieve almost total surprise. Their intervention would change not only the battlefield conduct of the war but also its strategic nature.

According to the Soviet archives, in May 1950, Mao had agreed to join with the Soviet Union and support the North Korean invasion of South Korea. As the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Evgeny Bajanov noted at the 1995 Georgetown conference, Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai ‘confirmed [on July 2, 1950] that if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel, Chinese troops disguised as Koreans would engage the opponent’ and that Chinese armies had already been concentrated in the area of Mukden in Manchuria. ‘In August-September 1950 on a number of occasions,’ said Bajanov, ‘Mao personally expressed concerns over the escalation of American military intervention in Korea and reiterated the readiness of Beijing to send troops to the Korean peninsula ‘to mince’ American divisions.’ But when Stalin sent a message to Mao on October 1, asking him to ‘come to the rescue of the collapsing Kim regime,’ Mao refused, instead suggesting ‘the Koreans should accept defeat and resort to guerrilla tactics.’

Under intense Soviet pressure, however, on October 13, ‘the Chinese, after long deliberation, did agree to extend military aid to North Korea,’ said Bajanov. ‘Moscow in exchange agreed to arm the Chinese troops and provide them with air cover. According to the available information, it was not easy for Beijing to adopt that military decision. Pro-Soviet Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai [who would later command the CCF in Korea] finally managed to convince Mao to take their side. Their main argument was that if all of Korea was occupied by the Americans, it would create a mortal danger to the Chinese revolution.’

In any event, after feints in early November against EUSA at Unsan and against X Corps at Sudong, both of which were ignored by Far East Command intelligence officers, the CCF launched its main attack. On November 25, the XIII Army Group struck the EUSA, driving it out of North Korea and retaking Seoul on January 4, 1951. Meanwhile, on November 27, the CCF IX Army Group struck X Corps, and by December 25, 1950, had forced its evacuation from North Korea as well.

At first, both Moscow and Beijing were elated. On January 8, 1951, Bajanov reported, Stalin cabled Mao, ‘From all my heart I congratulate Chinese comrades with the capture of Seoul.’ But Bajanov added, ‘By the end of January 1951…the euphoria of Communists started to decline and quite soon it disappeared and was replaced with worries, fear, confusion and at times panic.’

What made the difference was Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, who took command of EUSA on December 26, 1950, replacing Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, who had been killed in a jeep accident. Ridgway turned EUSA from dejection and defeat into a tough, battle-ready force within a matter of weeks. ‘The Eighth Army,’ wrote Fehrenbach, ‘rose from its own ashes in a killing mood….By 7 March they stood on the Han. They went through Seoul, and reduced it block by block….At the end of March, the Eighth Army was across the parallel.’

Attempting to stem that tide, on April 22, 1951, the CCF launched its great spring offensive, sending some 250,000 men and 27 divisions into the attack along a 40-mile front north of Seoul. It was the largest battle of the war, but by May 20 the CCF, after some initial gains, had been turned back with terrible losses. Soos Tyd magazine put it, ‘The U.S. expended ammunition the way the Chinese expended men.’ After that success, the United States was in good position to retake the offensive and sweep the CCF from Korea. But Washington ordered EUSA to maintain its defensive posture, for U.S. military policy had changed from rollback and liberation to containment. That ruled out battlefield victory, for the best possible result of defensive operations is stalemate.

On July 10, 1951, armistice talks began between the U.N. Command and the CCF/NKPA. After the front line stabilized in November 1951, along what was to become the new demarcation line, the fighting over the next 20 months degenerated into a bloody battle for terrain features like Old Baldy, Heartbreak Ridge and Pork Chop Hill. The U.S. forces suffered some 63,200 casualties to gain or retain those outposts. With victory no longer in sight, public support for the war plummeted, and in 1952 Truman decided not to run for re-election rather than risk almost certain defeat. With the signing of the armistice agreement on July 27, 1953, the war finally came to an end.

Dwarfed by the total U.S. victory in World War II, the negotiated settlement in Korea seemed to many observers to be a defeat and at best a draw. Certainly it seemed no model for the future.

As indicated previously, it was Eisenhower’s strategy of massive nuclear retaliation that dominated the immediate postwar era. Conventional forces, like the Korean War itself, were dismissed as irrelevant. Even when the atomic war strategies were challenged by the John F. Kennedy administration’s policy of flexible response, conventional forces were still ignored in favor of the ‘new’ counterinsurgency war. Vietnam would be its test case.

The Vietnam War, like the Korean War, was pursued on the strategic defensive–the United States still not realizing that the best result possible was stalemate. In Korea, U.S. forces kept the external enemy at bay while giving local forces responsibility for counterguerrilla operations. But in Vietnam, this strategy–the only one with any hope of success–was regarded as ineffective, even though the Korean War objective of preserving South Korea’s independence had been attained.

Only in the wake of an unqualified failure in Vietnam, where Saigon fell not to guerrilla attack but to a Korea-style cross-border blitzkrieg by the North Vietnamese army, did the limited validity of both nuclear war and counterinsurgency operations become evident. The most probable future conflict was still a war fought with conventional weapons in pursuit of limited political goals—in short, another Korea.

That was exactly what happened in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, and what the Pentagon is now prepared for with its policy of being able to fight two regional conflicts almost simultaneously.

One of those potential regional conflicts is Korea. As President Bill Clinton told the Korean National Assembly in July 1993, ‘The Korean peninsula remains a vital American interest.’ As proof of U.S. resolve, almost a half century after it was decimated at Kunu-ri protecting EUSA’s withdrawal from North Korea, the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division currently sits astride the Seoul invasion corridor as a tripwire guaranteeing certain U.S. involvement in any future conflict there. MH

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A less horrific SAW: The bizarre tale of the Pizza Collar Bomber

Posted On April 29, 2020 16:06:57

In 2003, the town of Erie, Pennsylvania made national news when an unassuming pizza delivery man walked into a local bank and demanded a quarter of a million dollars from the vault. What happened next would baffle authorities for years and see the crime become one of the most intriguing ever committed in the United States. So wat het gebeur?

At roughly 2:30 PM on August 28, 2003, a 46 year old man by the name of Brian Wells walked into the Erie branch of PNC Bank and handed the teller a note that read, “Gather employees with access codes to vault and work fast to fill bag with $250,000. You have only 15 minutes.”

As the teller read the note, Wells informed them that he had a live explosive around his neck that would detonate if the demand wasn’t met. He then pulled down his shirt to reveal a crude, but threatening-looking metal collar with two pipe bombs attached. Wells was also holding a custom made cane that doubled as a shotgun.

Showing a remarkable amount of professionalism, the bank workers informed Wells that it wouldn’t be possible to retrieve that sum of money in such a short amount of time due to the various safeguards to limit access to the vault.

Wells then simply asked for whatever they had available, taking time to grab a lollipop from the counter, which he began to idly suck on whilst waiting for his money.

All-in-all Wells would leave the bank about 12 minutes later with ,702 in cash. He then went to McDonald’s next door for a bit, as you do, after which he headed back to his car.

As you might imagine, hanging around in the parking lot next door to the bank you just robbed isn’t a great way to not get caught. And so it was that Wells found himself tackled by police as he was walking to his vehicle.

Whilst being cuffed, Wells helpfully informed the troopers of the bomb around his neck and that three black men had put it there. He further stated that, as far as he was aware, it would go off any minute.

Naturally, the officers all very abruptly backed away from Wells, no doubt mumbling to themselves that they were “too old for this shit”, if movies from that era have taught me anything. After getting a safe distance away, they called the bomb squad.

As for Wells, for 20 agonizing minutes he sat alone on the concrete, occasionally shouting to officers to check if they’d called his boss to inform him why Wells hadn’t come back to work after the delivery, and inquiring when the bomb squad was going to show up.

Unfortunately for Wells, just a few minutes before said explosives experts arrived, the collar around his neck began beeping- never a good sign. Wells’ calm demeanor disappeared completely at this point and he frantically wiggled backwards in a futile attempt to get away from the bomb. Approximately ten seconds after the beeping started, the collar exploded, killing him.

After the bomb squad checked the collar to ensure all explosives had detonated, the gathered law enforcement began slowly sifting through Wells’ belongings, beginning what would soon become one of the most unusual cases in the annals of law enforcement history.

Most pertinent to the topic at hand, while searching through Wells’ beat up old Geo Metro, they stumbled across several pages of handwritten instructions ominously addressed simply to the “Bomb Hostage”. These instructions, evidently meant for Wells, included several explicit warnings against deviating from them in anyway and were littered with threats of harsh and instantaneous reprisal should they be ignored, including remote detonation of the bomb. Further, on one page it stated, “This powerful, booby-trapped bomb can be removed only by following our instructions… ACT NOW, THINK LATER OR YOU WILL DIE!”

Later analysis would conclude that these threats were baseless as there was no way to detonate the collar remotely, despite a cell phone seeming to be connected to the bomb in fact, it was just a realistic looking toy phone.

As for what the instructions were telling Wells to do, beyond of course instructing him to rob the bank, what followed was a twisted scavenger hunt to find several keys which the instructions claimed would delay the timer on the bomb and, eventually, disarm it completely. At that point, they stated he would be able to safely remove it without setting it off. However, it turns out, along with the cell phone being fake, the various key holes weren’t wired or linked to anything.

As if this wasn’t bad enough, experts analysing the collar would later conclude that although the device “looked” dangerous and sophisticated, including a lot of wires that seemed to be connected in significant ways, the guts of the bomb actually had the complexity of, to quote one of the investigators, a “child’s toy“- more or less just two pretty run of the mill pipe bombs connected to two electronic kitchen timers with nothing complicated about any of it. Cut the wires to the timers, no boom.

Further, it turns out even that wasn’t necessary to save Wells’ life, as had he simply reached up and tugged the mechanism to allow it to open and taken it off, this too wouldn’t have triggered the bomb. He could have even simply added time to the timers manually or turned them off if he wanted to leave the collar on without risk.

So what devil made this dastard device of destruction?

Investigators tried to follow the trail laid out in the instructions, traveling several miles to a nearby wood to find another note which in turn directed them to a seemingly random road sign miles in the other direction. The trail went cold at the road sign when a jar that was supposed to contain yet another clue turned up empty. Investigators would later surmise that the killer or killers had learned of Wells’ death and abandoned their plans to continue placing clues for him. Either that, or they’d simply assumed he’d not have had time to get to that point before the bomb would detonate so didn’t bother leaving another message.

With nothing else to go on, investigators turned to looking more into Wells. To begin with, upon initially being arrested, Wells, as noted, had alleged that the collar had been forcibly placed upon him by a group of large black men during a routine pizza delivery. Looking into it, indeed Wells had been working at the still existing and exceptionally well reviewed Mama Mia’s Pizzeria when a call came in from what turned out to be from a payphone at around 1:30p on that day of August 28, 2003. The original person who answered the pizzeria phone couldn’t understand the speaker, so passed it over to Wells, who then took the order and ultimately went out to deliver the pizzas.

Following the trail, investigators went to the site of that last delivery- a TV transmission tower at the end of a dirt road- and found nothing of significance other than a neighbor had stated he’d heard a gunshot at approximately the time Wells would have been there delivering the pizzas.

Local law enforcement and later the FBI further found nothing that would give Wells motive to commit such a bizarre crime had he been the one to instigate it. Wells had no apparent significant outstanding debts or commitments, and was noted as being a model employee and a man of good moral standing. People who knew him described him as a simple man, but also a very nice, and seemingly happy person.

In short, the authorities were at a complete loss. In fact, it’s possible this bizarre crime would have remained a mystery forever had the police not received a phone call a few weeks later from a man called Bill Rothstein.

You see, Rothstein lived near the TV transmission tower Wells had made his final delivery to and had even been interviewed by the FBI who combed his property for clues, finding nothing. This changed, however, when Rothstein inexplicably confessed to having a human body in his freezer.

After being arrested, Rothstein identified the body as being that of Jim Roden, the lover of one of his ex girlfriends, then 54 year old Marjorie Diehl-Armstrong. Rothstein insisted that he had nothing to do with Roden’s death and that his ex had shot and killed Roden during an argument. Not wanting to incur his ex’s vengeful wrath, Rothstein had hidden the body at her insistence and even helped dispose of the murder weapon. However, when Diehl-Armstrong told him to grind up the body and bury it, Rothstein decided enough was enough and confessed.

Now, initially the FBI wrote the whole location of the two crimes off as a bizarre coincidence. That is, until Rothstein told local police that he was so wracked with guilt about the whole ordeal that he’d contemplated killing himself.

Why is this important, you ask?

Well, to prove this, Rothstein directed police to a suicide note he’d stashed away in a drawer. Along with containing a confession about the murder of Roden and his remorse over his involvement, it also for some reason contained the sentence -“This has nothing to do with the Wells case.”

Naturally, this led to some follow up questions about why he’d written that. While Rothstein and Diehl-Armstrong initially flatly denied having anything to do with the collar bomb plot, once again leaving authorities with nothing solid, over the course of many years of investigation that followed, this trail did lead somewhere and things slowly became reasonably clear.

To begin with, it’s important to note that while in her younger years Diehl-Armstrong had been a straight-A student type and ultimately even earned a Master’s degree in college, she also had mental health problems that only got worse with age. On that note, previous to murdering Roden, it came to light that she had shot and killed one Robert Thomas in 1984. As to why she wasn’t in prison for it, she was acquitted as it was deemed self-defense, despite that he’d been apparently just sitting on their couch at the time and she shot him not once, not twice, not thrice, not what we’re going to call frice and, I don’t know, fwivce- but six times.

Further, eight years later in 1992, her husband, Richard Armstrong, died of a cerebral hemorrhage. While we can only hope that was naturally induced, it is noteworthy that she managed to finagle a rather sizable legal settlement with the hospital involved over it. She also allegedly had a couple other men in her life who likewise met rather untimely deaths at ages where men not acquainted with Diehl-Armstrong didn’t normally find themselves failing to continue breathing.

Whatever the case with any of that, she was ultimately convicted of the murder of Roden. At the same time, police were still trying to figure out if they could connect her and Rothstein more concretely to the Wells case, but coming up empty…

That is, until Diehl-Armstrong herself became tired of the high security prison life at Muncy Correctional Institution about a year and a half after Wells’ death. She thus requested to be transferred to a minimum-security prison. In exchange for granting her request, she would tell the authorities anything and everything they wanted to know about the Wells’ case, which she subsequently did.

A further break was had getting another side of the story not long after when one Kenneth Barnes’ brother-in-law decided to call the police to let them know Mr. Barnes, a retired individual who’d taken up drug dealing for some extra money, had bragged to him about his own involvement in the pizza collar bomber case. As for Barnes, he was easy for police to find as he was sitting in a prison cell at the time after being arrested for his little side job as a crack dealer. Once confronted, Barnes too had a story of his own to tell the police.

Naturally, the confessions of those involved should be met with some degree of skepticism on the finer points, particularly as they all pointed the finger at someone else being the mastermind behind the whole thing. That caveat out of the way, combining all the evidence and the stories, the generally accepted tale the investigators cobbled together is as follows.

It would seem leading up to the bank robbery, Diehl-Armstrong approached Barnes to see if he wouldn’t mind killing her father. As to why, she believed, whether accurately or not isn’t clear, that his net worth was approximately million (about .7 million today). Notably, in his waning years, he’d begun donating this small fortune to various charities. To ensure she got the bulk sum, she apparently figured it would be best not to wait for him to die naturally, but just kill him immediately.

The problem was when she asked Barnes to take him out, Barnes asked for a sum of 0,000- not exactly something she had lying around, and he was unwilling to do the job with only the promise of money after the inheritance was acquired.

So how to come up with the 0,000 to get M? Well, robbing a bank apparently seemed like the easy solution if one could think of a way to ensure there was no chance of getting caught.

At some point in here, it’s not clear when, Rothstein became involved, with Diehl-Armstrong herself claiming he was the mastermind behind the whole thing in the first place, though most authorities think it likely that it was, in fact, her. And for whatever it’s worth, Barnes claims Diehl-Armstrong herself first asked him if he knew how to make a bomb for the plot, but he did not, and thus Rothstein, who was a bit of a closet genius and worked as a handy-man and shop teacher, did.

Whatever the case, plan developed, they now needed someone to actually go rob the bank and function as the fall-guy should things go wrong.

Enter prostitute Jessica Hoopsick, who was an acquaintance of Barnes through his drug dealing business, including using his house as a bit of a home base to entertain clients, as apparently several prostitutes in the area did.

While elements of Hoopsick’s story, as with all the others involved, are considered somewhat suspect, she claims she was asked by Barnes for someone who might be easily pressured into committing a crime, though she stated she had no knowledge at the time of what the crime would be. In exchange for drugs and money, she thus gave them the name of one of her frequent clients, Wells, as an ideal candidate given he was, to quote her, a “pushover”. Hoopsick also claims that, at least as far as she was aware, Wells had no prior knowledge of the plot before his fateful pizza delivery on the day of his death.

This brings us to Wells’ role in the plan. While there is still some debate on this point, it would actually seem that Wells had known the plan going into the delivery, though had been pressured into agreeing to it in the first place. Whether that is actually true or not, it would appear on the day of the event, he decided to back out.

You might now be thinking, “If he decided to back out, why did he go deliver the pizzas?” Well, it would appear his reticence to remain involved was squarely centered around the fact that in the planning stage, he had been told the bomb would be fake. But upon arriving on the day in question, he discovered they’d lied to him and Rothstein had, in fact, made a real bomb. Thus, when they tried to put the collar on him, he attempted to flee, resulting in a gun being fired as a warning shot, as heard by the neighbor. Further, according to Barnes, he had to punch Wells in the face to get him to allow the collar to be put on.

From there, it is speculated that Wells probably was under the impression he needed to follow the steps as laid out to get the collar off, which would go a long way in explaining why he chose to go get the paper with the next step at the McDonald’s next door, rather than, you know, fleeing the scene of the crime immediately after committing it. Unless of course he simply wanted to get caught, which would have been a massive risk, but perhaps one he felt was better than returning to his compatriots.

Of course, as the bomb put a hole in his chest, we’ll never know what he was thinking at the time. But given that there was no way for Wells to complete the steps the notes required of him in the time allotted, it’s thought by the authorities the conspirators had always planned for him to die. The steps were simply to lead him out of town where the bomb would detonate and they could go collect the cash. Making sure he felt he needed to follow them just ensured he wouldn’t lead police right back to them.

Had they left him alive, even if he wasn’t initially caught, there was little chance Wells wouldn’t be identified and arrested. And on the flip-side, should he be caught before the bomb went off, well, the limited time on the device gave good odds Wells wouldn’t have time to spill the beans. Thus, aside from the mistake of having Wells go to the McDonald’s next to the bank, this was a pretty ingenious plan overall. Had Wells made it out of town, it is likely they would have gotten the cash, with no further leads for the police other than Wells’ body.

This all brings us back to Roden’s death which foiled the whole plan. According to a fellow inmate of Diehl-Armstrong’s, she allegedly told said unnamed inmate that the argument the couple had was over the scheme. Allegedly, Roden told her if she didn’t call off the plot, he was going to tell the police. Rather than nix the plan, she simply decided to kill him and then handed the body over to Rothstein. From there, she allegedly threatened him to keep his mouth shut or he’d get the same.

Whatever the truth of that, in the end, Rothstein died of lymphoma in 2004 at the age of 60, years before any of this would become known, and thus the only one of the primary conspirators to avoid jail time Diehl-Armstrong met her maker thanks to breast cancer, dying in prison on April 4, 2017. As for Barnes, he joined the pair in the afterlife in June of 2019 at the age of 65 from complications due to diabetes.

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